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Abstract 
 
heories pertaining to spatial planning and sustainable development have 
magnificently grown during the second half of the past century and still 
witness increased rate of attention concerning the manifold aspects 
encapsulated by their subjects. However, both of these themes still remain 
underestimated and require further investigation and even augmentation when 
exploring areas of ‘political turbulences’ or  ‘unbalanced powers’; in other words, 
regions of ‘conflict areas’. The development process in the conflict areas seems to 
depend ultimately on the scale and magnitude of power between the different 
contested groups, i.e. the ‘dominant group’ and the ‘weaker group’; where 
sustainability becomes very vulnerable, and if exists, belongs to the dominant group 
neglecting the weaker one, and even in many cases, exploiting the resources and 
opportunities of the weaker for the advantage of the dominant, resulting therefore, 
more marginalizing and social degradation. Hence, new arguments pertaining to 
sustainability in the conflict areas conclude that sustainable development in these 
areas can be considered as a ‘terminology game’ which does not resolve the older 
growth debate, but disguises it. 
Spatial planning in the conflict areas may shape fast-changing or dynamic 
spatial policies accompanied with irreversible physical layouts that create in many 
cases multi-dimensional challenges for inhabitants. Especially, for the indigenous 
residents when considered for one reason or another ‘a group of minority’. Therefore, 
clarifying the relationship between spatial planning, power and politics is a prominent 
issue in this doctoral research. Understanding this relation reveals the range of 
influence of politics upon planning objectives and role. Accordingly, it is a marvelous 
question to know if planning is an organic reflection of politics or not; as well as, to 
explore whether spatial planning, in the conflict areas, is used to mitigate or intensify 
conflict. Based upon theoretical framework, this doctoral research presents 
comprehensive set of interrelationships between the main parameters affecting the 
development process in the conflict areas, namely (space, politics, power and 
planning); these are interestingly elaborated and conceptualized by the researcher 
within referenced spatial context; i.e. Jerusalem (the case study). Moreover, the direct 
and implicit role and impacts of these relations were examined. The examination 
through logical framework (theory – analysis – conception) of the aforementioned 
parameters (in conflict areas) reveals a maze of dynamic interrelationships which 
outstandingly guide the development for the benefit of the dominant group. This 
doctorate research provides critical review for the role of planning whether it acts as 
‘progressive’ or ‘regressive’ agent of change, especially in the conflict areas with 
unbalanced powers. In Jerusalem, it has been shown that power and politics are the 
major planning drivers which set out the development pattern and objectives. 
Consequently, the spatial and social profiles of Jerusalem have been changing very 
fast producing new norms of urban fabrics and geographical extents, which all 
together, constitute manifold challenges to the ‘indigenous’ Palestinian residents. 
 
 
Keywords: Spatial Planning, Land Use, Master Plan, Spaces of Risk, Secured 
Spaces, Spatial Scenario, East Jerusalem, West Jerusalem 
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Preface 
 
"Let our advance worrying become 
advance thinking and planning" 
Winston Churchill 
lanning is a short word, but represents borderless consequences and endless 
meanings. The first attraction between “me & planning” - by its broad 
definition - began when I was at school. It was during one of the English 
lessons which introduced to me the conceptual output of planning as: “Planning is the 
first step of any successful project”; the echo of this descriptive phrase has never left 
my ears. Although my perception in that time was not capable to comprehend 
ultimately what does planning mean, a quick-rigid bond between us has shaped itself 
in my consciousness. 
 
 
 
What is planning? 
 
I would like to start with the most fundamental requirement for studying a 
phenomenon – its definition. I believe that everybody has his own perception to 
express the basic meaning of planning, since everyone prepares – albeit casually – a 
plan for his activities and future needs. However, a brief review of literature 
pertaining to ‘planning’ in terms of physical development would immediately reveal 
that the word has a wide variety of meanings. I do also believe that "urban and 
regional planning" (or ‘town and country planning’ and ‘city planning’ as it is also 
called in the UK and North America, respectively) is ideally represented by the term 
Spatial Planning. One of the earliest definitions of spatial planning is given by the 
European Regional/Spatial Planning Charter, adopted in 1983 by the European 
Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning: 
"Spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and 
ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an 
administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and 
comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the 
physical organization of space according to an overall strategy" 
Albrechts (2001) delineates spatial planning to be not a single concept, 
procedure, or tool; it is rather a set of concepts, procedures and tools that must be 
integrally tailored if desirable outcomes are to be achieved. From this standpoint, the 
perception of spatial planning alludes to the need for coordinating various sectoral 
policies that concern a particular space in order to create positive synergies (OECD, 
2001). Spatial planning is directly related to space, even in its definition! It depends 
on the basic historical and institutional differences between the various settings where 
planning is practiced. Yiftachel et al. (2001) exemplify the variances for the 
perception of planning according to the spatial reference that originates the definition. 
Italian intellectuals for instance, habitually perceived ‘planning’ as an element of city 
aesthetic art. On the other hand, British researchers have often concentrated on the 
P 
XVI 
 
regulation of physical development in cities and regions.  Meanwhile, American 
scholars have often referred to planning as a loose concept, dealing principally with 
policy efforts of different governmental levels and semi-public bodies of community. 
Regardless of its definition, the basic role of planning could be argued as to improve 
the welfare of people and their communities by creating more convenient, equitable, 
healthful, efficient, and attractive places for present and future generations.  
Professionally (career wise), my story with ‘planning’ was crowned with 
success. My passionate love for 'spatial planning' forced me to deepen my knowledge 
and experience in this challenging field. As a result, in 2007 among skilled 
professionals I was chosen to be the `first` Urban Planner who works and establishes 
the department of planning and development at Ramallah Municipality. My planning 
vision never stopped, so I found myself permanently able to improve and introduce 
mass production in town planning remarkably. Consequently, in 2010, I was chosen 
among competitive professionals to be the `first` Manager of the Engineering 
Department in Birzeit Municipality. In context to the theoretical part of this field, I 
would like to commence by quoting Adrien Katherine in his writing “Healing Spirit 
Injuries” where he highlights the hope of establishing an independent Palestinian 
state:  
“At some point, peace may come to the Holy Land and the independent state of 
Palestine may sit side by side with Israel. At that time, the Palestinians may wish to 
come to terms with the spirit injuries that have affected their people since 1948 when 
the state of Israel was created, or since 1967 when the now forty-year old Israeli 
Occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem began. Spirit injuries 
represent a combination of “physical, emotional, and spiritual harms.” Spirit 
injuries can lead to the “slow death of the psyche, the soul and persona” on a 
personal level. On a group level, spirit injuries can result in the “devaluation and 
destruction of a way of life or of an entire culture.” When spirit injuries accumulate, 
the result can be spirit murder. Some spirit-murdered souls may be likely to commit 
literal or figurative homicide or suicide.” (Katherine, 2008:140). 
The 'question' and the 'hope' to live the moment when East Jerusalem becomes 
the Palestinian capital city have been moving hand in hand in my psyche. 
Theorization the creation of this state, may make me address it as "the state of the not 
yet" and, respectively, ‘East Jerusalem’ as the "capital of the not yet"! The increasing 
debate pertaining to the “existing gap and uncountable voids” of the Palestinian 
planning policies and researches reached heyday perhaps after the unilateral Israeli 
decision of evacuating the existing Jewish settlements in Gaza Strip in 2005. Since no 
Palestinian ‘vision or plan’ was either prepared or clear of: what shall the Palestinians 
do after the Israeli removal of those settlements in Gaza Strip? This event was by 
itself the major impulse which formed my enthusiastic intention to work on future 
vision of East Jerusalem as a future Palestinian capital city. Thus, to gain the fruits of 
this goal, firstly the current planning policies adopted in Jerusalem should be 
analyzed. Accordingly, the basic theory-analysis-concept of my doctoral research 
came out; and eventually, I formed scientific planning approach to formulate, 
evaluate, and propose future scenario-impact relationship for East Jerusalem in terms 
of spatial planning comprehensive perspectives.  
However, start working on this topic revealed to me how challenging shall it 
be, to cover, the dimensions of this fundamental research. In fact, I realized that the 
Israeli planning in Jerusalem was very fast and dynamic. I may introduce it to have 
“the formless form” and its policies to have “the shapeless shape”! Planning in East 
Jerusalem is to the extremist limits challenging. It can be perceived as paradoxical to 
the desired outputs of planning even. Advanced Israeli planning policies in East 
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Jerusalem created de facto statuses which result in most cases irreversible 
consequences and inevitable burdens to the native inhabitants, the Palestinian Arabs 
‘Jerusalemites’. Therefore, after extensive review of East Jerusalem status quo - in 
terms of its historical-spatial context - I concluded that to: investigate, search, 
explore, look through, scan, analyze, and question the ‘Israeli planning policies in 
Jerusalem’ is not a choice, but rather an urgent need. Hence, for me the decision was 
taken, and it was also irreversible! I knew that the complexity of analyzing planning 
in Jerusalem shall be aggravated when the political dimensions are considered. Thus, 
in such situation it is notable to recall a quotation of Winston Churchill which states: 
“If you are going through hell, keep going”. Yes, discussing the Israeli planning 
policies in East Jerusalem will reveal a hell which burns every effort to sustain ‘peace 
and hope’ of the Palestinians who live there. For the case of Jerusalem, both: ‘hope 
and future’ have had only a tenuous hold. However, here emerges the power of 
planning which overcomes space and people, if prepared firmly, to sustain the 
development process equally.  
It is worthwhile looking more closely at the case of Jerusalem in terms of 
conflict relations’ context, and unbalanced powers’ critique, since Jerusalem presents 
the case of: historically conflict area with unbalanced powers. I would like finally to 
refer by quoting to Yuval Shany in his paper “Years After 1967” which clears out that 
the occupational powers often fail to sustain the needs of the occupied nations: 
“The law of occupation, as largely codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations, …. , has 
traditionally strived to protect the basic rights and interests of the population of 
occupied territories through the introduction of legal standards which serve as 
constraints on the power of the occupying force. At the same time, the laws of 
occupation confer upon the occupier considerable powers of government, which it 
may (and sometimes must) exercise in lieu of the displaced sovereign state. Still, in 
some, if not most instances where the law of occupation is applied, the interests the 
rights and interests of the local population appear to remain under-protected and the 
occupier arguably fails to satisfactorily exercise its governmental authorities. This 
begs the question to what extent do the specific norms and principles of the law of 
occupation and the legal discourse that affects their application actually shape 
reality under conditions of conflict and occupation” (Shany, 2008:6) 
All previously discussed shortcomings faced me during this doctoral research, 
and formed confusion at the beginning. However, confusion faded away by time for 
two reasons: first, the wise guidance from my supervisors Prof. Christa Reicher, Prof. 
Michael Wegner, and local advisor Ass. Prof. Jamal Amro, who directed my study 
approach and helped me to reach and discuss input-output relations objectively. 
Second, the solid spatial planning knowledge I gained through reviewing related 
literature. Hence, eventually, the purpose of my dissertation became more polished 
and refined, and thematic questions became clearer and more lucid. At the end, I am 
grateful for everyone shared me thoughtful comments, suggestions, and superb 
criticism that made my doctoral research becomes what it is now. 
"To accomplish great things, we must not only act, but 
also dream; not only plan, but also believe" 
Winston Churchill 
 
 Raed Najjar 
Researcher, 2012 
  
Chapter One 
Prologue
2 
 
Chapter One 
Prologue  
"Never look back unless you are planning to go that way" 
 Henry David 
HE prologue is an introductive gate of this doctorate research study, in which, 
an overview of the research rationale is described, starting from the initial 
incentives that pushed the researcher to focus on this topic, specifically, for 
referenced explained significance. This introductive chapter is formulated to 
define comprehensively the scope of this doctorate study combined with the: research 
problem statement, research hypothesis, research objectives, research questions, and 
the research methodology. Furthermore, at the end of the prologue, the researcher 
introduces brief summary about each chapter of this doctorate research. 
 
 
1.1   Introduction 
The total area of “historical Palestine” is estimated to be 
26,320 km
2 
of land in addition to 704 km
2
 of inland water (ARIJ, 
2004). After the Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1948 and 1967, 
the Palestinian Territories as stand today consist of two physically 
separated land masses: West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS) (Fig. 
1.1). Its total area including the area of the Dead Sea reaches 
approximately 6,210 km
2
 (UNEP, 2003), the WB comprises an 
estimated 94 per cent of that area (World Bank, 2004). The 
population in the Palestinian territory has risen by almost 40 per cent 
in the past ten years, one of the highest growth rates in the world. 
The population of the West Bank has increased to 2.5 million 
Palestinians with annual growth set at 3.5% (PCBS, 2008), for WB 
with GS set at 4.8% (UNDP, 2002), the urban population comprises 
72 percent of the total (ARIJ, 2002). The West Bank is also 
inhabited by Israelis, according to Levinson (2009) there are 
300,000 Jewish settlers interspersed throughout it.  
T 
Figure 1.1: Palestinian Territories,          
(ARIJ, 2004; edited) 
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Few cities evoke such sharp expressive response from so many people all over 
the world as does Jerusalem. Sacred to at least three major faiths, Jerusalem has been 
a source of inspiration to adherents of these religions since very long ago (Efrat and 
Noble, 1988). Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian people; it has been a focal 
point of attraction for the universal powers during many different eras. Until 1917, 
Jerusalem was an “Ottoman Province”, after the end of WWI1; particularly, after the 
Battle of Jerusalem the British Army captured the city of Jerusalem. The League of 
Nations, through its 1922 ratification of Balfour
2
 Declaration, confided the United 
Kingdom to administer the “Mandate for Palestine” and help establish a Jewish state 
in Palestine (Mendelsson, 2007). During three decades of British Mandate (1917-
1948), Jerusalem northern and western parts examined the construction of new garden 
suburbs (Tamari, 1999; Eisenstadt, 2002). At the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, 
Jerusalem found itself “divided” between Israel and Jordan. The ceasefire line 
established through the Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Israel and Jordan, cut 
through the center of the city from 1949 until 1967, during that time West Jerusalem 
(WJ) was part of Israel and East Jerusalem (EJ) was part of Jordan. In 1949, Israel 
declared West Jerusalem as its capital 
Following the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, asserted 
sovereignty over the entire city, and later in 1980 declared Jerusalem, "complete and 
united", to be the capital of Israel
3
. However, the status of a "united Jerusalem" as 
Israel's "eternal capital" has not been officially recognized by most of the international 
community, and nearly all countries maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv (Kellerman, 
1993). Nonetheless, East Jerusalem has been seen by the Palestinian as their capital of 
a proposed Palestinian state (Abu-Toameh, 2007). Palestinians also refer to United 
Nation Security Council Resolution 252, which considers invalid expropriation of 
land and other actions that tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem. The status of 
Jerusalem and of its holy places remains contended up to date. 
Jerusalem is now the largest city in Israel in both area and population with more 
than 795,000 inhabitants
4
 in an area of 126 km
2
.
 
The walled area of Jerusalem, which 
                                                   
1 WWI (First World War) was a military conflict centered on Europe lasting from 1914 to 1918. This conflict 
involved all of the world's great powers, assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies and the Central Powers 
(Willmott, 2003). 
2  Arthur Balfour was the British Prime Minister (1902-1905), later as Foreign Secretary; he authored his 
declaration in 1917 to reconstruct Palestine to be the Jewish homeland. 
3 Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1968, 05, 21).  
4 Extrapolated from a population of 763,600 in “end of year 2008/2009”. Jerusalem Statistical Year Book-2008, 
Table III/1: Population of Israel and Jerusalem (1922-2008). 
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constituted the entire city until the 1860s, is now called the Old City, and was added 
to the List of World Heritage Sites in danger in 1982 (Welfare, 2004).  Jerusalem has 
been one of the holiest cities in the world; it is the focal point for the three 
monotheistic religions. Since 64 years (45 years for EJ & Old City)
5
, Jerusalem has 
been suffering from the Israeli occupation which aimed at Judaizing
6
 the city; by 
erasing its Arabic culture, history, and evacuating the city from its Palestinian "Arab" 
inhabitants. Jerusalem may be the key to achieving a just and comprehensive peace in 
the Middle East. In addition to its religious, cultural, and historic importance, 
Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian people, their most important economic 
centre of their social, health and educational services (Khamaisi & Nasrallah, 2003).  
Planning could be defined as preparing for actions through a methodological 
approach that will eventually lead to the “right” decisions to be taken (Ruiter & 
Sanders, 1998). Planning has different types and paradigms, Spatial Planning is one 
of the most important fields of planning that is needed for the development process 
needed to sustain the nations’ resources and prosperity. Despite this significance of 
planning; Mayer & Miller (1984) argue that the world moves into the future as a result 
of decisions not as a result of plans. Rapid urbanization is a global phenomenon, and 
cities require an increasing amount of land and other resources (Yokohari et al., 2000). 
Expanding cities also generate air, soil, water, light, and noise pollution (Haughton and 
Hunter, 1996). However, urban citizens expect a high quality of life, including good public 
health, an unpolluted environment, good food and safe drinking water, as well as, 
possibilities for recreation in open green spaces (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Satisfying 
these aspects, along with economic and social well-being are the important components in 
the development of sustainable urban environment (UN, 1992). 
In Palestine, urban and physical planning has lately begun, almost since the creation 
of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1993. Development planning in the context of the 
Israeli military occupation presents the PA with substantial challenges in terms of 
leadership and oversight capability. Since 1948, the Israeli occupation has not stopped 
blocking the Palestinian social, economic and human development, imposing heavy 
constraints on Palestinians’ freedom of movement and investment in both private and 
public sectors. These restrictions have been intensified since the year 2000, with the 
tightening of closures through roadblock and checkpoints. Since 2000, Palestinian 
                                                   
5 According to the date of this doctorate research. 
6 Judaizing also known (Israelizing): a process of changing the Arabic/Palestinian features of the city/space into 
Israeli features through organized methodologies defined within planning policies. 
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businesses have failed and deteriorated because access to markets has been blocked, 
restricted and employees have been unable to reach their jobs (Coad, 2005). All of these 
conditions created many problems and challenges in urban planning especially in urban 
expansion and how it can be controlled while saving natural resources and making 
sustainable development. The accelerated growth, which took place during the last few 
years, exacerbated to serious congestion problems in the urban fabric for cities (Isaac, 
2000). It is noteworthy to mention that since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948; 
Palestinians neither have the power nor the jurisdiction to play any role of planning in 
Jerusalem. 
On the other hand, Brutzkus (1964) argues that roots of physical planning in 
Israel existed even before establishing the state of Israel, so that attempts were made 
by professional planners to initiate an advisory physical planning on national scale 
guided by the Jewish National Institutions during the British Mandate in Palestine. 
Particularly, these attempts were vital source for the explication of main aims and 
outlining primary attitudes for future spatial planning in Israel. After the dissolving of 
the Mandate and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, new situation was born, in 
which physical and urban planning were of essential value to accommodate the 
requirements resulting from the massive influx of Jewish immigrants to the new state, 
and the highly varying socio-economic standards accompanied with accelerating 
development process. Therefore, the urgency of comprehensive planning, and the 
significance of physical planning on national level are easily elucidated. Israel had 
hastily responded to this fact, accordingly, in July 1948, just two months after the 
declaration of the state, a National Planning Department was established on the 
initiative of the professional organizations of architects and city engineers. Main 
duties of this department were to initiate comprehensive planning on the national, 
regional, and local levels, surpassing by that the limited regulative planning practices 
of the Mandatory Government, which also were carried out by this department. In the 
first years of its functioning it was at Tel-Aviv until 1953, and was openhandedly 
granted financially, supported a big staff of planners and designers, and enjoyed far-
reaching autonomy. Later it was transferred to Jerusalem; continuing to assume the 
same responsibilities as before (Ibid). 
In light of above discussion, apparently Israel has deep-rooted experience in 
physical and spatial planning; Jerusalem is a remarkable case study in which this 
practical experience has resulted irreversible de-facto situations in the city. The city is 
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"outwardly unified"; however, Jerusalem is, in reality, still a "divided" city, since 
Jerusalem is intentionally planned to grow in totally two different unequal spatial 
systems resulting a “socio-physically-separated” city, i.e. East and West. Accordingly, 
growth and expansion manifested itself in two distinct ways, one is a growth initiated 
and implemented by the central government in (WJ); the other is a confined growth 
with very limited provision of expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods in (EJ). On the 
western side, construction is public and of enormous scale, with whole sectors of 
cities designed by a single architect, housing projects with standardized, repetitive 
units characterized the neighborhoods of western Jerusalem. Palestinian "Arab" 
development in (EJ), on the other hand, was small-scale and piecemeal, the largest 
construction is initiated by a family or perhaps a small group of buildings by a 
developer, nevertheless, this small-scale development is hindered by sophisticated 
planning tools and regulations. Currently, the "Jerusalemites"
7
 are facing high natural 
growth rates accompanied by on-going shrinking land; therefore, their future 
sustainable existence in the city is an important questionable issue (Najjar, 2007a).  
The “threatened existence” of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem 
emerged the story behind this doctoral research, starting with different pivots in terms 
of: the future sustainable living of the Jerusalemites in EJ; the cultural and historical 
identity of the city; and the future status of EJ as a Palestinian capital city. All these 
aspects have inevitably originated a lot of inquiries for the researcher to investigate 
the real targets and aims of the Israeli planning policies in East Jerusalem; as well as, 
to seek for exploring the planning tools used to achieve those aims. Moreover, the 
researcher noticed the sharp changes in the image of the city of Jerusalem occurred 
during the last few decades, where there is a sever shift from the Palestinian "Arabic" 
features of the city to the Israeli "Jewish" landmarks imposed by planting tens of 
Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. This challenge of the city identity and the 
changing style of life were also noticeable forces that pushed the researcher to deepen 
more in the research, especially in the absence of integrated and comprehensive 
studies from the Palestinian side that deal with this serious challenge the city and its 
Palestinian residents have been facing.  
To attain the overall goal of this doctoral research, there was a need to combine 
both a theoretical debate and an empirical analysis as backbones to support this study. 
In addition, the current political conflict between Israel and Palestine and the 
                                                   
7 Jerusalemite: is a title name given to the Palestinian who lives in East Jerusalem. 
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accompanied future uncertainties, make any attempt to create predictions for the 
future extremely difficult, therefore, the researcher chose the scenario approach to 
develop different visions regarding EJ as capital city for Palestine, setting different 
assumptions in sight of the "status quo", and the proposed "peace" situations. 
Insight of the limitations of this research, the outcome of this study is a 
comprehensive analytical exploration and evaluation of the Israeli planning policies 
(aims & tools) used in East Jerusalem; besides, a description of the challenges the 
Palestinian Jerusalemites are facing from those policies in East Jerusalem. Finally, it 
draws future visions for East Jerusalem as a Palestinian sustainable capital city. In 
total, this doctoral research forms a rigid scientific study that outstandingly 
contributes in filling the gap in terms of the Palestinian related researches. 
1.2   Research Rationale 
This section connects the researcher’s observations on the current Israeli spatial 
planning policies in Jerusalem (East & West) to the problem formulation and the 
research hypothesis by deducting the research questions from the observations. The 
research rational is divided accordingly into five main parts: (1) research significance; 
(2) research scope; (3) research problem statement; (4) research hypothesis; (5) 
research objectives; and finally, (6) the research questions. 
1.2.1   Research Significance 
This doctoral research provides crucial comparison-based study in the conflict 
areas; particularly, where planning is used against what it promises to be. It provides 
critical review for the "Israeli planning policies" and "role of planning" in Jerusalem. 
It demonstrates how planning is 'misused' and utilized as a 'control tool' over the 
indigenous Palestinians in East Jerusalem. This research provides spatial analysis for 
the context of Jerusalem, and highlights manifold scales for different parameters 
between East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. Furthermore, it draws up future visions 
for Jerusalem as a “peaceful capital city”; and therefore, achieving translation from 
‘post-conflict era’ into ‘status of urban stability’. Thus, it could be argued that the 
output of this doctorate research establishes a scientific cornerstone for researchers, 
politicians, and decision makers who are interested in Jerusalem spatial context and 
future status. 
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1.2.2   Research Scope 
Jerusalem has witnessed successive administrative and socio-physical 
transformations since the early start of the twentieth century. Jerusalem, therefore, has 
re-identified its physical structure and social texture totally in variant patterns. Even 
the city spatial boundaries were divergent, the city was divided, then unified, and even 
during its unification, the city is still growing fragmentally in terms of the physical 
and socio-economical perspectives. Regarding its jurisdiction and political 
boundaries, Jerusalem – even – has more than one definition; the first is "municipal" 
Jerusalem.  Municipal Jerusalem is 126 km
2
 and includes the areas of Jerusalem that 
Israel had annexed after 1967. Municipal Jerusalem has a population of 795,000; it 
includes 16 Jewish settlements among which 12 are in East Jerusalem. Municipal 
Jerusalem also includes more than 250,000 Palestinian in East Jerusalem. A second 
definition of Jerusalem is “greater” Jerusalem; it comprises an even larger area and 
includes areas of the West Bank and vast Israeli settlements. The last and largest 
definition of Jerusalem is "metropolitan" Jerusalem; it encompassed large sections of 
the West Bank and would incorporate both Bethlehem and approximately half of the 
district Ramallah and Al-Bireh. Recently, after the construction of the apartheid wall 
in the West Bank, the physical boundaries of Jerusalem are being depicted (Khamaisi 
and Nasrallah, 2003; Khamaisi, 1997). 
Apparently, the research dimensions concerning planning in Jerusalem could 
have taken many tracks, dealing with the Israeli spatial planning policies on several 
(international, national, regional, district, and local) levels. However, the researcher 
selected a 'regional scope' applies to Greater Jerusalem and Metropolitan Jerusalem 
boundaries; and 'local scope' applies to Jerusalem municipality boundaries, for the 
study of  this doctoral research. 
Limitations  
By perforce, there were various reasons influenced the researcher to limit the 
doctoral research to the above mentioned "regional-local" scope; most importantly: 
 The current ongoing escalated Israeli-Palestinian conflict that implies: 
o High risk in conducting fieldwork-oriented research between 
Jerusalem Governorate boundaries and the Palestinian Authority 
lands, due to the researcher’s nationality8.  
                                                   
8 The researcher holds Palestinian nationality; Palestinians are not allowed to enter Israel unless they are given 
special permission issued by Israel. These permissions are rarely issued for the Palestinian especially during the 
current political instability; however, the researcher recently has held permission. 
9 
 
o Security threat to conduct surveys and field observations in 
Israel, which limits retrieving direct data (e.g. personal 
interviews, questionnaires, etc.) in the Israeli areas, due to 
conflict and researcher's restricted accessibility to Israel. 
o The fluctuant openings & closures of the main entrances 
connecting the Palestinian cities with each other, and the 
restricted accessibility and mobility in the Arab Areas in Israel 
for Palestinian. 
 The overall lack of official Palestinian documentation about the Israeli 
planning policies, in terms of studies, reports, agreements, minutes of 
meetings, accords, protocols, researches, etc. 
 The high-speed changes in the political situation which results in new 
and continuously alternating Israeli plans on all levels. 
 
The research scope was extremely an important phase in funneling the research 
observations towards the specificities of the research problem. 
1.2.3   Research Problem  
The Israeli government has organized and managed all urban activities in terms 
of planning and regulations in the West Bank after occupation in 1967 (Kuttab and 
Isaac, 1994). Since that time, the Israeli occupation has blocked Palestinian social, 
economic and human development, imposing heavy constraints on Palestinians’ 
freedom of movement and investment in both private and public sectors (Coad, 2005). 
The Palestinian cities since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1948 have been 
subjected to expropriation policy by the Israeli planners (Fig. 1.2), consequently, 
considerable challenges are facing the Palestinian cities and people. East Jerusalem 
was not an exception to this illegal policy, where 24,500 dunums
9
 (one third) of the 
total area of 70,500 dunums have been expropriated, mainly for the construction of new 
neighborhoods intended for the Jewish settlers.  Of the 45,500 dunums remaining after 
the expropriations, planning has been completed and approved for approximately 38.7% 
of the area (17,600 dunums) as shown in (Fig. 1.3). Planning procedures for the 
remaining area (61.3%) have yet to be completed: approximately 7,100 dunums are at an 
advanced stage of planning, and an additional 5,000 dunums are at preliminary 
planning stages. Of the planned areas approximately 40% are defined as open space in 
which no construction is permitted; approximately 37% are zoned for residential 
construction. The approved plans earmark approximately 6,100 dunums for residential 
                                                   
9  1 hectare = 10 dunums; (1 dunum = 1000 meter square). 
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construction. Of this total, approximately 1,000 dunums require the preparation of 
unification and re-parcellation plans that will take many years to prepare and approve 
before building permits can be issued. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Palestinian loss of land resulting from Israeli occupation
10
 
 
       Figure 1.3: Proportion of planning of lands in East Jerusalem according to (Halawani, 2006, edited) 
Therefore, approximately 11.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem only is 
available to the Palestinian population for residential construction. Arnon (1998) 
argues that the study of the aerial photographs shows that this construction is possible 
mainly in existing built-up areas. The total potential for additional housing units in the 
                                                   
10 Source: (http://www.muzonline.de/photos2/palestine.jpg) Viewed on 15.01.2008; edited. 
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approved plans (excluding areas requiring unification and reparcelation) is approximately 
5,000. From this number one must deduct an unknown number of housing units for 
which building permits cannot be received for various reasons. Of the total area of 
East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations, approximately 7.3% only is available for 
residential construction, and approximately 0.6% for commercial and industrial 
construction. The remaining areas are zoned for various needs that do not enable 
private sector exploitation, or are unplanned areas. Consequently, small area of the total 
area of East Jerusalem is available to the Palestinian sector for any kind of private 
sector development.  
In light of the above discussion, after more than forty four years of Israeli 
occupation for EJ, it is evident that the Palestinian development and existence is 
controlled and confined by the Israeli planning policies. Forty four years of Israeli 
planning have left indelible marks on the geography and demography of East 
Jerusalem. As such, deliberate and discriminatory actions against the Palestinian 
population continue and include (Jerusalem Unit, 2010): 
 Land expropriation; 
 Neighborhoods fragmentations and economic siege by the Separation Wall; 
 Massive construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem; 
 Building restrictions upon the Palestinian; 
 Destruction and confiscation of homes; 
 Lack of adequate public infrastructure; 
 Prejudicial land regulations and zoning laws; 
 Changing residency rights and permits. 
1.2.4   Research Hypothesis 
Jerusalem city space is growing magnificently with manifold layers in terms of 
its hard infrastructure and physical layouts, namely the expansion of built up areas. 
This ‘rapid’ urban expansion is, however, accompanied with variant growth rates in 
the city soft infrastructure, i.e. the city population, which is characterized mainly into 
two major national affiliations, Israelis and Palestinians. The Israeli communities are 
growing fast according to the ‘empowered development’ process guided by the 
government; whereas, the Palestinian communities face ‘restrained development’ and 
limited growth rate. Consequently, the Palestinians’ future existence in East Jerusalem 
and their cultural identity are severely threatened. Moreover, the “spatial 
sustainability” will not be achieved according to the current Israeli planning policies.  
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1.2.5   Research Objectives 
 
According to the research scope and to the research problem statement, the 
research goal and objectives were developed. The overall goal of this doctorate 
research is: 
 
 
According to this goal, the research objectives are described as the following: 
 To analyze the pattern of urban development according to the current 
spatial planning and urban policies in East Jerusalem and to clarify 
their future impacts with respect to the Palestinian future needs.  
 To explore relationships between space, planning, power and politics.  
 To highlight the challenges imposed on the Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem in terms of socio-spatial and geopolitical conflicts. 
1.2.6   Research Questions 
 
In context of the research problem, and after the research overall goal and 
objectives were defined; the research questions were formulated as described below to 
cover the research scope and the related problem statement. The main research 
question is: 
The consequent questions this doctorate research will answer are: 
 In the conflict areas, who is the leader: planning or politics? How can 
urban policies be employed to achieve political goals?  
 Is there any relation between spatial planning and ideology of the 
regime? Is government ideology part of planning? 
 To what extent can planning tools restrain native minorities? What are 
the main challenges the Israeli planning policies impose upon the 
Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem? 
 How do the Israeli land management techniques (zoning, land uses, 
master plans, etc.) alternate according to the Arab demographic factor? 
Do these plans match the Palestinian residents' needs? Do these plans 
allow sustainable future development for the Jerusalemites? 
To investigate and analyze the “aims and tools” of the Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem; and to 
explore their consequences upon the future development of the Jerusalemites. 
 
Is planning in Jerusalem used to mitigate or intensify conflict, and if so, how does it attempt to do so 
and to what extent is it successful?  
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1.3   Research Methodology 
Applied research in social sciences has more tendencies and concerns about its 
methodological approaches than do the natural sciences (Sechrest and Sidani, 1995). 
The research’s dimensions can be investigated via manifold research techniques of 
data collection (such as field survey, interviews, questionnaires, observations etc.). 
The selection of a relevant technique (method) predominantly depends on the subjects 
under investigation, objectives of the study as well as on the knowledge to be 
acquired. However, a review of literature reveals that scholars may use different 
methodological and analytical approaches to investigate the same issues in different 
research settings. Researches dealing with spatial planning outstandingly demonstrate 
that variation. For example, in their research about housing (a spatial planning 
element) Rapoport (1999) and Kellett (1995) highlight a great emphasis on social and 
cultural anthropology as a mechanism to understand the connection between residents 
(families) and housing (production process). On the other hand, Shawesh and 
Awotona (1999) argue that investigating the relationship between housing and 
residents could be described largely with reference to quantitatively measured 
variables. Meanwhile, Aravot (1999) used descriptive approaches to study housing 
adaptation to changing conditions in Israel. Spatial planning policies combine 
interdisciplinary dimensions, therefore, during this doctoral research the following 
methodological approaches are utilized as shown in Figure (1.4). 
 
 
Figure 41.4: The doctoral thesis methodological approaches, (researcher) 
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approach 
 
Scenario 
Impacts 
approach 
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Many social researchers argue that in-depth events and behavior of people are 
aligned through words and actions, and if numbers are used, a rigor results and 
creditable conclusions can be obtained (Denzin & Lincoln 1998; Lofland & Lofland, 
1984). In general, the documentary data is considered helpful in gaining insight, in-
depth, and powerful enhancement of the interpretation process (Creswell, 1994). 
Nevertheless, to sustain 'objectivity' during the research, this requires in this process 
using different resources with high attention. It is useful in many research fields to 
adopt a case study during the research (Yin, 1994). Therefore, the researcher utilizes 
case study approach to identify the problem dimensions clearly. During this doctoral 
research, it is worthy to point out that there was a lot of data in hand, some was 
relevant to the study and some was not. Therefore, to get more clear analysis and 
precise results, the data that was relevant to the research scope was focused on.  
Reviewing the literature about the Israeli spatial planning policies and the use of 
official reports and documents from various governmental and quasi-governmental 
agencies, ministries, and NGOs [such as: the Jerusalem Unit of the Palestinian 
President Office, the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 
(MOPIC)
11
, the Ministry of Local Governor (MoLG), the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics (PCBS), the Palestinian Land Authority (PLA),  Local Building and 
Planning Commissions, and National Organizations that deal with the Israeli 
Palestinian affairs such as: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), and Palestinian 
Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON)] were utilized during the process of data 
collection, analysis, and evaluation. Tangible aspects of spatial planning [such as land 
management, land confiscation and land use plans, population densities, etc.] were the 
standard indicators during the investigation process. Opdam (2002) argues that 
“success” in reaching positive results depends on whether more than one approach 
can be integrated during the research. Therefore, the researcher used different 
interactive approaches during work on this doctoral research as was explained 
previously in this section. Primarily, to cover the research dimensions, the historical, 
analytical, comparative, descriptive, and future scenarios approaches are interestingly 
intervened. Related literature, maps, available statistics were studied and evaluated. 
Figure (1.5) shows the researcher's methodology in developing the research rationale. 
 
                                                   
11 After establishing a separate Ministry for Foreign Affairs, MoPIC became MOP (Ministry of Planning). 
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Initiative Phase: 
 
Literature Review 
   (continually) 
Identification of: 1. Research Problem    
                            2. Objectives and Questions 
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1. Research problem; 2. Research objectives and questions 
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conceptual 
outputs   
Data Collection 
1. Spatial data 
2. Attributes data 
3. Related information 
 
General outline plans, 
master plans, town 
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land use plans 
zoning plans 
etc. 
 
 
Satellite 
images  
aerial photos 
site pictures 
survey maps 
etc. 
 
Building laws and 
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regulations 
projects documents 
etc. 
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social 
geopolitical, etc. 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
input/output 
relations for 
study cases 
Field 
observations, 
city space 
investigation 
in terms of the 
socio-physical 
dimensions  
Using theoretical approach during qualitative or quantitative research should be 
accompanied with special attention through formulating the methodological questions, 
procedures and canons used, and evaluative criteria for final judgment on results 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The researcher developed this doctorate research in the 
framework of "Theory – Analysis – Concept" interrelationship as shown in (Fig. 1.6). 
 
Figure51.5: Methodology in formulating the research rationale, (researcher) 
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Figure61.6: The doctoral thesis framework, (researcher) 
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1.4   Research Structure 
This doctoral research study is divided into six chapters that cover the logical 
framework of this dissertation, i.e. theory – analysis – conception. The “first chapter” 
is an introductive module where the research rationale and methodology are 
presented. The “second chapter” formulates the theoretical backbone as well as 
covers the literature review of this research where interesting exploration of space, 
planning, politics and power and the complex set of interrelationships (cause-effect) 
amongst these subjects are discussed, in addition to presenting interesting debate 
about the spatial sustainability and the role of planning in the conflict areas. The 
“third chapter” points out the main characteristics of Jerusalem (the case study) 
dealing with the historical, social and spiritual context of Jerusalem standing upon 
spatial planning point of view.  The “forth chapter” deals with analysing the 
chronological development of spatial planning in Jerusalem since the Ottoman era 
hitherto (i.e. since 1516 – to present); it presents analytical discussion of urban 
planning for Jerusalem during the different governing powers of Jerusalem in that era, 
specifically Ottomans, British, Jordanians and finally Israelis. The “fifth chapter” 
presents the researcher major examination for the role of spatial planning in Jerusalem 
(East and West - the conflict areas) through deep analysis for seven selected 
Palestinian urban centres distributed evenly (north, centre, south) inside the case study 
with comparative discussions for some Israeli urban settlements. Finally, the       
“sixth chapter” of this doctoral research highlights the researcher major spatial 
conceptions; it also closes out with executive summary of the overall research 
findings and results, and presents future outlook, as well as spatial scenarios for 
Jerusalem’s geopolitical status.  
 
  
 
Chapter Two 
Space, Planning, Power and Politics  
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Chapter Two 
Space, Planning, Power and Politics 
“The theory has to be interpreted that extra dimensions beyond the ordinary four dimensions the three 
spatial dimensions plus time are sufficiently small that they haven't been observed yet" 
Edward Witten  
HIS chapter provides interestingly an philosophical outlook for spatial 
concepts as well as remarkable theoretical debate pertaining to dynamic spatial 
relations of space, planning, power, and politics. It reasserts how spatiality is 
highly correlated with the dialectical mode of argumentation, and presents 
outlook pertaining to spatial planning and sustainability. Moreover, it presents the 
differences between Cartesian and dialectical viewpoints of the space-place 
interrelationship, and shows how space and place are different aspects of unity. In 
addition, the researcher highlights space traits and the power of spatial planning in 
regulating space. Furthermore, the researcher illuminates the concrete bond between 
planning and politics, and eventually, argues how planning may act as a regressive 
tool serving provident groups against the minor ones. 
 
2.1   Overview 
The transformation of a given status is not, unquestionably, the core theme of 
philosophy. The abstract character of the philosophical work in the past and present is 
rooted in the social conditions of existence. Adhering to the abstractness of 
philosophy is more appropriate to settings, and closer to certainty, than is the pseudo 
philosophical concreteness that condescends to social struggles (Herbert, 1968). 
Social struggles reach climax when various socio-political dimensions merge 
together. Thiong'o (1997) points out that the struggle between the intellectuals (arts) 
and the power (state) can best be observed in the battle over performance space, i.e. 
space where the social and natural processes of production
 
take place. Spatial 
presentations of space outline complex set of variables (spatial relations); power and 
politics surface to the top in this manner. Shome (2003) asserts that the role of space 
in the production of cultural power and politics has been largely ignored in cultural 
theory and criticism. Shome also addresses that focusing on power as a spatial 
presentation helps researchers to precisely theorize the manifold social reproduction 
processes.  
T 
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Space in a merely metamorphic sense refers to mental image, or nonphysical 
presentation. According to many viewpoints, this is illusionary, invoking space as a 
metaphor rather than a physical ‘quantifiable’ subject is problematic, because 
invocations of space habitually adopt space as known, specified, and unproblematic 
(Smith and Katz, 1993).  Space is exceedingly correlated into social relations and is 
the convenient medium of power that is socially constituted through material relations 
that enable interaction of definite politics. Foucault (1980:149) interestingly 
highlights the political nature of space, stating: “A whole history remains to be written 
of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of power”. Power reflects 
through its definition energy, movement, circulation, strength, might, and force. In 
this sense, Massey (1999) articulates space as a dynamic, non-static or closed thing; it 
is rather a product of relations that are themselves active and constantly changing.  
Instability addresses ‘implicitly’ conflict of powers whichever the kind it 
represents, i.e. physical, natural, political, or social power. Spatial configurations 
constitute unequal relations and thus the emergence of differences and seeking for 
power. Theorization utilizes that ‘mess’ of relations; to theorize space ‘unbalanced 
powers’ and ‘unequal relations’ in terms of social complexity (classes, races, gender, 
etc.), terms to differentiate between strong powers (dominant relations) and weak 
powers (marginal relations) arise. Grossberg (1996) argues that the ‘differences’         
- emerging out of the spatial relations - consist part of the social and the cultural 
theory. Massey (1995) assures that spatiality of powers constitute and reconstitute our 
social marks (identities), furthermore Massey urges that space and spatial relations 
should be considered  as active components in the unequal and heterogeneous 
production and distribution of social marks (identities), politics, and powers (actions) 
which altogether highlight places: 
“In daily life, in politics, in battles over development and conservation, we often 
operate in ways which mobilize this point of view of place. Arriving in Paris, say, on 
the first day of a much-needed holiday, …., ‘ah’ we sigh with satisfaction, ‘this is the 
real France’, …., Or again in London’s docklands ‘the local community’, itself a 
term of a municipality of interpretations, …., but shouting also ‘this is a white 
working area’, ….,  Different as these examples are in terms of their political import 
and practical effect, they are all calling upon a particular way of conceptualizing 
‘place’”. Massey (1995:182). 
 
In this context, Shome (2003) asserts that in order to avoid misapprehension of 
the socio-spatial relations of space and place; it is important to refuse considering the 
framework of social marks (identities) as the sole background against which all other 
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investigations of social (cultural) relations occur. For that the social marks are 
constantly variable parameters which are continually altered, disputed, and 
reproduced. Furthermore, Shome interestingly retrieves the dynamism of space and 
the spatialities of power, he illuminates that space comprises an active and constantly 
changing site of power, however, he argues that the theory of ‘politics of location’ 
does not capture that critically. 
Drawing upon the very deep meaning of space, demonstrates how essential it is 
to clarify the dimensions of interaction between the ‘social attributes’ of space and its 
‘material processes’ of production. To illustrate this metaphoric concept, space 
representation helps clarifying this issue. Considering a place’s socio-physical form 
(e.g. the city concept – a subunit of space) outlines matchlessly how space is a non-
static mass, rather it is a dynamic organism. Thus, understanding the nature of this 
organism magnifies a clear illustration of how space can constitute, interact, and 
affect the spatiality of relations. Mumford (1968) highlights the city concept by 
raising many questions e.g.: what is the city? how did it come to existence? what 
relations (functions) does it perform? what processes does it fulfill? Mumford urges to 
understand the relations carried out within this ‘closed container’ before analysing its 
components, and to accept that ‘the city’ is not merely a container. Another exciting 
explanation for the city concept is introduced by Gruen (1964) who conceived city as 
a place where there is still a recognizable concentrated, teeming, dynamic expression 
of urbanism; it is a place which becomes very enjoyable for its inhabitants and lots of 
visitors every year. Gruen eventually asks whether it becomes a city just by the act of 
being incorporated, or must it offer social, cultural, recreational and political 
consciousness to its inhabitants. 
 The previous interpretations for the city concept (a subunit of space), 
apparently show that the core meaning of space or place is a relative norm, highly 
correlated to social and cultural concepts. It depends on the cognitive images of a 
place conceived by the manifold experiences and backgrounds of people. The 
dynamic sociality in the place definition is interestingly presented by Gruen: 
 “… the city is the place articulated in the countless cafes and sidewalks of Vienna, it 
is the crowded sidewalks and covered galleries in Italy, it is the parks, ……, it is the 
holy feeling expressed from mosques and churches;……, it is a six years boy who ask 
another "do you want to play with me?" and later becomes his lifelong friend; ……, 
the gentleman who asks for a permission to sit at a sidewalk café with another and 
ends up writing a book with him; it is the millions of chances of meetings that turn 
out to be the important events of lifetime; ……,  A place of full of life, it is a place of 
different moods, between morning, afternoon and evening. It is a mirror of everything 
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human, for love for hate, for spirituality and for social activities, it is the well 
functioning place with different choices between be socialized to feel private, to act 
people together or give opportunity to escape alone, it’s the base that link different 
classes together, ……, it is a place with a high social dimension (Gruen, 1964). 
Tracing the previous descriptions outlines the contextual and metaphoric 
meaning of the space, which is to some extent linked implicitly to the human 
cognitive (mental) images. Furthermore, it determines the character of the spatial 
representation in terms of its physical, social, ideological and spiritual aspects that 
altogether are articulated in this form. Indeed, the case in which the interrelations 
between space, power, and politics are outstandingly presented lies in Jerusalem. In 
East Jerusalem the image is even dramatically more interesting, upon examining the 
social and power spatiality, two predominant realities, diametrically tied, strike one’s 
mind: the physical displacement, and the social struggle. In order to make the space 
politics in Jerusalem accurately understood, the researcher found it is outstandingly 
important, at first, to investigate different theories and concepts pertaining to: the 
power of planning to act either as progressive or regressive agent of change; and the 
probability of using planning as a “control tool” instead of “reforming tool” 
principally upon ethnic minorities. The study of East Jerusalem uniquely elucidates a 
model of: contested cities, political conflicts, unbalanced powers, and urban 
instability. Hence, abstraction to these concepts arises several questions: In conflict 
areas, which is the leader: planning or politics? How can urban policies be employed 
to achieve political goals? Is there any relation between spatial planning and ideology 
of the regime? Is government ideology part of planning? Lastly, to what extent can 
planning tools restrain native minorities? 
2.2   Spatial Planning  
Planning - is defined in the ‘linguistic meaning’ as: the activity of setting in 
order and time in advance of some act or purpose; in other words, an act of 
formulating a program for a definite course of action. On the other hand, planning - in 
the ‘conventional sense’, simply, refers to: the process of setting goals, developing 
strategies, and outlining activities and schedules to accomplish desired objectives 
(Ruiter & Sanders, 1998). The emerging 'compound nouns' of planning, have attracted 
scholars to explore and investigate the meanings and semantics of those “flexible 
names”. For example, the terms 'land use planning', 'regional planning', 'town 
planning', and 'urban planning' are often used interchangeably, and in many cases will 
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depend on the reference country, but do not always have the same meaning (see e.g. 
Palemro and Ponzini, 2010; Yiftachel et al. 2001). In the United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand, the term "town planning" is common. Meanwhile, in the United 
States and Canada, the term "urban planning" is more familiar. However, in Europe 
the preferred term is increasingly "spatial planning". 
Spatial planning represents the interrelationship between the concepts of space 
and place. It explores how such concepts reflect the shift in geographical thought to a 
dynamic, dis-contiguous, relational conceptualization of spatiality (Healey, 2004). 
Moreover, spatial planning is a multidisciplinary, hermeneutic discipline, which 
integrates the acquaintance of many other disciplines to explain spaces and eventually 
to optimize strategic mechanisms in developing spaces towards a more sustainable 
and equal living conditions (Albrechts, 2001; OECD, 2001).  In this context, a good 
definition for the spatial planning is derived by the British
12: “going beyond 
traditional land use planning to bring together and integrate policies for the 
development and use of land with other policies and programs which influence the 
nature of places and how they function”. Spatial planning, therefore, refers to the 
methods used by the public sector to influence the distribution of people and activities 
in spaces of various scales. This definition is integrative, it highlights the flexibility in 
providing the planning authorities with opportunities to simulate their areas, develop 
strategic approaches to planning that will deliver sustainable development and reflect 
the local distinctiveness of the area and the aspirations of the local community. 
Spatial planning is a wider, more inclusive approach to considering the optimal 
use of land than traditional 'land-use planning' which is defined as
13: “the scientific, 
aesthetic, and orderly disposition of land, resources, facilities and services with a view 
to securing the physical, economic and social efficiency, health and well-being of 
urban and rural communities”. Young (2003) argues that land use planning is the 
process of methodical assessment of major resources (land and water), alternatives for 
land use, and socio-economic conditions in order to select and approve the optimal 
land-use options. Uncontrolled growth and random development cause deterioration 
in the social, economic and environmental conditions (SNCPEDC et. al, 2009). Land 
use planning developed, to envision the changes that development would cause and 
mitigate the negative effects of such change. Land use planning is often guided by 
                                                   
12 This definition is proposed by the British Government and available at the Customer Service Centre, Winchester 
City Council, UK. 
13 This definition is proposed by the Canadian Institute of Planners CIP 2011. 
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laws and regulations, commonly referred as 'zoning' - an effective regulative 
instrument; besides, it is historically tied to the practice of zoning and generally used 
in the developed countries (Lefcoe, 2005). 
 Zoning first emerged to protect the interests of property owners in the late 
nineteenth century in America. According to the American Planning Association, 
practicing of zoning expanded and was found to be constitutionally sound by early 
twentieth century.  Barnet (2004) argues that zoning controls the sorts of events (e.g. 
construction) that can take place on a particular piece of land, the amount of space 
devoted to those events and the ways that construction may be established and shaped. 
Conventional zoning, however, has not normally regarded the manner in which the 
events (e.g. buildings or constructions) relate to one another or the public spaces 
around them, but rather has provided a practical structure for complying jurisdictions 
according to approved land use. Although Walters (2007) argues that zoning provides 
remedy for the uncontrolled development patterns and that its practices evolved as an 
attempt to overcome these challenges, Barnet (2004) points out that suburban sprawl 
is generated if zoning is used without planning.  
Progressively more, land use planning is prepared at larger scales and involves 
manifold concerns. It becomes an important part of socio-economic policy, ensuring 
that resources (land and water) are used efficiently to meet the needs of people and 
environment. According to the American Planning Association, the goal of land use 
planning is: to further the welfare of people and their communities by creating 
convenient, equitable, healthful, efficient, and attractive environments for present and 
future generations; enhancing, therefore, sustainable development and optimizing 
resources (Cherry, 1988; Faludi 1973). Urban planning, on the other hand, is the 
integration of the disciplines of ‘land use planning’ and ‘transport planning’, to 
investigate a very wide range of aspects of the physical and social environments of 
urbanized spaces. Meanwhile, regional planning deals with a still “larger” socio-
physical environment, but at less detailed level. Regional planning, on the other hand, 
is conceived as the science of efficient placement of infrastructure and zoning for the 
sustainable growth of a region. Early visions of the planning movement and the 
regional planning (in America) flourished in the late decades of the nineteenth century 
and the first years of the twentieth (Hall, 2002). 
Both concepts of - land use planning and regional planning - are encapsulated in 
'spatial planning' using a 'Eurocentric' definition. The European Conference of 
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Ministers Responsible for Regional Planning (adopted in Spain, in 1983) introduced 
the concept, the core concern, and the characteristics of spatial planning as: 
"Spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and 
ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an 
administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and 
comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the 
physical organization of space according to an overall strategy, …, Man and his 
well-being as well as his interaction with the environment are the central concern of 
regional/spatial planning, its aims being to provide each individual with an 
environment and quality of life conducive to the development of his personality in 
surroundings planned on a human scale. Spatial planning should be democratic, 
comprehensive, functional and oriented towards the longer term." 
Spatial planning investigates the interaction of different policies and practice 
across regional space, and sets the role of places in a wider context. Consequently, it 
moves focus from "traditional" land use planning based on regulation and control of 
land, to a "wider" more far ranging approach that aims to ensure the best use of land 
by assessing competing demands, and setting out a strategic framework to guide 
future development and policy interventions (OECD, 2001). Integrating the manifold 
dimensions of spatial planning arises complexities. For instance, Eccles and Bryant 
(2007) illustrates that including environmental impacts of significant developments 
remained ‘somewhat’ unclear. Accordingly, various environmental guides were 
developed (Burchell and Listokin, 1975; Beer, 1977). Moreover, Kunzmann (2004) 
points out that in the past, important subjects (such as culture) were neglected in 
spatial planning, but it attained more attention from planning professionals in the 
period of globalization and increasing urban competition. Thus, spatial planning 
expanded its scopes gradually to cope with the dynamic changes of communities, 
resources, technologies, and environment. To this end, social, economic and 
environmental factors are taken into account in producing a decision that is more 
conducive to sustainable development. 
2.3   Spatial Sustainability  
Years after the Industrial Revolution witnessed fast transformation in both the 
norms of knowledge, and the communities’ growth patterns. Unfortunately, the fast 
mode of production and unregulated urban growth resulted - in many cases - social 
degradation, poor living conditions, and environmental concerns (Vitousek et al, 
2007; Stearns, 1993).  ‘Rethinking’ the development processes and urban growth 
became urgent need consequently. As a result, the concept of “sustainable 
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development”, or “sustainability” floated to the surface introducing various challenges 
and questions for planners and policy makers as well (UN, 1993). Sustainability is, 
therefore, a major concern of all the scientific communities with reference to the 
crucial need to protect the global environment while attaining better life for the people 
(Dooge et al., 1992; Grubler, 2000). Noticeably, sustainability is closely tied to the 
environmental concerns which both introduced changes in knowledge and sciences 
(Adams, 1990).  
Sustainable development attained intense concern in the late decades of the 
twentieth century. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development 
in its “Brundtland Report - Our Common Future” identified that concept as: ‘paths of 
human progress that meet the needs of the present, without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs’. However, Pearce (1990) argues that 
the concept of sustainable development was already promoted by the World 
Conservation Strategy. Brundtland Report incorporated components of sustainability 
within the economic and political context of international development, as well as, it 
combined ethical norms of welfare, democracy, and environment (Naess, 2001). 
Sustainability is a concept that provides new visions for the national and international 
development, and formulates new solutions for the recurrent socioeconomic needs. 
Hassan and Zetter (2002) argue that assuring the adoption of sustainable 
developments requires establishing national committees (local pressure groups) who 
can formulate new governmental policies. However, responses to meet the increasing 
needs of a growing population in an interconnected but unequal and human-
dominated world are undermining the Earth’s essential life-support systems (Kofi, 
2000; Watson et al., 1998). 
Modern interdisciplinary mode of thinking has interestingly succeeded in 
linking the traditionally separate intellectual norms of critical social theory and 
environmental science (e.g. Wilson, 1992; Ross 1994). Ideally, sustainability evokes 
steering the development wheel towards environmental protection, economic growth, 
and social equity; thus, towards improved and balanced living conditions. However, 
Campbell (1996) argues that planners work within the ‘tension’ generated among 
these three fundamental aims (social justice, economic development, and 
environmental protection), which, collectively, Campbell calls the "planner's 
triangle", with 'sustainable development' located at its center as shown in (Fig. 2.1). 
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Figure72.1: The triangle of conflicting goals for planning & the three associated conflicts,(Campbell, 1996; edited) 
 
Sustainable development aspires to offer a fascinating, holistic way of evading 
these conflicts, but they cannot be resolved so simply. Kates et al. (2000) argue the 
world’s present development path is not sustainable. Sophistication of the 
development and production processes reaches climax when considering the 
increasing consequences of the global environmental changes and the profound 
transformations underway in social and economic life. Major indications for such 
consequences are the global climate warming, degradation of biological diversity, 
deterioration of living conditions and increase in poverty levels, excessive utilization 
of resources with unprecedented levels rates of pollution (McNeill, 2000; UNEP, 
2000; UNDP, 1997).  In this context, Campbell (1996) argues that the current concept 
of sustainability is vulnerable to the same criticism of vague idealism prepared against 
comprehensive planning. Yet, planners have faced tough decisions for utilizing 
optimal solutions, even compromises, to meet organic demands, provide sufficient 
supply which all together  shall stand on protecting environment, promoting the 
economically growing city, and advocating social justice. To this end, planners need 
to combine both their procedural and their expanding skills, and thus, become central 
players in the battle over demanding growth, shrinking environment, and threatened 
social justice. An interesting conclusion of the threatened sustainability is proposed by 
Kates et al. (2000), who believe in the sharp contrast in both perceptions and realities 
of resource distribution between countries of the North and South, and thus, 
expanding gaps between them. Eventually, the socio-economic, environmental, and 
knowledge oppositions are aggravated by the deepening digital divide, as shown in 
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(Fig 2.2). In this concern, Burgh and Mooij (1996) argue that the discussion 
surrounding ‘sustainable development’ can be considered as ‘terminology game’ that 
does not resolve the older growth debate, but disguises it. 
 
 
Figure82.2: Sustainability science within a divided world, (Kates et al., 2000) 
2.4   Space Dialectics  
The interest in place and region has significantly grown during the last decade; 
it is reflected by the development of the so-called new regional geography (Pudup, 
1988). Arguments concerning the theory of space have reappeared on the agenda of 
many scholars and theorists in recent years. The claim that space presentations (place 
themes) became something provident during the 1980s (Massey and Allen, 1984) and 
repeated invocations about spatial perspectives within the geographical imagination 
(Agnew and Duncan, 1989). Thus, recognizing that spatiality of places is not equal in 
its socio-political relations and that this inequality is significant in affecting 
argumentations has floated to surface once again. Many scholars and theorists assure 
that the problematic nature of space can be resolved through a dialectical mode of 
argumentation. Ollman (1993) remarks the philosophy of dialectics is both a 
proclamation about what the world is and a method of arranging this world for the 
purpose of analysis and presentation. The cornerstone in the dialectics philosophy 
commonly concern to address the question of change (spatial, social and physical), 
interrelations, interconnections and interactions, processes, activities, flows, relations 
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and eventually contradiction (Mao, 1954; Harvey, 1993).  Accordingly, dialecticians 
often conceptualize ‘dynamism’ as the basic framework to all matter and thus 
‘stability’ is irrelevant status which necessitates explanation. In this sense Ollman 
states:   
“given that change is always a part of what things are, the problem for research can 
only then be how, when and into what they change and why they sometimes appear 
not to change” (Ollman, 1990:34)   
According to the dialectical mode of argumentation, the complex composition 
of space (spatial relations, power, politics, productions, and phenomena) is conceived 
just as a single entity (wholeness). Lefebvre (1968:111) demonstrates wholeness 
(totality) as “the way the whole is present through internal relations in each of its 
parts”. Although it is not achievable to comprehend manifold interrelated elements of 
a whole without understanding how the elements relate to each other within this 
whole, Bohm (1980:11) signifies totality in its wholeness: “a need to look on the 
world as an undivided whole”. Capra (1982) opposes to dialectics and contrasts 
markedly with the concepts of totality, he believes in 'discrete' objects by breaking up 
of thoughts and problems into pieces and in arranging these in their logical order. 
Capra mode of thinking stems out of Cartesianism which posits an essentially 
mechanical and mathematical representation of reality. In this sense, space is 
articulated as: absolute, a passive empty container independent of physical 
phenomena (Smith, 1984). Totality from this viewpoint amounts to nothing more than 
the sum of the parts. On the other hand, dialecticians oppose the reification of 
fragmentation and the separation of different aspects of reality. Alternatively, 
dialectics epistemological and ontological commitment affirms the unity of 
knowledge and the total character of reality. Space, therefore, in this sense is a unity 
containing within itself different aspects.  
Conceptualizing the physical meaning of space necessitates highlighting the 
material interrelation among its components. To clarify this issue, the interaction 
between space (whole) and place (space subunit or element) here is crucial one. The 
'whole' and the 'part' are, in fact, closely tied together forming a dialectical unit. 
Lefebvre (1991) argues that the production process does not occur solely in some 
abstract sense, it has to be represented in particular places, if it to have any meaning. 
In other words, space 'the whole' earmarks its definition though place 'the part', 
likewise, the accumulation of parts through their interrelations constitutes the whole. 
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Needless to say, the dividing line between the whole and the part is invisible. It is 
arguable, therefore, to say that both space and place have a real ontological status and 
their distinction depends on the comprehensive integration for grasping the 
interconnected relations (social, power, politics, process) among them.  Lefebvre 
stresses politics among the heterogeneous and conflictual elements of space as an 
internal parameter and major player; he argues that the overall production process of 
space and place is genuinely a political event (Ibid). Consequently, Lefebvre matches 
the concrete foundation of dialectics, i.e. contradiction, which is the ground on which 
all the phenomena are acknowledged. Spatial contradictions (political conflicts), 
therefore, between socio-economic interests and forces - express themselves in place, 
a subunit of space. Yet, from dialectical standpoint, these elements are different parts 
of the same unity, however, the significance of these qualitative aspects of place and 
how they, in turn, shape space cannot be downplayed. 
2.5   Explicit Review of the Implicit Planning-Politics Interrelationship 
In their definitions for the individual and communities' social capital, Lippert 
and Spagnolo (2005) introduced the networks of relations as implicit contracts. 
Relations in their regional and international context urge theorists to develop various 
theories regarding the role and importance which they constitute to regional powers. 
GIGA (2006) reveals that modern literature with respect to international relations 
argues - conflicts to achieve or to frustrate regional dominance - will become more 
potent in the future. Moreover, international politics addresses concepts of power 
relations and power hierarchies interestingly in conflict areas. From objective point of 
view, the researcher believes that planning, power, and politics all are perfectly 
interrelated though the study of socio-spatial relations in conflict areas. In context to 
the theoretical debate on politics, the researcher highlights such relations by quoting 
Waltz:  
“ …. students of international politics with their yen to get the power out of power 
politics, the national out of international politics, the dependence out of 
interdependence, the relative out of relative gains, the politics out of international 
politics, and the structure out of structural theory” (Waltz, 2000:8). 
Clarifying the explicit and implicit relation between planning and politics is a 
prominent issue in this doctoral thesis. Understanding this relation reveals the range of 
influence of politics upon planning objectives and role. Accordingly, it is a marvelous 
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question to know if planning is an organic reflection of politics or not. It might be 
argued that the revolutionary ideas of spatial planning direct their role in changing the 
space in addition to improving its conditions; and so to spread equity, justice, 
enhancement of community, and protection of amenity (Ward, 1994). Moreover, 
Kivell (1993) argued that political sector in the eighteenth century began to bracket 
land and space (spatial planning) together with control and power. As per the 
theoretical debate on powers, the researcher highlights such conception by quoting 
Walt: 
“The concept of power is central to realist theory, yet there is still little agreement on 
how it should be conceived and measured. We still lack a firm conceptual foundation 
on which to base valid measures of national power” (Walt 2002:222). 
Spatial planning - previously conceptualized as the regulator - by its 
terminological definition integrates those elements of space, especially such dynamic 
ones (powers). This is why many theorists argue planning to be a primarily 
ideological activity. In analyzing this dialectical conception, Friedmann stated: 
“Planning is done by individuals whose fundamental motivations derive in part from 
an ideological interpretation of the function of planning in society. This influences 
the choice of problems, method of work and proposed solutions.” (Friedmann, 1992) 
According to many researchers it has been shown that the relation between 
politics and planning is also paradoxical. For example, Friedmann (1987) believed 
that modern planning practice is apolitical process, and Planning was regarded as an 
alternative to politics. However, Simmie showed that there is a strong relation 
between planning and politics: 
“Town planning is political in three senses. First it was set up by government 
presumably to execute political wills on the subject of land use and regulation. 
Second, as an executive branch of government it is directly linked to the political 
power structure, … , Third, the way town planning decisions are taken is political”. 
(Simmie, 1974) 
The researcher supports the second interpretation which is more realistic and 
convincingly touches the ground on which planning is happening, i.e. planning is to 
some extent influenced by politics. Bilski (1980) points out that there are many cases 
in which planning reflects the political ideologies of members in governmental 
bodies; and thus planners have political roles, they take the politicians’ perspectives 
into account during planning process. Accordingly, it might be argued that planners 
pave the way to serve politics and control, also it could be concluded that the 
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assumption “planning is apolitical process” is far away to touch truth - especially in 
Jerusalem -where extensively the community is addressed to be politically-oriented. 
The effects resulting from attempting to plan upon political and administrative 
relationships at national and regional levels are highlighted by Hayward and Watson 
(1975), who conceived the planning-politics interrelationship as a technique of public 
economic policy-making of the political and administrative institutions. The interest 
in defining the role of ideal planning has generated intensive debate on its relation 
with the government ideology. Many scholars considered what the researcher 
conceptualizes “ideal planning” as a reform tool which improves the living conditions 
of mankind and allows exploiting resources sustainably. However, some theorists like 
Oren Yiftachel argued that this viewpoint of planning is narrow, too idealistic and 
often unrealistic. Furthermore, theoretically this idealism of planning role has ignored 
the position of planning as an arm of the modern nation state; whereas empirically it 
has overlooked the numerous cases in which planning functions as a form of 
deliberate social control and oppression mainly exercised by elites over weaker 
groups in various societies. In this context, Smooha (1990) concluded that planners in 
many situations may seek to attain, preserve, and strengthen the dominance of one 
ethnic group that is related directly to the government, and to control sectors of the 
community. Supportively, Flyvbjerg (1996) added that planners could be servants to 
the interests of the state which expect them to promote the goal of government, and 
that the state and planners can accomplish what they seek by playing the game of 
power covered up as technical reasoning.  
Imperfection of planning idealism – i.e. using planning as a control tool – is 
discussed by Thomas (1994), who provided arguments on how housing, zoning, and 
development policies have systematically excluded and distanced blacks from 
opportunity and wealth in America. Likewise, Yiftachel (2009, 2008, 1999, 1996) 
reveals the dark side of planning in Israel and proves the regressive impact of Israel's 
regional development and settlement policies, which in total have profoundly shifted 
land along with economic resources from indigenous Palestinians to Israeli settlers 
and Jewish immigrants. Accordingly, those examples among others assure that 
"planning as oppression instrument” not only does exist in a variety of settings but 
also constantly affects a range of dynamic socio-spatial relations of space. 
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2.6   Fundamental Scopes of Imperfect Planning  
'Imperfect planning' is a conceptual representation the researcher used for the 
cases in which planning is oriented to function as a ''control tool'' achieving 
oppressive objectives. Once again, questioning the role of planning is a good 
commencement to demonstrate this issue. After the early start of the Industrial 
Revolution the world witnessed rapid transformation process from simple agricultural 
communities into massively urbanized ones (Stearns, 1993). This quick 
transformation resulted in many cases unhealthy living conditions, social dilemmas, 
and environmental hazards. Cherry (1988) argues that planning was born as a reaction 
to heal the ills of urbanization, then grew up – as an organized field of human activity 
– in response to the exigent need of reforming all that unacceptable conditions. This 
basic definition of planning inspired the first planners to introduce ‘ideal’ concepts 
such as utopianism, equity, public interest, maximizing economic growth, and 
improving living conditions. These basic thoughts formed the foundation of planning 
theories. In his articulation of planning Yiftachel (1995) showed that most of planning 
theories addressed two prominent questions: What is a good city? And what is good 
planning? In this manner, perfect planning could be conceived as a problem-solving 
activity which relates knowledge to action in different ways (Simon 1957, 1960; 
Tinbergen 1956; Faludi 1973). 
Thus, regardless of the socio-spatial reference, planning challenging problems 
and tools always seem to be fraught with a considerable degree of uncertainty and 
vagueness; not only does this affect the effectiveness of planning, but also its 
legitimacy, consensus and sustainability in real contexts. Consequently, this 
widespread uncertainty of planning perception continues to raise doubts regarding a 
presumed disciplinary statute and even professional conception for planning and its 
expected - and in many cases - unpredictable roles. In this sense, issues concerning 
physical development - especially within spatially sociopolitical instability -
simultaneously recall crucial questions to the fore; in addition, interactive powers 
relationships clearly exist between contingent styles of planning and their institutional 
and cultural contexts which illustrates to some extent the differentiation in planning 
tools and the variety of outcomes (Booth et al., 2007; Faludi and Janin, 2005; 
Freestone, 2000; Newman and Thornley, 1996). Examining theoretical and empirical 
studies regarding planning practices in different contexts could help clarifying a solid 
core of common trends and problems constituting a series of challenges, dilemmas 
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and limitations which are valid in different institutional frameworks, government 
models, economic and administrative structures (Rodwin, 1981; Bruton and 
Nicholson, 1987; Alexander, 1992; Taylor, 1998).  
Hence, any study in this sense must specify, insofar as possible, its underlying 
references and points of view. Understanding the context in which planning is 
transformed into what the researcher conceptualized as imperfect planning “i.e. 
planning as an oppressive tool” addresses substantial exploration of particular scopes 
that reveal how planning is used as a socio-graphical control tool. Those scopes are 
categorized into four folds: spatial context (territorial scope), power relations and 
decision-making processes (methodological scope), physical consequences 
(socioeconomic scope), and impacts on identities and mode of thinking (cultural 
scope). 
2.6.1   Spatial Context 
The spatial context of planning outlines issues with regard to space, geography, 
time, and people. Its widespread territorial policies may represent the regulations in 
term of land titles, land use, land development, land settlement, land boundaries, etc., 
linking land into people highlights planning (ideal) role which according to Ward 
(1994) is to regulate land uses and improve living conditions along with 
environmental standards. Thus, ideally planning territorial scope is supposed to 
effectively serve the needs of people, improve their ways of living, and minimize the 
gap between different social groups, especially for ethnic minorities. 
However, the territorial scope is not always utilized ideally during planning 
process, it can be oriented paradoxically. For example, Yiftachel (1995) in his writing 
about - Planning as Control – states: “ … territorial policies can also be used as a 
most powerful tool of control over minorities, particularly in deeply divided societies, 
where ethnic group often reside in - their own- regions”. In this sense, Haider (1994) 
points out that land use policy (which is a tool of territorial scope) is an active 
instrument that can be employed for either progress or retardation in society. 
Moreover, Badcock (1984) shows that government can controversially exploit 
territorial scope, it can develop ordinances regarding land tenure to restrain minorities 
landownership and to block their housing needs and future growth, which in total 
creates socio-spatial fragmentation. In this manner, particularly in spaces where   
multi-ethnical groups exist, territorial policies can harmfully be utilized by regime or 
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by the prevailing and wealthy classes. In many cases inhabitants belonging to poorer 
and dissimilar ethnic groups are prevented from power-sharing, decision-making, and 
land-ownership. Thus, imperfect territorial policies result ‘unseen barriers’ which 
form “walled-spaces” within ‘one space’ along with recognizable social 
fragmentation.  
2.6.2   Methodological Scope 
Planning is typically connected to powers. Attaining planning objectives forces 
the governments to develop dynamic mechanisms and active methodologies through 
which the regime’s aims can be accomplished. Wherever power dominates high rates, 
plans can touch the ground and achieve desired goals. An international, national, 
regional or local influence of these goals is highly correlated to the regime’s power. 
Keohane (1969) classifies a state according to power point of view as: 
“A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, 
perhaps decisive, impact on the international system; a secondary power is a state 
whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in 
itself decisive, on that system; a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that 
it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small 
group or through international institutions; a small power is a state whose leaders 
consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant 
impact on the system”. (Keohane 1969: 296) 
According to Yiftachel (1998) the methodological or procedural scope includes 
statutory aspects that determine the formal relationship between regime and the public 
in a space; also it incorporates the formulation and implementation of plans and 
respective policies. The methodological scope is meant “ideally” to enhance social 
reform though allowing all community groups of a space to share in the process of 
decision-making, which genuinely empowers the disadvantaged groups, and creates 
kind of balance to the scattered parts of the community through the access of power 
relations of a space. However, Friedmann (1992) argues that this scope could be 
viciously employed to marginalize specific groups of a space, thus enhancing 
segregation and exclusion of – ethnical or minority groups – from the active and real 
participation in the process of decision-making. According to Yiftachel (1995) regime 
can practice this kind of control whether explicitly by using ‘top-down approach’ thus 
imposing decisions ‘from above’, or implicitly through complex techniques of 
information misrepresentation and meaningless structures of public consultations.   
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2.6.3   Socioeconomic Scope 
In many contexts in literature, economy was perceived as the concrete 
foundation which sustainable and remarkable social reform can firmly stand on. This 
vitality of the economical roles in enhancing the stability of a space tends to attract the 
regime of that space to dominate over this “economic” scope, and to orient this scope 
by all the possible means to serve its policies. Thus this scope is a double-edged 
weapon; it can ameliorate the quality of economic condition, improve social 
relationships, and achieve progress in the communities. However, Mclaughlin (1992) 
argues that this scope could be used through rearranging the costs-benefits 
interrelations to serve the interests of the dominant party, and thereby contribute to 
create weaker groups of a space who become more dependent on the dominant party 
which in turn manipulates the regime of that space to increase its influence and power. 
Moreover, Garnett and O'Hara (2007) point out that the government takings that are 
justified by the need for “economic development,” but occurring outside of a 
comprehensive development plan, may become constitutionally suspect and has 
pretextual rationale. In this sense, the researcher highlights how socioeconomic scope 
could be used as a control tool by quoting Garnett: 
“… The district court found that the Authority’s assertion that the condemnation was 
necessary to prevent the “reestablishment of blight” was “palpably without 
reasonable foundation” and thus, invalid … The court reasoned that the asserted 
public purpose of future-blight prevention was pretextual: In this case, the evidence 
is clear beyond dispute that Lancaster’s condemnation efforts rest on nothing more 
than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of property from one private party to 
another…” (Garnett and O'Hara, 2007:455) 
As shown in the above quotation, the regime – authority – can influence 
positively specific group and impact negatively another. Accordingly, protecting 
community civic rights is a prominent issue. Bray (2010) identifies the concept of 
‘power rules’ for understanding how law can protect a vulnerable person from a 
powerful one. In his concept, Bray helps illustrate patterns in the use of legal rules, 
especially in the contexts of violence, competition, and the performance of relational 
statuses. Eventually, it could be concluded that socioeconomic scope is also a 
paradoxical control instrument.  
2.6.4   Cultural Scope 
Space is like humankind each has his own character; however, in many cases 
where space includes humans it starts to re-identify, re-define or even re-shape its 
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identity. This identity-transformation process is happening either by natural growth 
and development processes or by enforced policies imposed by humans. In fact, it is 
almost impossible to find a space of homogenous soft infrastructure “i.e. humankind”; 
most spaces incorporate heterogeneous soft infrastructure shaping what is known in 
literature as multicultural spaces. The cultural scope deals with the influence of 
planning policies on the various cultures and collective identities within a space. 
Burgess (2009) introduced the concept of “strategic culture” who considered it as an 
explanatory variable for the regime’s suboptimal performance in the external relations 
and internal powers. The role of ‘ideal’ planning in multicultural space is very 
essential in preserving minor groups’ identities and integrating multi-ethnic cultures. 
However, Yiftachel (1998) argues that planning strategies are practiced by dominant 
ethnic group which often aims to minimize and alienate the other ethnic cultures. 
Hence, the sense of intellectual ‘cultural’ scope could be employed progressively or 
oppressively forming catastrophic weapon for planning as a control tool. 
2.7   Spatial Visions and Scenarios 
Exploring any spatial context within geographical area depends upon the 
existing situation on the ground and the available spatial and attribute data ultimately. 
The more availability of data leads to more comprehensive analysis and better 
understanding. However, integrating the analysis to include physical, socio-economic, 
and political aspects generates complex set of relations that require interdisciplinary 
backgrounds to clarify objective conclusions and to identify fruitful 
recommendations. The science of planning grasps the ‘conclusions’ and integrates the 
‘recommendations’ within scientific approach to improve the “existing” spatial status, 
and then, to direct that “concurrent” status into more 'desirable' situation and better 
conditions. Linking this gap between the “current” status and the “future” status has 
been subjected into unquiet debate lately. Visions and outlooks have been driven to 
compensate this time difference and unforeseen varieties between these two temporal 
statues. Unlike ‘strategic planning’ which has conditionally supported that, ‘scenario 
planning’ has bridged the gap between the ‘present’ and ‘future’ uniquely. 
A vision is an advanced step of an outlook and recommendations; IPCC (2005) 
identifies the vision as:  
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“…, a coherent, emotionally appealing and convincing statement about a desired 
outcome – it is an articulation of the way we wish we could live … A vision is 
composed of two parts: the visible part, that we can see and feel, and the invisible 
part, those political, cultural and social processes which make the visible part 
possible.” (IPCC, 2005:19) 
The above definition highlights the core theme of vision, and how does the 
vision link the present towards an oriented target and desired status. The vision will be 
optimizing the opportunities and strengths identified within a spatial context in order 
to draw up the best status of the future, as shown in (Fig 2.3). Moreover, the vision in 
order to be more comprehensive and realistic must cover both dimensions mentioned 
above; i.e. the visible part (places, images, etc.) which is also referred to as the 
“feelings”; and the invisible part (analysis, logic, language and description etc.) which 
is also known as the “mind”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure92.3: Clarifying reality, outlook, and vision within time horizon, (researcher) 
 
In practice, applying any of the aforementioned techniques within conflictual 
space, i.e. in regions of political instability, or more specifically, in the conflict areas, 
Existing 
Status 
Time Line 
Outlook 
Zone 
Vision 
Zone 
Short Term Medium Term Long Term 
Recommendations 
Zone 
VISION 
OUTLOOK 
REALITY 
Opportunities 
 39 
 
becomes excessively complex and requires numerous effort and manifold 
assumptions. Standing upon this viewpoint, Rollier and Turner (1992) argue that 
‘uncertainty’ about the future increases, and relying upon ‘quantitative’ decision-
making approaches for strategic planning becomes less appropriate; therefore scenario 
analysis is an effective ‘qualitative’ technique for enhancing strategic planning. In 
other words, in periods of stability, the past may serve as a rationally reliable model 
for predictions about the future. But in the turbulent environment (conflict areas) the 
guideposts of the past become unreliable, and generally the planning processes 
become less formalized.  
The debate over forecasting and future projections has met huge momentum 
during the past years. According to (Toffler, 1990; Camillus and Datta, 1991) the 
acceleration of change and increased uncertainty in environment in recent years has 
made it less and less appropriate for plans to be extrapolated from previous year 
tendencies. Highlighting the turbulent environments and the un-useful dependence 
upon past to project future in such environments, Godet (1979) points out: 
“the results of our actions today will occur in a world profoundly different from that 
in which they were taken" (Godet, 1979: 5) 
In this context, Wack (1985) criticized the “ordinary” or “classical” strategic 
planning which depends ultimately upon, stability, in order to project proper 
forecasting – stating: 
“Forecasts are not always wrong, more often than not, they can be reasonably 
accurate. And that is what makes them so dangerous. They are usually constructed 
on the assumption that tomorrow’s world will be much like today’s. They often work 
because the world does not always change. But sooner or later forecasts will fail 
when they are needed most: in anticipating major shifts in the business environment 
that make all strategies obsolete.” (Wack, 1985:83) 
This debate pertaining to the dynamic upheavals and the continuous spatial 
changes of today’s world highlights again the dialectical nature of space, where 
change is a must. According to James (2005), a basic principle of dialectic philosophy 
is in the belief of: things’ dynamicity, change is real and stability is illusory, not only 
everything is changing but all is flux. Dialectics, therefore, recognize reality as a 
structure of evolving processes. On the other hand, Bohm (1983) referred to the 
flexibility in dialectic thinking to consider wide scale relational analysis rather than 
concentrating on restricted analysis of objects. In other words, dialectic thinking 
spotlights on integrating and interrelating relations, processes, flows and fluxes to 
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scrutinize elements, objects, dynamic systems and physical structures.  
Prior to introducing the definition of scenario, and within this conceptual 
“dynamic” and changing nature of the space, it is important to cope with the meaning 
of spatial planning, which the researcher delineates as “a multi-dimensional 
interactive process of dynamic future arrangements of spaces within their socio-
geographical context, by means of understanding space as a complex set of processes 
and relations which explicates the structure of elements, items, and events in a 
space”. Thus, space is conceived dialectically as a dynamic system that presents 
ongoing interactions among various dynamic components (e.g. population, and 
environment), which are again interrelated with each other through various spatial and 
temporal interactions and feedbacks. Therefore, misunderstanding the dynamicity and 
the generic behavior of space components as discussed by Shuvo and Lay (2010) will 
generate a theoretical gap between the planning process and responses of planning 
strategies.  
In this complex and continuously ‘changing’ spatial system, surpassing the 
classical planning paradigms becomes crucial. Interestingly Grayson and Clawson 
(2007) discuss this subject, and state: 
“The single-line forecasts that are often the essence of strategic planning are 
appropriate only for stable word. If the world is highly dynamic, straight-line 
projections quickly become obsolete.” (Grayson and Clawson (2007:1) 
Therefore, ‘new thinking’ and critical considerations to redevelop the classical 
approaches arose. For instance, creativity and innovation have been increasingly 
important for planning and have become much more desirable planning 
characteristics. Imagination is closely related to creativity Rollier and Turner (1992); 
in this sense, Hogarth (1987) emphasizes the significance of imagination in 
developing choices and argues that large powers of imagination improve and enrich 
more livable and functional alternatives. Subsequently, scenario planning has 
appeared to overcome deficiencies of the ordinary strategic planning. According to 
Grayson and Clawson (2007) this evolutionary approach (scenario building) came 
into its own during the 1970s as an alternative to the ordinary strategic planning. On 
the other hand, Mietzner and Reger (2005) and Heijden (1996) argue that the roots of 
scenario planning has grown since 1940s and gained remarkable public awareness 
after the WWII. Literature presents wide arguments for the original emergence of 
scenario planning; these arguments conclude that scenario planning was first 
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introduced to serve the military planning (Mietzner and Reger, 2005; Kahn and 
Wiener, 1967; Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, 1972).  
The definition of “scenario” has gained numerous interests, it is considered to 
be a “fuzzy concept” (Mietzner and Reger, 2005) which is misleading in many ways 
and has also various shades of connotations. Roubelat (2007) looks at this term 
standing upon rigid linking with previous planning approaches and points out the 
“theoretical” and “empirical” dimensions of this term, stating: 
“… In theory, scenarios are a synthesis of different paths (events and actors’ 
strategies) that lead to possible futures. In practice, scenarios often merely describe 
particular sets of events or variables” (Roubelat, 2000:4) 
Basically, there are diverse definitions about scenarios. Godet (1990) believes 
that scenarios are introduced as 'alternative' futures. The idea behind this concept, 
assures that scenarios are not themselves points forecasts; rather, they are distinct 
possible futures developed so that the real future will lie within the borders of diverse 
scenarios identified together but independently. Within this framework, scenario 
planning is considered an evolutionary process of constructing a range of probable 
futures to use as a background for discussing strategies. Scenarios are distinguished 
by creative thinking and imagination, they help to clarify interrelationships, identify 
emerging patterns and reduce complexity (Schwenk, 1983), and they support strategic 
planners in considering a spectrum of possibilities (Wack, 1985). Another interesting 
identification for the conceptual meaning of scenario is introduced by Godet and 
Roubelat (1996) as a description of a future status and the course of events which 
makes it possible to move forward from the original situation to the future. The 
terminological meaning of scenario was captured by Mietzner and Reger (2005) as: 
“… narrative description of a possible state of affairs or development over time. It 
can be very useful to communicate speculative thoughts about future developments to 
elicit discussion and feedback, and to stimulate the imagination. Scenarios generally 
are based on quantitative expert information, but may include qualitative information 
as well.” (Mietzner and Reger, 2005:223) 
Scenarios are the preferred approach in futures studies (Sohail, 2002). Scenarios 
are powerful since they offer distance from the present, explore the future and allow 
the creation of alternative futures. Eventually, it could be argued that the scenarios’ 
distinct value is in the stimulation of imagination and the generation of ideas. 
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2.8   Conclusion  
The philosophical interrelations, as well as theoretical debates, between space, 
power, politics and planning are outstandingly presented in this chapter. In summary, 
it has been shown that the spatial presentation of “space” outlines complex set of 
spatial relations (variables). Power and politics surface to the top in this manner. 
Understanding these relations reveals the range of influence of politics and power 
upon planning in terms of its objectives and role. Theories and concepts pertaining to 
the power of planning to act either as, progressive, or regressive, agent of change; and 
the probability of using planning as a “control tool” instead of “reforming tool” 
principally upon ethnic minorities were discussed. It has been shown that “space” by 
its nature, is a dialectical entity. According to dialecticians, space is conceived as a 
dynamic whole which can only be grasped through the contradictions represented by 
the conflictual relations it constitutes. Thus, space is not merely an abstract term; it is 
rather a terrain where basic socio-political practices (relations) are lived out. 
Accordingly, spatial planning is conceived as a multi-dimensional interactive process 
of dynamic future arrangements of spaces within their socio-geographical context. 
Exploring the future of spaces can be achieved by many approaches; scenario building 
and planning has been shown to be one of the most effective, creative, and 
evolutionary methodologies in this regard.  
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Chapter Three 
Spatial and Social Space Structure in Jerusalem 
"The materials of city planning are: sky, space, trees, steel and cement; in that order and that hierarchy"  
Le Corbusier 
N this chapter the researcher summaries the socio-physical outline of Jerusalem in 
terms of its historical context, social structure, and spiritual reflections 
respectively. In the first section of this chapter, the researcher goes back to the 
historical roots when the city was found showing the passionate events the city 
underwent through. After that, the researcher explores the social structure of 
Jerusalem analysing the demographic characteristics and the existing social fabric in 
the city for the current demographic status quo accompanied by some future 
projections. The last section in this chapter investigates the spiritual bond between 
Jerusalem and the major three world’s religions, i.e. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.  
 
3.1   Historical Outlook   
The history records reveal that the first civilization found in Jerusalem is dated 
back to the sixth millennium BC (Fanni, 2003). According to the Hebrew Bible, the 
original inhabitants of Jerusalem were the Canaanites: 
"And say, this is what the Lord has said to Jerusalem: 
Your start and your birth was from the land of the 
Canaanite; an Amorite was your father and your mother 
was a Hittite." (Ezekiel, 16:4) 
Walter (1992) concludes that the land of Canaan was inhabited by 
multicultural groups who occasionally fought but mostly traded and collaborated and 
their histories are intertwined. In that time Jerusalem was named “Ur-Salem”, a 
Canaanite word meaning, the city of Salem, an ancient God-King of the Jebusite clan. 
Although Redford (1992) argues that archeology provides ample evidences of the 
prosperous and relatively peaceful Canaanite civilization coexisting with nearby 
civilizations, Jerusalem was attractive for invaders and conquerors and has been 
destroyed and reconstructed more than eighteen times (Armstrong, 1996; Benvenisti, 
1976). King David captured the city and changed its Canaanite’s name to the City of 
I 
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David in 997 BC proclaiming it the capital of the united Israelite Kingdom. Less than 
forty years, the Egyptian recaptured the city and demolished the Israelite Kingdom. 
Subsequently, the city was captured by the Babylonians, the Persians, the Hellenistic 
and then the Roman-byzantine Empire when in 132 AD the Roman Emperor Hadrian 
renamed the city “Aelia Capitolina” (Prawer and Ben-Shammai, 1996). In 636 AD, 
Muslims led by Caliph Omar Ibn Al-Khatab conquered Jerusalem. Since then, and 
except the period of 1099-1187 AD when Jerusalem fell to the Crusaders, the city was 
under Muslims control relating to the Umayyad, Abbasid, Tulunid, Ikhshidid, 
Fatimid, Seljuk, Ayyubid, Mameluke, and the Ottoman, Figure (3.1) shows the 
historical time line in Jerusalem. The city of Jerusalem remained under Muslims rule 
until 1917, when Ottomans surrendered to the British (Biger, 2005). The British 
mandate ended directly after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Shortly 
following Israel’s proclamation of independence, a war broke out which resulted in 
the division of Jerusalem into two parts, the western part ruled by Israel and was 
declared as a capital of Israel and the eastern by the Hashemite Kingdome of Jordan 
(Pollack, 2002).  In 1967, another war broke out and ended for the Israeli side (Stein, 
1991), consequently the Jordanian eastern part of Jerusalem fell under Israeli 
occupation, and in 1980 the Israeli parliament declared unilaterally East Jerusalem 
part of - United Jerusalem - the capital of Israel.  
 
 
Figure103.1: Historic Timeline of Jerusalem, (RISSC, 2010; edited) 
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The fast-accelerating events inside the history of Jerusalem made it more 
passionate to reflect how the city has been a bridge of diverse civilizations and 
political entities that have ruled it and left marvelous imprints and monuments, and 
thus producing a space of several layers of fabulous landmarks. During the intense 
course of its history, Jerusalem resembled a range of provident roles: it was a central, 
a capital and a provincial city. Table (3.1) illustrates an overview of the administrative 
changes in Jerusalem city and the Jerusalem province.  
 
Table13.1: Administrative changes in Jerusalem city and Jerusalem district, (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003; edited) 
T
h
e 
C
it
y
 
1863 The establishment of the municipality in Jerusalem. 
1877 The establishment of the municipality in accordance with the Ottoman Municipalities Law. 
1948 
The division of the city into two sectors and the establishment if an Israeli and an Arab municipalities. 
The annexation of demolished Palestinian villages to West Jerusalem sector. 
No villages were annexed to East Jerusalem. 
1967 
The Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem. Israeli law is imposed in East Jerusalem. 
The dismantling of the East Jerusalem Municipality and village councils. 
1985 The establishment of the neighborhood councils (neighborhood administrations in Jerusalem). 
T
h
e 
D
is
tr
ic
t
 
1938 The Jerusalem province is declared as one of six provinces in Palestine. 
1948 The Jerusalem province is divided between Jordan and Israel by political borders. 
1950 The delimitation of the Israeli Jerusalem Province and the Jordanian Jerusalem Governorate. 
1954 
The appointment of village councils in some of the Palestinian villages surrounding Jerusalem.  
Mukhtars continue to present the central authority in other villages. 
1967 
Israel dismantles the Jordanian Jerusalem Governorate and divides it between Ramallah, Jericho and 
Bethlehem provinces. 
Major parts of the Jerusalem Governorate were added to Jerusalem.  
1982 
The formation of Jewish regional councils in the West Bank in order to manage settlements with the 
announcement of the establishment of the Civil Administration and maintenance of the Palestinian 
governorate whose boundaries were determined by Israel. 
1995 
The redrawing of the boundaries of Jerusalem Province which is located within the boundaries if 
Jerusalem prior to 1967. This province is not recognized by Israel. 
1996 
The formation by the PNA of municipalities, local councils and development committees in the 
villages surrounding Jerusalem. 
 
As shown in the previous table, the first municipality of Jerusalem was 
established by the Ottomans in 1863 when Jerusalem was the centre of the Sanjaq of 
Palestine in the Ottoman Empire who controlled the city around four centuries (Auld, 
2000). Referring to its importance, the British considered Jerusalem to be the capital 
of their Mandate in Palestine. After being divided in 1948, east and west Jerusalem 
each has its own municipality, the west operated under Israeli government and 
functioned as a capital of the newly established state, which also intensified its 
administrative institutions and governmental bodies there, while the other left under 
Jordanian control affiliated with Amman the capital of Jordan. After the 1967 war, 
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Israel annexed East Jerusalem to the western part; it also dismantled the Arabic 
municipality in East Jerusalem and imposed Israeli laws with one municipality 
operated totally under Israeli control up to date (Wasserstein, 2001). Figure (3.2) 
shows the geopolitical administrative changes in Jerusalem since the establishment of 
the first municipality in 1863 up to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 
1993. 
 
As a holy city for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Jerusalem has always been 
of prodigious symbolic importance (Kanaan, 2005). The Old City of Jerusalem 
characterized by its encircling wall consisted for long period of time the spatial 
definition of the city. Jerusalem lies less than 55 kilometers from Jaffa, 85 kilometers 
from Amman, 290 kilometers from Damascus, 388 kilometers from Beirut, 528 
kilometers from Cairo and 865 kilometers from Baghdad. This centrality of that 
position entitles Jerusalem with more logistical value and adds points to its credits of 
distinction. The present city of Jerusalem has evoked from the Old City, after 1948, 
Figure113.2: Administrative changes in Jerusalem since 1863, (Khamaisi and Nasrallah, 2003) 
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the city extended towards the north and west where the Israeli government established 
new and massive Jewish neighborhoods, whereas since the year 1967, Israel has 
concentrated its settlements construction works in the eastern part of the city, so that 
to accomplish desired demographic balance which will be discussed later in this 
doctorate research. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem has been 
dramatically intensified since Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967. Jerusalem has 
been described as a deeply divided city due to the intensity and persistence of the 
ethnic conflict it has faced for decades (Hasson, 2007; 2004; Benvenisti, 1995; 1996). 
Furthermore, Khalidi (1997) argues that the future perspectives of Jerusalem are 
unpredictable due to the status the city has faced in the modern ethno-national 
identities of Palestinians and Jews. Moreover, Jerusalem has also been characterized 
as a frontier city (Klein, 2005; Bollens, 1998; Hasson, 1996; Kliot and Mansfield, 
1999), according to Kotek (1999), frontier cities are not only polarized along ethnic 
and ideological lines, but are also disputed foremost because of their location on fault 
lines between ethnic, religious or ideological entities.  
3.2   Social Structure of Jerusalem  
Like many other features in Jerusalem, the demographic and social fabric have 
witnessed massive changes since the declaration of independence for the state of 
Israel in 1948 and more specifically after the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem in 
1967. The population of Jerusalem represents large scale heterogeneous layers with 
manifold social cultures, Pressouyre (1999) points out that the cultural characteristics 
of the historic centers in Jerusalem are changing, not without unfortunate 
consequences for the consistency of the urban fabric and authenticity of the buildings. 
The dynamic changes in the social as well as the political entities in Jerusalem 
produced unbearable burden over the space of the city, according to many researchers, 
this far-reaching alteration influenced both the social space viability of the Old City 
and the originality of its cultural heritage (see e.g.: Albin, 1992; Katz, 1995; 
Khamaisi, 1997; Amirav and Siniora, 1992; Ben Arieh, 1989). Jerusalem was 
recorded on the UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1981, however, the radical 
consequences and dramatic changes in the socio-physical urban form of Jerusalem 
enforced UNESCO to inscribe the city  on the World Heritage in Danger List in 1982 
(Welfare, 2004).  
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The social aspects of Jerusalem are mainly classified by two major categories, 
the Israeli Jewish and the Palestinian Arabs (Jerusalemites). The cultural backgrounds 
for the Israeli Jewish people are amazingly divergent; immigrants compromise large 
volume of the population slice in Israel, Figure (3.3) shows the routs of Jewish 
immigrations by continents for the years 1948 – 1991. According to the Jerusalem 
Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS, 2011), Jewish compromises the overwhelming 
majority of the population in Jerusalem, and even in East Jerusalem as well as (Ju'beh, 
2010). The Jewish multicultural origins with their divergent cultures to the Arab 
population; Jerusalem space faces endless challenges to meet the needs and interests 
of residents that seriously affect the overall socio-physical image of the space. This 
conflict of interests and various cultural dimensions make it more complex for 
planners to involve the integrity of the socio-cultural needs with the value of the 
places without influencing the surrounded built environments in Jerusalem. In his 
writing Moore highlights this critical relationship between defined spaces (places) and 
social needs:  
"We need places where people can exercise their wills and enjoy the willfulness of 
others within a pattern of accord that is physically rooted to the place – more 
enduring than, but enlivened by the transit interests of those who each day can give it 
a new life and point" (Moore et al., 1974). 
 
 
                   Figure123.3: Jewish immigration by continents between 1948 – 1991, (Hussein, 2006; edited). 
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In the case of Jerusalem, especially for its enriched cultural space 
accompanied by the political instability and socio-economic turbulences, the change 
of the city structure in both: city soft infrastructure (population component) and city 
hard infrastructure (built up environment) is inevitable. In this context, Touqan (2004) 
argues that social classes moved and concentrated in specific geographical areas, for 
example Arab Jerusalemites from elite and middle class families moved toward the 
new neighborhoods around the Old City while low income families stayed at the city 
core centre. Pressouyre (1991) on the other hand, points out that Jewish made 
expansion towards the Arabic quarters and the open spaces. 
Demographically, the British Mandate Census of 1922 characterized 
Palestine’s population at 88 percent of Muslim and Christian Arabs while 12 percent 
of Jews. During the British mandate in Palestine, the Jewish community grew from 
one-sixth to almost one-third of the population. Immigration accounts for most of the 
increase in the Jewish population at that time, while the increase of the non-Jewish 
population was due to natural birth rates (Justin, 1990; Morris, 2004). By the end of 
the British mandate, the Jewish immigration influxes raised the Jewish population to 
more than six times than that was before the mandate period (Morris, 2001), Figures 
(3.4 – 3.8) show: the population of Jerusalem by national affiliation, the population 
growth in Jerusalem by population group, the age structure of the population in 
Jerusalem by population group, source of population and population projection 
respectively. 
 
                           Figure13 .4: Population of Jerusalem by population group, 1922 – 2009, (JIIS, 2011 a, edited) 
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     Figure143.5: Annual growth of population in Jerusalem by population group, 1999 – 2009, (JIIS, 2011 b; edited) 
 
 
 
 
        Figure153.6: Age structure of population in Jerusalem by population group, 2008, (JIIS, 2010; edited) 
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Figure163.7: Source of population in Jerusalem, 2009, (JIIS, 2011 c; edited) 
 
 
 
 
Figure173.8: Population projection of Jerusalem 2000-2020,& actual population, 2000-2005, (JIIS, 2011 d, edited) 
 
 
The following Tables (3.2 – 3.3) present the population and population growth 
in Jerusalem by population group, and the population projection of Jerusalem & 
Jerusalem district by population group, respectively. 
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Table23.2: Population and Population Growth in Jerusalem, by Population Group, 1967-2009, (JIIS, 2011 e; edited) 
Year 
Jews & Others Arabs Total 
No. 
thousands 
% 
No. 
thousands 
% 
No. 
thousands 
% 
1967 197.7 74.2 68.6 25.8 266.3 100 
1977 272.3 72.4 103.7 27.6 367.0 100 
Avg. annual growth rate 
1967-1977 
3.3% 4.2% 3.5% 
1987 346.1 71.7 136.5 28.3 482.6 100 
Avg. annual growth rate 
1977-1987 
2.4% 2.8% 2.5% 
1997 429.1 69.0 193.0 31.0 622.1 100 
Avg. annual growth rate 
1987-1997 
2.2% 3.5% 2.6% 
2007 487.1 65.2 260.5 34.8 747.6 100 
Avg. annual growth rate 
1997-2007 
1.3% 3.0% 1.9% 
2008 492.2 64.7 268.2 35.3 760.4 100 
2009 497.0 64.3 275.9 35.7 773.0 100 
Avg. annual growth rate 
2008-2009 
2.9% 1.0% 1.7% 
 
 
 
Table3 .3: Population projection of Jerusalem, by Population group, 2000 – 2020, (JIIS, 2011 f; edited) 
Projection Area 
2000 
(%) 
2005 
(%) 
2010 
(%) 
2015 
(%) 
2020 
(%) 
Jerusalem 100 100 100 100 100 
Total areas of Jews and others 68.8 66.7 64.6 62.2 61.2 
Total areas of Arabs 31.2 33.3 35.4 37.8 38.8 
Jerusalem District 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Jews and other 72.0 70.8 69.6 68.0 67.8 
Arabs 28.0 29.2 34.4 32.0 32.2 
 
The average number of rooms per housing unit in Jerusalem governorate was 
3.3 rooms and the average housing density in Jerusalem governorate was 1.6 persons 
per room (PCBS, 2005). Moreover, the average family size in Jerusalem was 5.2 
capita and the nuclear family composes more than eighty percent of the total family 
categories in Jerusalem Figure (3.9). The average house dwellers density was 1.5 
capita per room for the year 2009; Figure (3.10) shows the housing density in terms of 
number of persons per room (PCBS, 2010).  
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Figure183.9: Percentage distributions of private households in Jerusalem governorate by household 
type, 2007, (PCBS, 2010; edited) 
 
 
Figure193.10: Percentage distribution for households in Jerusalem governorate by housing density 
(number of persons per room), 2009, (PCBS, 2010; edited) 
Data presented in the previous figures and tables regarding the social 
characteristics of Jerusalem community show that almost 45% percent of the 
population in Jerusalem fall under the age of twenty years. According to the 
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics the Arab population in Jerusalem governorate 
is considered a young community; since it is estimated that 36.8% of the total 
population in Jerusalem governorate are aged less than 15 years, while those aged 65 
years and over were estimated at 2.9% (PCBS, 2010). The average growth rate for the 
Jews is around one percent, while for the Arabs around three percent, furthermore, 
sixteen percent of the population growth relates to immigration factors while the 
remaining stands for natural growth of the population. Although statistics indicate that 
Jerusalem society is becoming gradually urbanized, a large segment of the population 
Extended 
9.4% 
Composite 
0.1% 
Not stated 
5.6% 
One person 
4.4% 
Nuclear 
81% 
2.00-2.99 
24% 
+3.00 
8% 
less than 1 
15% 
1.00-1.99 
53% 
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– mainly in the Arab community – still manifests the characteristics of a rural society. 
Jewish population are demonstrated as urbanized social groups who dwell within 
highly developed spaces, mainly in west Jerusalem and in the Israeli settlements in 
East Jerusalem. On the other side the Arabic community can be divided into a number 
of secondary social groups, each with its own special characteristics (Khamaisi and 
Nasrallah, 2003): 
1. The indigenous residents: include the urban population of noticeable 
families that developed under the Ottoman and British mandate before the 
rural migration with activated in 1920s-1960s; this group does not exceed 
20% of the Arab population in Jerusalem. 
2. The Immigrants originated from the West Bank, this group compromises 
50% of the Arab population in Jerusalem. 
3. The villages annexed to Jerusalem, this group represents 20 % of the Arab 
population in Jerusalem. 
4. The refugees who were forced to leave their native towns and cities, this 
group dwells in two refugee camps in Jerusalem and represents 5 % of the 
Arab population in Jerusalem. 
5. The Bedouins who principally live outside the municipal boundaries and 
expand especially in the eastern part of the district. Those who live within 
the municipal boundaries adopted the rural life style. This group represents 
almost the remaining percentage of the Arab population in Jerusalem. 
 
By time, those above mentioned social groups are undergoing transformation 
process with respect to the social, geographical and economical dimensions in a way 
of normalizing differences and minimizing gaps in between. These transformations 
may be concluded as the following (Ibid): 
A. The urban society which is becoming socially more apparent as a result of 
the improved education and employment, consequently, the society in 
Jerusalem has been transformed from a traditional society controlled by 
traditional noble families, into a more socially mobile one. Hence, 
individuals who previously belonged to the lower and middle classes or to 
the immigrants or villager groups have now moved to the middle or higher 
classes.  
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B. The rural society is experiencing a continuous urbanization process with 
different acceleration rates, some geographical areas represent rapid 
urbanization (e.g. Silwan, At-Tur, Kafr Akab) while others showed low 
urbanization process (e.g. Sour Bahir, As Sawahirah, Um Tuba) in which 
differences in the social structure are still visible in the institutional 
structures, the level of spatial development and the availability of services. 
C. The refugees are also undergoing social transformation but with more 
limitations. Some have gradually moved out of the camps seeking better 
services and work opportunities, while the others remained in the refugee 
camps and have improved their living and socio-economic conditions 
there.   
D. The Bedouins can be clustered into two groups, the first group lives in As 
Sawahirah and has become ruralized and partially urbanized and the other 
group is the Jahalin Bedouin tribe that lives in the valleys of the East 
Jerusalem mountains and a traditional Bedouin lifestyle.  
3.3   Spiritual Reflections of Jerusalem  
The tangible relationship between human being and places has long been 
described in the literature. One way in which people have experienced and expressed 
their sense of holiness, was in their relation to space and places. Among those 
thoughtful descriptions is what Hernández (2007) states: 
“Place attachment is an affective bond that people establish with specific areas 
where they prefer to remain and where they feel comfortable and safe. Place identity, 
however, has been defined as a component of personal identity, a process by which, 
through interaction with places, people describe themselves in terms of belonging to 
a specific place” (Hernández et al. , 2007).  
Holy spaces are such places that are considered holy by virtue of the bond that 
binds human groups to the earth on which they live. It is a bond of gratitude and love 
that undetectably turns into reverence, according to Eliade (1954) sanctity of place 
reflects eruption of the sacred. However, some holy spaces acquired their holiness as a 
result of historical circumstances and events, or places that are holy because either in 
theory or in actual fact they were constructed so as to reflect cosmic reality. Jerusalem 
represents a substantial example for globalized sacred space, in this sense Peters 
states: “Jerusalem, therefore, because of its biblical centrality, serves as a definitive 
image and symbol of sacred place” (Peters, 1987:4838). With all the manifold 
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challenges that Jerusalem poses, Bovis (1971) in his writing “The Question of 
Jerusalem” introduced its special value: 
“Jerusalem holds a place of honor in the hearts of the followers of the three major 
monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Here is situated the 
Wailing Wall, a remnant of the western wall, …, there are now the Muslim 
sanctuaries of the Haram al- Sharif, …, stands over the spot from which the tradition 
says Mohammad made his night journey into Heaven, …, Here in Jerusalem is also 
situated the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which stands over the supposed sites 
where Jesus was crucified and buried.” (Bovis, 1971) 
The following three sections outline the interrelation and the connection 
between Jerusalem and the major three world’s religions, namely Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam respectively. These relations among religion and Jerusalem 
have been considered the major engine of the ideological conception for all the city 
conquers and defenders.  
3.3.1   Jerusalem in Judaism  
The fact that Jerusalem is correlated into the Jewry as a major center dates 
back some three millennia (Ma’oz and Nusseibeh, 2000), ultimately since King David 
considered Jerusalem the capital of Israel (Bard, 2002). Thus, Jerusalem represents for 
Jews the superlative focus of their spiritual, cultural, and national life (Feintuch, 
1987). Friedland (2000) describes this historical connection between Jewish people 
and Jerusalem: 
"Israel was first forged into a unified nation from Jerusalem some three thousand 
years ago, when King David seized the crown and united the twelve tribes from this 
city, ..., Jerusalem was the seat of Jewish sovereignty, the household site of kings, the 
location of its legislative councils and courts. In exile, the Jewish nation came to be 
identified with the city that had been the site of its ancient capital. Jews, wherever 
they were, prayed for its restoration." (Friedland et al., 2000:8) 
In the Jewish tradition, Jerusalem is a part of the Holy Land promised by God 
to the children of Israel in the Torah. The Books of Samuel and Psalms portray King 
David’s struggle to arrest Jerusalem with yearning to build a temple there (Kaplan, 
1992). The construction of the Temple by Solomon gave the city its holiness to Jews 
as the place with which God chose to distinctively associate His Holy Name 
(Deuteronomy, 12:5). Moreover, Jews believe that the earth used to create Adam was 
taken from Jerusalem and that Adam was created at the site of the Temple (RISSC, 
2010). Jerusalem thus served as the focus of the spiritual unity and purpose of the 
Jewish people (Psalm: 122).   
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Within the common and recent spatial definition of Jerusalem city, the Jewish 
people who dwelled there were mostly Sephardi natives prior to the mid-1850s, 
Grenville (2005) argues that the Jewish community constituted the prevalent single 
religious group in the city by 1840, whereas Weiner (2003) points out that from the 
1880s onward the Jewish constituted the majority within the city. In the nineteenth 
century Jerusalem witnessed arrival of Ashkenazi Jewish communities who 
intensively lived in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and later expanded to the outer 
walls of the city. The massive Jewish immigration fluxes into Jerusalem and the 
Israeli destruction of some parts of the Old City and its transformation into a purely 
Jewish place of devotion altered the city’s character permanently (RISSC, 2010).  
Moreover, Jewish expansion into Muslim and Christian spaces are seen by Jewish 
religious extremists as the only way to prevent the soiling of the race chosen by the 
God of the Israelites (Deuteronomy, 2:6). Hoppe (2000) argues that even those secular 
Jews respect the spiritual value of Jerusalem:  
"The centrality of Jerusalem to Judaism is so strong that even secular Jews express 
their devotion and attachment to the city and cannot conceive of a modern State of 
Israel without It, ..., For Jews Jerusalem is sacred simply because it exists". (Hoppe, 
2000:6) 
Jerusalem has long been embedded into Jewish religious life and 
consciousness; it has got a pivotal position for the Jewish people over the past three 
millennia. Countless expressions of the intimate ties to Jerusalem maintained and 
strengthened the Jewish memories of and attachment to the city; apparently with the 
citation of Psalm (137:5-6) 
If I forget you, O Jerusalem, 
Let my right hand wither; 
Let my tongue cleave to my palate 
If I cease to think of you, 
If I do not keep Jerusalem in memory 
Even at my happiest hour. 
Smith (1987) demonstrates that it is unlikely that the choice for Jerusalem was 
merely an arbitrary political decision.  Although Peters (1987) argues that Jerusalem 
is never mentioned in Torah (Pentateuch), the symbolic and religious core of the 
entire Hebrew Bible; Jerusalem represents for all the Jewish people a sacred and 
matchless religious symbol as what Heschel states: “We come to you, Jerusalem, to 
build your ruins, to mend our souls, and to seek comfort for God and men” (Heschel, 
1967:17).  
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3.3.2   Jerusalem in Christianity  
It is noteworthy commencing with what Rodney Stark demonstrated for how 
successful emerging religions consistently adopt symbols of previously established 
religions and use them to set up their creditability (Stark and Bainbridge, 1996).  
However, Peters (1987) argues that the essential nature and sense of Christian 
Jerusalem is not the same as Israelite Jerusalem; Christianity demonstrated its entire 
domination over Jerusalem by shifting the spiritual focus of the city from the Temple 
Mount symbolizing the old Israelite religion, to the Holy Sepulchre symbolizing the 
essential act of Christianity: the passion and resurrection of Christ, and thus creating 
new sacred geography for the city.  In the Christian tradition, Jerusalem had to be 
transformed in order for it to be a principal and empowering centre for Christianity 
(Mathew 21:10-14).  Jerusalem became spiritualized in the early Christian context and 
therefore got many distinct expressions that reveal its value. It is a “new Jerusalem” 
(Revelation 3:12) and a “heavenly Jerusalem” (Hebrews 12:22). For Christians, 
Jerusalem's place in the life of Jesus provides it with inordinate significance, it is the 
place where Jesus was brought as a child to be presented to the Temple (Luke 2:22) 
and to attend festivals (Luke 2:41). Moreover, the defining act of the Crucifixion that 
would both symbolize Christianity had to occur there, and in order for Jesus’s death 
and resurrection to have an impact as a significant event they had to have occurred in 
Jerusalem;  furthermore the divine authority of Jesus was established by association 
with the holy city (Luke 13:33-35).  
Christianity according to the spiritual and blessed events related to Jesus 
makes Jerusalem the most sacred place in the world, besides Jesus Christ’s love for 
Jerusalem means that it is the spiritual home for all those followers who believe in 
Jesus (RISSC, 2010). Christian tradition as cleared in the Gospels reflects how Jesus 
conceived Jerusalem. In Luke (13) for instance, Jesus started by Jerusalem to rebuke 
Jewish for their disobedience to prophets:  
Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the 
prophets and stone those sent to you, how 
often I have longed to gather your 
children together, as a hen gathers her 
chicks under her wings, and you were not 
willing.  Look, your house if left to you 
desolate. I tell you, you will not see me 
again until you say, ‘Blessed is who 
comes in the name of the Lord’”. (Luke 
13:34-35) 
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The true home of the Christians - according to the medieval conception - is the 
heavenly Jerusalem. Grabar (1996) clears that Jerusalem acquired its special character 
of piety and spiritual wealth through the wide presence of saints and holy men and 
women. Thus the value of Jerusalem crossed and even surpassed the conceptual 
definition for the terrestrial or earthly Jerusalem, in this sense; Christ’s followers are 
promised placement in the heavenly Jerusalem: 
 But you have come to Mount Zion, to the 
heavenly Jerusalem, the city of the living 
god. You have come to thousands upon 
thousands of angels in joyful assembly, to 
the church of the firstborn, whose names 
are written in heaven. (Hebrews 12:22-
33) 
A good example that represents geographical confirmation of the Christian 
status of Jerusalem in the sixth century is Madaba Map shown in Figure (3.11). The 
map locates Jerusalem in the inner center of the map considering it as the central core 
of the universe (Levine, 1999).   
 
 
Figure203.11: Madaba Map depicting the biblical world from Egypt to Syria centered by Jerusalem 
(Fanni, 2003) 
 
In the early start of the seventh century, Christians lost Jerusalem when the 
Persians army seized the city. Yarbrough argues that the symbolic value of Jerusalem 
was not touchable for the Persians on contrast to that value which the Christians hold: 
 61 
 
“But if the seizure of Jerusalem meant little to the Persians, it meant a great deal to 
those who were defeated – the Christians who had controlled the city for almost 300 
years. Its loss was a devastating event that demanded explanation. ,……,  An 
eyewitness himself, Strategous sought to explain the loss of Jerusalem by claiming 
that the Persians were instruments of God, who was punishing the Christians for 
their sins”. (Yarbrough, 2008:67) 
The originality and the nature preserved inside the holy city apparently served 
to emphasize the splendors of its monuments and shrines (Tsafrir, 1999). On the other 
hand, Yarbrough (2008) points out that Jerusalem attracted bishops and saints from 
around the Christian world who then established more churches and monasteries, as 
well as, imperial Christian women enhanced those remarkable establishments and 
facilitated Christian’s pilgrimage not only in Jerusalem but also throughout Palestine 
Burman (1991) which attracted dramatically more flow of noble Christian pilgrims 
(Wilkinson, 2002).   
This Christianity of Jerusalem’s identity was empowered by the Jesus willing 
to remove the most symbolic reference of the Jewry, namely the Temple. One of the 
most convincing assessments comes from Sanders who focuses on Jesus’s cleansing 
of the Temple and his saying about its coming destruction, Sanders concludes also 
that Jesus saw himself eschatological prophet called to proclaim that “the end that 
was at hand and that the temple would be destroyed, so that the new and perfect 
temple might arise” (Sanders, 1985:75). However, according to RISSC (2010) new 
Christian dominations made their presence in Jerusalem, namely groups like Christian 
Zionists who believe the current state of Israel is a fulfillment of Biblical prophecy 
and  by supporting it they may speed up the second coming of Jesus Christ, and hasten 
the Apocalypse. 
Yet for later generations of Christians, Jerusalem is the scene on which the 
most uniquely momentous events of history had been enacted. These challenges 
notwithstanding, Jerusalem status as Christian city is still well recognized. Its 
historical significance, its imperial patronage, and the resulting importance of Christ’s 
childhood and manhood there insured its standing in the minds of Christians around 
the world. Thus, when Jerusalem fell in the Persians’ hands Strategos states:        
“there took hold of all the Christians of the whole world great sorrow and effable 
grief” (Strategos, 1910:510).  
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3.3.3   Jerusalem in Islam  
The symbolic value of Jerusalem according to Muslims’ (believers) perception 
is deeply established and foundational, although finding several parallels with 
Christian and Jewish traditions; the Islamic association with Jerusalem remains 
unique, Jerusalem is the city of the prophets, the most powerful and universal symbol 
of monotheism (Peters, 1987). Jerusalem is the first direction of prayer in Islam 
(Mourad, 2008), however, the sole sanctity of Jerusalem was represented in the 
miraculous night journey in which Prophet Mohammad was transported from Mecca 
to the holy city in Jerusalem, and then ascended through Jerusalem, the gateway, to 
heaven (Elad, 1995; RISSC, 2010). This exceptional event has decisively affected and 
changed the status of Jerusalem, and influenced its consolidation as a centre of 
Muslim devotion; it is anchored onto the first verse of the seventeenth chapter of the 
Holy Quran, known as Night Journey: 
Glorified be He who carried His servant 
by night from the Inviolable Place of 
Worship to the Far Distant Place of 
Worship (Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa) the 
neighborhood whereof We have blessed, 
that We might show him of Our tokens! 
Lo! He, only He, is the Hearer, the Seer. 
(Quran 17:1) 
Needless to say, the night journey is considered as a benchmark in Islam. 
Following arriving into the holy city, Mohammad leads the other prophets in prayer; 
then he ascends the seven levels in heaven and receives a number of divine gifts 
which guide him and authorize his personal behavior to become the highest norm for 
Muslims throughout the world and through history. All of this is authorized and 
authenticated through the acknowledged sanctity of Jerusalem, the holy city (Peters, 
1987). The emblematic value of the holy city of Jerusalem is outstandingly supported 
by the erection of magnificent Islamic monuments and features. Although some of the 
Islamic features are influenced by the architectural style used by the Christians in 
Palestine (Grabar 1959; Chen 1999); Grabar (1986) magnifies the Islamic erections in 
Jerusalem, specifically the construction of the Dome of the Rock; Grabar depicts it as 
“the first consciously created masterpiece of Islamic art”. Moreover, it is worth 
mentioning that the inspiring encircling wall of the holy city of Jerusalem was built 
during the supremacy of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in the early 
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sixteenth century. Furthermore, Al-Tabari (1987) points out that Jerusalem was a 
point of attraction for the Muslims’ rulers; it was the place where one of the caliphs 
preferred to be crowned.  
Among the most important worships in Islam is Pilgrimage which is also 
connected with Jerusalem. As per Islam, there are three places as the only destinations 
of Pilgrimages:  
“The messenger of God said: You shall 
only set out on pilgrimage for three 
mosques: the sacred mosque (in Mecca), 
my mosque (in Medina), and the Aqsa 
mosque (in Jerusalem)” (Al-Wasiti, 1978: 
3-4, no.1). 
To stress the special advantage for visiting Jerusalem during Pilgrimage, Islam 
offered special accounts for those conducting it through Jerusalem:  
“He who makes pilgrimage [to Mecca], 
prays in the mosque of Medina, and 
[prays] in the Aqsa mosque in one season, 
is purified from his sins as if he has just 
been born”( Livne-Krafi, 1995:161, no. 
215) 
What can be inferred from these observations is that Jerusalem’s significance 
lies in the very centre of the hearts of Muslims believers.  All this explains why 
Muslims are bound to protect Jerusalem by virtue of their religious beliefs. Yet, 
unquestionably East Jerusalem including the old city is considered to be under Israeli 
occupation. From Islamic point of view, that is why the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is 
qualitatively different from any other conflict in which Muslims are involved.  
3.4   Conclusion  
In this chapter, the researcher starts outlining the historical background for the 
city of Jerusalem since its early existence, approximately six thousand years ago, up 
to date. The researcher briefly continued mentioning the successive civilizations that 
fought and controlled the city starting by the Canaanites and ending by the Israelis. 
After that, the researcher explores the social space of Jerusalem highlighting its social 
and demographic structure. It was shown that the major two social groups in 
Jerusalem are the Arab (Palestinians), and the Jewish (Israelis). The latter are mainly 
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urbanized groups occupy West Jerusalem and lots of space in East Jerusalem; while 
the Arabs are living only in the eastern part of the city and categorized into four social 
groups:  urban community, rural community, refugee camps, and Bedouins. All these 
groups are undergoing socio-economic transformation and moving towards being 
more urbanized.  
The last section in this chapter interestingly investigates the religious 
connection between Jerusalem and the major three monotheistic religions, namely 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The researcher clarifies what Jerusalem has meant to 
Jews, Christians and Muslims, and what it means to them today. Moreover, the 
researcher attempts to show the differences in the nature of the bond, in the origins of 
the sacred character, and in the quality and functions of the holiness involved. This 
religious bond and interrelation is one of the fundamental bases that form the 
ideological background for the city conquerors and defenders.  It has been shown that 
Jerusalem has long been embedded into Jewish religious consciousness; it represents 
for Jewry the superlative focus of their spiritual, cultural, and national life. Likewise, 
Christianity glorifies Jerusalem for the historic facts of Jesus (i.e., his life and death) 
and the relative events (e.g., the resurrection and ascension), and both combined to 
create holy places in the city. Eventually, the Islamic connection with Jerusalem, 
undoubtedly, provides us with perhaps the most impressive example of how a holy 
city can acquire an explicit holiness on the basis of miraculous events, Prophet 
Mohammad’s divine authority was established though his personal association with 
Jerusalem, and therefore, locates Jerusalem as a major Islamic centre for all Muslims 
throughout the world.  Jerusalem thus represents an early example of a sacred place 
that transcends cultural and religious boundaries.  
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Chapter Four 
Spatial Planning Development in Jerusalem14  
"Planning is bringing the future into the present so that you can do something about it now"  
Alan Lakein 
N this chapter the researcher analyzes the evolution of planning in Jerusalem resulted 
by the historical administrative authorities; exposing to their historical development 
in terms of spatial planning. The researcher is shedding light on the special 
characteristics of each authority, attached by an overview analysis of the planning 
perceptions in terms of jurisdiction, policies, and achievements. In Particular, this chapter 
explores mainly four administrative and planning authorities in Jerusalem 
chronologically, that is, planning in the era of: (1) Ottoman Rule; (2) British Mandate; (3) 
Jordanian Control; and (4) Israeli Occupation. The researcher aimed to divide this chapter 
into different sections to ensure that an analytical study of planning in Jerusalem can be 
grasped historically.    
4.1   Background 
Over three millennia ago, during the first four 
hundred years of Jerusalem’s existence, a tradition 
developed which envisioned Jerusalem as a "Holy City". 
By the first century AD "Holy Jerusalem" became 
known as the birthplace of Christianity. When Islam 
appeared in the seventh century, it also perceived 
Jerusalem as "Sacred Centre" (Enis, 2004). By time, 
Jerusalem became core of all monotheistic religions and 
was regarded as the “origin” of all cities, so pertinently 
represented in Bunting’s Map1580 which shows 
Jerusalem in the heart of three continents (Fig. 4.1). 
                                                   
14 This chapter of this PhD research has recently been submitted in a research paper authored by the researcher and the 
supervisor; the publication is referenced as: Najjar, R. and Reicher, C., 2011, Spatial Planning In The Conflict Areas – 
Chronological Analysis: The Case of Unbalanced Powers in Jerusalem, London Art and Architecture Magazine. 
London: Lonaard (Paper in press). 
I 
Figure124.1: Bunting’s map1580 presenting Jerusalem as the 
centre of the world, (Rosenbilt, 1987) 
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Jerusalem is a unique case study in terms of its historical development, especially 
during the last century where the city had passed through different ruling and 
administrative powers. Within less than fifty years, the city of Jerusalem was controlled 
by four different Administrations, i.e. (Ottoman, British, Jordanian, and Israeli 
occupation). During these subsequent administrative transformations, the city of 
Jerusalem had witnessed quick and variant development patterns, which in total had 
produced different challenges to the city;  more particularly, in terms of the fast changing 
composition of both: its soft infrastructure "city population", and its hard infrastructure 
"city built-up areas". Hence, the overall experience in the field of physical planning in 
Jerusalem, offers unique and special aspects of profound interest for any scholar in spatial 
relations, history and human geography. 
Today Jerusalem stands reflecting two divergent images, one in which the city 
shows one of the most historical pictures in the world; while the other expresses one of 
the most modern cities there. These two contradictory representations of the city are 
accompanied with amazing heterogeneous population, resulted mainly during the last 
century. Consequently, to understand this exceptional mixture of the city, it is crucially 
important to go back to the historical roots of the physical and demographical 
development the city went through. The successive occupations and authorities in 
Jerusalem have created a maze of wide rules and regulations, making the planning system 
complex and in many ways inefficient. The historical powers that had characterized the 
official planning system in Jerusalem are listed chronologically in (Figs. 4.2 & 4.3). In 
this chapter the researcher analyzes the administrative planning systems shown in (Fig. 
4.3). 
 
Powers that controlled Jerusalem before Ottomans  
    
 
 
Figure224.2: Historical powers that controlled Jerusalem before Ottomans, (PASSIA, 2002; edited) 
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Figure234.3: Historical administrative development of Jerusalem since Ottoman time, (researcher) 
 
The previous figure reflects the quick and dynamic transformations of the 
administrative authorities in Jerusalem; it is quiet noticeable how fast these 
transformations were in the last century. During the ruling time of each authority the city 
of Jerusalem was defined “spatially” in completely different approach, the smallest 
definition was definitely during the Ottoman Rule, in which Jerusalem was mainly 
developing in the boundaries of the Old City, which is conveniently and precisely defined 
by its impressive encircling wall which depicts the feature of the traditional old 
fortification cities, built during the reign of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent 
in the early sixteenth century. The properties of planning during the Ottoman Rule in 
Jerusalem are analytical discussed in the following section. 
Planning and Administrative Systems of Jerusalem 
(1516 – Current) 
British Mandate 
1917-1948 
Jerusalem  
Old City with its 
suburbs 
Ottoman Rule 
1516-1917 
 
Mainly Jerusalem 
 Old City  
Israeli occupation 
1967 - onwards  
 
Unification of 
Jerusalem after 
the 1967 Six-Day 
War 
 
Occupation & 
annexing  
EJ to WJ 
 
Division of Jerusalem after 
the 1948 Arab-Israeli War 
 
First Israeli 
occupation 1948 
Occupation of 
West Jerusalem 
(WJ)  
Jordanian Rule 
1948-1967 
 
East Jerusalem  
(EJ) belongs to 
Trans-Jordan 
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4.2   Planning Jerusalem during the Ottoman Rule (1516-1917) 
Ottomans had stepped their first rule in Jerusalem in the early sixteenth century, in 
that time; Jerusalem was met with great concern from the Ottomans Government, 
consequently, strict laws and orders were imposed, various public works were undertaken 
to renovate the city infrastructure, the walls of Jerusalem were rebuilt, drinking fountains 
were installed especially in places where worshippers and pilgrims were expected.  
Imposing security and socio-political stability in the city was quite enough to originate 
increase in population accompanied by economic prosperity. However, inconsiderable 
prints of this prosperity and urban renewal remained in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, during which Ottoman Jerusalem underwent a period of arrested growth, which 
lasted until the early 1830's. 
 Contrary to the 16
th
 century, Scholch (1996) argues that Jerusalem's revival came 
about not because of economic expansion but because of the political, religious and 
administrative developments of the 19
th
 century; during which, Jerusalem was a subject 
to massive foreign missionaries along with consulates
15
 establishments, which Ottomans 
proved hard dislodgment. In the middle of the 19
th
 century, the profound administrative 
redevelopment of Jerusalem was a dominant parameter of the Ottoman centralization in 
Palestine. As a result of the institution of municipal and administrative councils, 
Jerusalem's political life was revitalized; more attention was paid to the city urbanization, 
and the growth of the city population rose. All of these European-inspired changes quite 
naturally accelerated the building boom in the city, and new European building style and 
architecture continued to appear influencing the urban landscape without interruption 
until WWI.  
Although Mahrouk (1995) points out that on the national level of Palestine 
Ottomans had no direct spatial policies and they did not integrate to a comprehensive 
planning system; Ottomans had recognized Jerusalem as main province in Palestine in 
terms of physical planning; this special conception towards the city was translated by 
large scale actions. The first windmill in Jerusalem was built in 1839; in 1863 the local 
authority ordered the removal of all market platforms in order to create additional space 
                                                   
15 The first European consulates were those of Great Britain (1838), Prussia (1842), Sardinia (1843), France (1843), 
America (1856) and Russia (1857).  
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for pedestrians. In 1885, old-street tiles were replaced in all the city's allays and main 
streets, with the provision of side drainage channels. A railway line was opened in 1892 
between Jerusalem and Jaffa; the first major highway joining the two cities was 
completed in 1867; and the city hospital was rebuilt in 1891. Also Post offices and other 
channels of international links were opened in Jerusalem (Auld, 2000; Amn, 2001).   
This unique value of Jerusalem has always made it a point of attraction. To assure 
sustainable and guided pattern of development, Ottomans had developed remarkable 
social system constructed by flexible laws and regulations, including residency rights, of 
both: native inhabitants, and visitors. The natural composition of the city population was 
of Muslim majority, secondary Christian parties, and small minority of Jews; among this 
diverse population, no discrimination was reported. According to (Cohen, 1996) 
Ottomans never prevented any of the Christian communities from exercising their 
historically acknowledged rights of free passage into Jerusalem; even Jews though were 
minority, enjoyed some religious freedom during the Ottoman period unprecedented in 
any European country.  
However, the interaction of the Ottomans sectarian policy with the international 
politics in the late Ottoman era when the Ottoman Empire declined had negatively 
affected the social life in Jerusalem and produced unanticipated results. Since Ottoman-
European treaties were originally agreed upon under provisions where the Ottoman 
Empire was dealing with its European partners from a position of strength; while 
Ottoman declination continued, the treaties remained and the Europeans spent all the 
efforts to interpret them in the sense of increasing their influence upon and control over 
various areas and communities (Jews, Americans, etc) in the empire. Accordingly, more 
European and American missionaries were settled in Ottoman Jerusalem, since Jerusalem 
represented a coexistence and plurality of faiths and confessions (Salibi and Yusuf, 
1995). When, around 1860, the Ottoman government began allowing European 
Christians to build outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem extensive western style 
compounds continued to grow. 
The Jewish desire to establish Jewish national state in Palestine was announced 
initially by Dr. "Theodore Herzl", the founder of Political Zionism, by his publication of 
"Der Judenstaat" in 1869. Immediate refusal to settle Palestine with Jewish colonists was 
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declared by the Ottoman Sultan Abd-al Hamid II
16
. In 1897, First Zionist Congress, 
meeting in Basel, Switzerland, issued the Basel Program on Colonization of Palestine and 
established the World Zionist Organization (WZO). In response to First Zionist Congress, 
Abd-al Hamid II initiates policy of sending members of his own palace staff to govern 
province of Jerusalem. Besides, Ottomans devised a series of entry restrictions that 
prohibited all foreign (non-Ottoman) Jews, with the exception of pilgrims, from visiting 
Palestine. However, Jewish immigration in Jerusalem did not stop, and was facilitated by 
foreign Consuls who had usurped a large role in the conduct of minority relations with 
the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Jerusalem governor perceived that laws were not firmly 
connected to prevent the sale of land to foreign Jewish immigrants (Oke, 1982).  
In conclusion, Ottomans had controlled Jerusalem since the early sixteenth century 
up to the end of WWI, after which the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and Jerusalem was 
captured by the British Army. Although Ottomans did 
not develop planning regime with comprehensive and 
detailed (laws and regulations; Master Plans; etc.), 
Ottomans did integrate different factors during their 
development process. An outstanding aspect was the 
social integration of the city, reflected by its amazing 
quarters. Jerusalem Old City quarters (Fig. 2.4) are 
one of its most distinctive features, forming a clear-
cut division along well defined geographical and 
demographical lines. The formation of these quarters 
reflects the integration of the social aspects with the 
physical appearance of the city, since each quarter 
contained a group of people having more or less similar background, and who preferred 
to live in proximity with each other forming "homogenous space" in a relatively large 
"heterogeneous population".  
Moreover, Ottomans renovated and reconstructed the Old City physical structure 
which reflects up today a vivid presentation of the "old fortification towns", by this 
                                                   
16 Sultan Abd-al Hamid II was the 34th and the last Ottoman Sultan to rule the Empire with absolute power, ruling from 
August 31, 1876 until he was deposed on April 27, 1909. 
Figure124.4:  Quarters of Jerusalem Old City, (Hussein, 2006)   
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Ottomans inherited to the world a distinctive city which in the current conventional 
planning no such amazing city structure was created elsewhere in Palestine. Finally and 
most remarkably, Ottomans had distinguishingly conceived the religious value of 
Jerusalem, and developed their planning policies to make Jerusalem as what the 
researcher describe "Religious Open City", so that, even foreign (non-Ottoman) Jews and 
Christians could always visit and most probably inhabit the city for religious purposes. 
The researcher sums up in (Fig. 4.5) and (Table 4.1) the planning perception and the 
resulted spatial reflection on Jerusalem during the Ottoman Era. 
 
 
Table4 .1:  Ottomans planning perception–reflection interrelationship, (researcher) 
Ottoman 
Jerusalem 
Old Fortress 
City 
Religious 
Open City 
Administrative 
Province 
Deplomatic 
Centre 
Vernacular 
City 
Planning Era Planning Perception  Spatial Reflection 
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Old  Fortress City 
 Building and reconstructing the encircling city walls  
 place the old city as a monolithic unit serving as a 
regional 
Vernacular City   Old style city quarters structure with narrow allays  
Religious Open City 
 Always foreign Jews and Christians are able to visit 
the city for religious activities "e.g. Pilgrim, etc."  
 Enhancing the heterogeneous city population 
Administrative Province 
 Renovate the city infrastructure, besides installing 
public services 
Diplomatic Centre 
 Concentration of international Consulates and political 
missionaries 
Figure254.5:  Characteristics of Ottoman Jerusalem, (researcher) 
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4.3   Planning Jerusalem during the British Mandate (1917-1948) 
Political life in "Mandatory Palestine" (1917-1948) was matchlessly more rigorous 
and passionate than during the late Ottoman epoch. Historic benchmarks were born from 
the conflict with the British because of their unilateral Jew-biased policies: the 
appointment of a Zionist Jew as first High Commissioner for Palestine in 1920 and 
periodic changes of his successors; a set of government "White Papers" planned to 
outline the destiny of Palestine, in 1922, 1930, and 1939; several inquiry commissions; 
and a British plan to divide the country, in 1937. Hence, the paramount question was the 
future of Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular, which for more than one time 
was intended to be internationally administrated. Rising tension between the native Arab 
people and the immigrant Jews erupted into bloody riots in 1920 and 1929, followed by 
the Arab revolt of 1936-1939. The turbulence reached a climax as the British Mandate 
drew to a close (O’Ballance, 1957; Begin, 1951; Garcia-Granados, 1948). Therefore, to 
understand precisely the British planning policies in Jerusalem;  the researcher finds it is 
noteworthy to highlight briefly the historical background (within the next three 
paragraphs) about the exceptional socio-political events during the British Mandate, 
before focusing on the planning footprints the mandate left in Jerusalem.  
The British control over Palestine began when the WWI verged on its end, more 
specifically, when the British forces entered the Old City of Jerusalem on December 11
th
, 
1917 (Glubb, 1959). This act marked the end of more than four hundred years of the 
Ottoman rule and the beginning of thirty years of British rule. In November 1918, a 
military edict was issued dividing Ottoman territories into occupied enemy territories 
(OET) (Biger, 2005),  and the British had established their military government in 
Palestine, which had later been changed into mandatory administration system as per 
"Article 22" of the Covenant of the League of Nations as stated at the "Paris Peace 
Conference" in 1919. The League of Nations mandatory also declared general aim of 
entrusting - territories from the dissolved Ottoman Empire inhabited by citizens incapable 
to stand by themselves – to advanced nations until such time they are able to stand alone 
(Encyclopedia Judaica, 1972). However, British Mandate in Palestine had paradoxical 
objective than the stated above; since it was international recognition for the purpose of 
establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home.  
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In 1920, "San Remo Conference" pointed out that the British Mandate of Palestine 
comprised territories in present-day Jordan (called in that time Transjordan), Israel, and 
the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Aruri, 1972), which in total 
allocate the boundaries of the British Mandate in Palestine that were extending to the 
western boundaries of its mandate for Mesopotamia (Feith, 1994); nevertheless, Biger 
(2005) argues that "San Remo Conference" did not precisely define the boundaries of the 
mandated territories. In 1921 Jordan was split off and given separate Arab administration 
operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine
17
 (Lustick, 
1988), and in September 1922 the League of Nations Council approved the memorandum 
of the "Churchill White Paper" of excluding Jewish settlements in Transjordan. Also in 
1922, the British Mandate was modified to stand within Palestine which consists in the 
present-day Israel and the Palestinian Territories (Pappe, 2004). This new delimitation of 
the boundaries merges with main purpose of the British Mandate in Palestine according 
to Balfour's Declaration of 1917, in which the British promised to create and foster a 
Jewish national home in Palestine. Accordingly, the terms of the British Mandate 
incorporated the language of the Balfour Declaration and were approved by the League 
of Nations Council in July 1922. Although the United States was not a member of the 
League of Nations, a joint resolution of the United States Congress in June 1922 
endorsed the concept of the Jewish National Home. Besides, Pappe (1994) argues that 
even though Britain and France in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 proposed Palestine 
as an international enclave, the mandate in Palestine was pure British to commit with 
Balfour's promise mentioned previously. 
The mandate system in Palestine was designed by the British with the appealing of 
terms that denied the principle of majority rule or any other criteria that would give the 
Palestinian “Arab" majority control over the government of Palestine. To encounter this 
problem, massive influx of Jewish immigration to Palestine had taken place during the 
British Mandate, raising the Jewish community from one tenth to almost one third of the 
populations. Between 1920 and 1945, more than 365000 Jews were immigrated to 
                                                   
17 "Hebert Samuel" a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine. By assigning a Zionist 
Jewish commissioner, the British assured creating Jewish National Home in Palestine. 
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Palestine
18
, and more than 60000 Jews had illegally immigrated, the accuracy of these 
numbers was boosted by sequent studies (McCarthy, 1995). Therefore, according to the 
demographic policy of the British Mandate, the Arab population in Palestine grew 
naturally, while immigration accounts for most of the increase of the Jewish community. 
The administration centre of the British Mandate was headquartered in Jerusalem. 
Hosting the headquarters of the political administration of the country, Jerusalem 
acquired a new value of political significance adding to its position of religious 
importance, and became the capital of the whole country again for the first time since 
Crusader days. This in itself was an outstanding source of urban growth which 
accelerated rapidly after the WWI. Thus, it was in Jerusalem that most of official British 
buildings were erected, building activity began almost immediately, and Jerusalem 
expanded to the north, south, and west. During these years, Jerusalem began its 
transformation from the provincial town of Ottoman times to a modern administrative, 
political, religious and cultural center.  
The unique composition of Jerusalem's character had attracted the famous pioneer 
European planners and architects. Many of the most eminent architects and planners of 
that time were invited to Jerusalem to draw master plans, develop guidelines, and design 
buildings. The building boom embraced every sphere, from office buildings, commercial 
areas, luxurious hotels, residential districts, and sport facilities to industrial plants and 
religious institutions. During the British Mandate, Jerusalem saw the arrival of Sir Patrick 
Geddes and Charles Ashbee, William McLean, Henry Kendall, and Rau whom in total 
had played significant role in shaping the city image of the new extension of Jerusalem. 
Many of these planners were known of their support of the "garden city" idea; therefore, 
they tried to translate this support in terms of drafted outlines and master plans to the city 
of Jerusalem. 
In light of above discussion, one of the most significant signs of British Mandate 
was the start of the "conventional town planning" in Jerusalem
19
. The British perceived 
the need to conserve the old city exclusive identity and historic heritage, while 
transforming Jerusalem into a modern city. That is why the preservation component was 
                                                   
18 A Survey of Palestine: Prepared in December, 1945 and January, 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry. Palestine: Govt. printer.  
19 i.e. the start of designing urban “advisory and master” plans for Jerusalem. 
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always present in their conception. The British aware of the political, cultural and 
religious meaning of their governance in the city, they aimed to demonstrate this weighty 
task by preservation and renewal of the historic city with its environs integrally. 
Consequently, the British planning conception for Jerusalem old city and its surroundings 
was entitled by the "Romantic Approach".  
This romantic conception of planning has inspired the most important contribution 
of saving the space originality of the old city of Jerusalem; the regulations of buffering 
the old city and for building with original stone only were firstly introduced by Roland 
Storrs
20
 who said: 
“No person shall destroy, improve, change or repair the structure of any building in 
Jerusalem or its surroundings within 2500 meters radius from the Damascus Gate 
without first obtaining a written permit from the Military Governor”
 21
 
The regulations which Storrs instituted 
show sensitivity to the care for the city’s 
appearance and the preservation of its beauty. 
His regulations served as a thoughtful basis for 
subsequent plans, British and others that have 
shaped Jerusalem from then to now.  Storrs also 
forbade using sheet metal and stucco for 
building and prohibited the use of beaten iron 
and stucco within the walls. Within the 30 
years of British administration, five plans were 
prepared for Jerusalem. Three of these plans 
were advisory and two statutory outline plans. 
In 1918 Sir William McLean was invited to 
Jerusalem by Ronald Storrs in order to prepare 
city outline plan. Three months after his arrival 
McLean submitted the first proposed master plan of the city (Fig. 4.6).  The strategic 
principles of this plan are important even to this day, and serve as foundations for the 
                                                   
20 The British Military Governor of Jerusalem from 1918-1926, he announced his order of regulations on the 8th of 
April 1918, i.e. four months after the capture of the city. 
21  Cited from: “Preservation of the Building Heritage” P.4, Jerusalem Outline Plan 2000, Jerusalem Municipality, 
2008. 
Figure264.6: McLean Master Plan 1918, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
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planning of Jerusalem, the plan identifies a practical implementation of the principle of 
green space around the walls. The plan which was designed according to a common 
baroque urban model, draw the first touch of the romantic conception in planning 
Jerusalem, it treated the historic centre of Jerusalem as a monolithic unit, architectural 
and emotional focal point for the entire city, however, it does not serve it as a functional 
focus. In this plan all the radial roads, streets and paths are connected to the park around 
the walls of the old city. Between it and the new city which developed to the west there 
were left open spaces with no building in them whatsoever. Another space was created 
towards the east and the north-between the old city and Mount of Corruption, Mount of 
Olives and Mount Scopus. The area west of the old city was for the development of the 
new city with no limitations besides the road system to the old city that was laid out. 
Although McLean plan was not a detailed plan, it has got its power though solid 
architectural components such as forbidding building with materials such as corrugated 
iron, stucco and cement, use of traditional building forms such as domes and stone paved 
roofs. These considerations enhanced urban uniformity throughout the city and created 
harmony between all space components of the built environment. Table (4.2) shows the 
percentage of land use management of McLean plan. 
 
Table54.2: Percentage of land use categories for McLean Plan 1918 according to (Shapiro, 1973) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above table reflects the pure preservation criterion that McLean practiced to 
save the privacy of the Old City. In order to ensure the basic principles of this plan 
Ronald Storrs forbade new building, within a radius of 2500 meters from the Damascus 
Gate, without his written permission. Regulations were enforced as to heights of 
buildings in order to preserve the skyline. Later, a crucial law promulgated by the 
Land use category 
Designated 
area(ha) 
Percent of 
total area* 
Development and  
Building Area 
1002  56% 
Restrictions on  
Building 
599  33% 
Building Prohibition 190  11% 
* The total area of the Plan is 1791 ha 
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administration of Sir Ronald Storrs requiring that all new buildings must be faced with 
only "native Jerusalem stone", regardless of the actual construction material. This law is 
the most influential contribution to the character of architecture in Jerusalem and has 
done a remarkable job of preserving the city's unique beauty. McLean succeeded in 
preparing a master plan which has, in many respects, determined the course of 
Jerusalem's urban development with an emphasis on preservation.  
Within a decade three more master plans were prepared. In 1919 Professor Patrick 
Geddes submitted the second master plan establishing lesser open green area in the 
western side of the city (Fig. 4.7). In 
his plan Geddes inspired the general 
idea of McLean plan. Nevertheless, 
Geddes was more flexible in terms of 
the preservation criteria, he proposed 
guided development process near the 
walls of the Old City, and significantly 
minimized the amount of land where 
building was prohibited. The direction 
of future development was almost the 
same as McLean plan, i.e. in the north 
and the west of the Old City, while the 
restriction remained on the eastern and 
southern side. The road system 
remained as that proposed by McLean 
but the large radial axes lost their 
visual importance and became simple 
movement routes. The park around the 
walls remained and was integrated into the Mount of Olives area in which building was 
restrained. Table (4.3) shows the percentage of land use management of Geddes's master 
plan. 
 
Figure  72 4.7: Geddes Master Plan 1919, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
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Table64.3: Percentage of land use categories for Geddes's Plan 1919 according to (Shapiro, 1973) 
 
 
 
Among the first architects whom planned Jerusalem was Charles Ashbee
22
, his 
planning philosophy was collaborated with Geddes, and both of them only one year later 
after the Geddes Plan, produced Geddes-Ashbee's plan which continued to develop until 
1922 (Fig. 4.8).  
 
Figure284.8: Geddes -Ashbee Master Plan 1920-1922, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
 
                                                   
22 Ashbee served as a civic advisor during the British Mandate in Palestine since 1918 till 1920, also served as planning 
advisor to the Governor in 1922  
Land use category 
Designated 
area(ha)  
Percent of 
total area* 
Development and  
Building Area 
1179 66% 
Restrictions on  
Building 
516 29% 
Building Prohibition 85 5% 
* The total area of the Plan is 1780 ha 
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Geddes-Ashbee advisory plan had introduced greater emphasis on neighborhood 
planning and established building criteria according to zones. The plan was influenced by 
Ashbee's fascination by traditional Palestinian vernacularism, and he contended to shield 
its dignity and beauty from disruptive random development. The basic urban structure of 
Geddes-Ashbee plan was not changed from Geddes plan, although some aspects were 
widened and along the major transportation routes were located industrial areas. This 
plan for the first time indicated clear designations of land use “Zoning”. As observed in 
the plan, the Old City was encircled by green belt and open spaces which are more 
intensive in the northern and eastern parts of the city, the designated areas under special 
control to save the originality of the location were increased. Geddes-Ashbee’s plan is 
considered more comprehensive than the proceeded plans; it allocates wider range for 
development while maintaining the privacy of the Old City of Jerusalem. Table (4.4) 
shows the percentage of land use management of Geddes-Ashbee's plan. 
 
Table74.4: Percentage of land use categories for Geddes-Ashbee’s Plan 1920-1922 according to (Shapiro, 1973) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impulse of the British desire in planning Jerusalem was incomparable; three 
years latter to Geddes-Ashbee’s plan, architect Clifford Holliday23 introduced his plan in 
1925 which was officially approved in 1930. The importance of this plan lies in the fact 
that in effect it determined the character of building in Jerusalem in its peak period from 
1924 to 1944
24
. From the Holliday plan, detailed local plans were derived and all 
parcellation and building plans in the city were adapted to it. This plan became therefore 
from 1930 the first legal outline plan and its detailed regulations defined the land uses, 
                                                   
23 Clifford Holliday worked in Jerusalem as a city planner from the beginning of 1923 while involved in beginning in 
preparation of the formal outline plan for the city. 
24Holliday plan served officially from (1930-1944) and is considered the plan which served for the longest time period 
(i.e. 14 years) during the British Mandate control over Jerusalem. 
Land use category 
Designated 
area(ha)  
Percent of 
total area* 
Development and  
Building Area 
1437 65% 
Old City and Villages 142 6% 
Industry 151 7% 
Open Spaces 486 22% 
* The total area of the Plan is 2216 ha 
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the building setbacks, building densities, heights and building materials. According to 
principles which were in force at that time, to the axial transportation routes were added 
natural road systems that encircled the city at its margins and were meant to enable 
interurban traffic to bypass the city. In accordance with land use designations, special 
zones in the city, especially along the main roads the largest of which was Jaffa Road, 
were designated for commercial activities; this road is considered up to date one of the 
most popular commercial road in Jerusalem.  
The four previously discussed 
master plans (McLean's Plan, Geddes's 
Plan, Geddes-Ashbee’s Plan, and 
Holliday’s Plan) outlined the general 
shape of the city space and the 
respective urban development process. 
However, even during the WWII
25
 
times, the city continued demanding new 
ideas and more comprehensive details 
about its physical context and future 
pattern of development. As a result, in 
1944 Henry Kendall as a British Town 
Planning Adviser, toward the end of 
WWII developed the last plan to be 
initiated by the British Mandate 
Authority (Fig. 4.9). 
In his plan, Kendall was inspired 
to some extent by the Abercrombie Plan for Greater London of 1944. It is noteworthy to 
mention that the total area of Kendall Plan is almost twice the area of the preceding 
(Geddes-Ashbee) Plan which is understandable, since the population according to Efrat 
(1984) had grown from 62578 capita in 1922 to 165000 capita in 1946, i.e. the population 
was almost 2.6 times the population during the previous plan. Kendall had significantly 
                                                   
25 WWII: the Second World War, it was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945, which involved most of 
the world's nations, including all of the great powers: eventually forming two opposing military alliances, the Allies 
and the Axis. Source (Sommerville, 2008). 
Figure  124.9: Kendall Master Plan 1944, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
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reduced the amount of area earmarked as open spaces especially in the westward, 
southward, and even northward of the Old City, which means, enhancing the 
development towards these directions, and that is why he located the commercial 
frontage besides the concentrated central business district in the northwest direction. The 
plan added to the city new residential zones in areas which were in the older plans part of 
the park surrounding the walls. Kendall who was sensitive to the social isolation 
tendencies of the different communities, religions and economic classes planned his 
neighborhoods according to the model of separate neighborhoods “zones”. (Fig. 4.10) 
shows the geographic proportion of planned lands in Kendall plan. 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that most of the British plans and regulations 
with respect to Jerusalem were all crowned with sensation. For their “romantic approach” 
in planning, the major dominant principle that underlay all the plans was the separation of 
the old city of Jerusalem “holy city” from the new city “secular city” around it. From this 
concept emerged the other planning and architectural principles. Although British plans 
were directed to be restraining and limiting “conservative plans”, they also aimed at 
preventing accelerated and uncontrolled development while encouraging sustainable 
interrelation among the historic centre and the demanding future expansion of the near 
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Figure  034.10: Percentage of geographical distribution for Kendall Plan 1944, 
according to (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
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environs. So that British planners laid down standards for design and building regulations 
which enriched the vernacular space of Jerusalem. Planning during British Mandate was 
passionate, progressive and innovative; however, the natural British conservatism 
prevented harming the old. (Table 4.5) shows the planning perception and the resulted 
spatial reflection on Jerusalem during the British Mandate Era. 
Table 4.5:  British planning perception–reflection interrelationship, (researcher) 
 
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that the foundation plan which formed the basic 
planning strategy for Jerusalem and inspired all the other plans during British Mandate is 
the McLean plan of 1918. All the proceeding plans followed McLean’s basic concept in 
preserving the old city of Jerusalem while directing development outside and away from 
its fascinating encircling wall. The comparison between these plans is shown 
schematically in (Fig. 4.11). Although the Ottoman Rule had lasted in the Jerusalem more 
than four hundred years, it did not inherit a lot of "plans and regulations" in terms of 
spatial planning as the Mandatory Government did. If Ottomans inherited Jerusalem 
originality, the British preserved it and introduced the modernity to the city! After thirty 
years of the British Rule in Jerusalem, the British left irreversible physical and social 
textures as well as remarkable political changes. 
Planning Era Planning Perception  Spatial Reflection 
J
er
u
sa
le
m
 i
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 M
a
n
d
a
te
 
Political Significance  
 The administration centre was headquartered in Jerusalem 
 Jerusalem became the capital of the whole country again for 
the first time since Crusader days 
Romantic Conception 
 Conserve the old city exclusive identity, while transforming 
Jerusalem into a modern city. 
 Building regulations show sensitivity to old city’s appearance. 
 Master plans treated the old city as a monolithic unit, 
architectural and emotional focal point for the entire city 
Garden City Concept 
 Design buffer zone around the old city walls where building is 
prohibited 
 Control heights of buildings to preserve the skyline. 
Modern City  
 Jerusalem began its transformation from provincial town to a 
modern administrative, political, religious and cultural center 
Challenging Attractive 
City 
 Start comprehensive town planning by the most  eminent 
British planners 
 Produce five Master Plans and powerful building regulations 
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2.4   Planning during the Division of Jerusalem (1948-1967) 
The League of Nations gave Great Brittan a mandate to govern Palestine including 
Jerusalem after WWI (Hanna, 1942). Although in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 
Britain and France had proposed to divide the Middle East between them into spheres of 
influence with "Palestine" as an “international enclave”, the imperial administration 
The most important plan that formed 
the planning strategy for Jerusalem 
from the beginning of the British 
planning is the McLean plan of 1918, 
which defined for the first time the 
basic problem of the city and set urban 
development principles and guidelines 
for relationship between the old city 
and the new. The main ideas were the 
separation between the old city and the 
new city, preservation of the old city, 
preservation of the areas east of the old 
city as open spaces and development of 
new building to the west of the old city. 
           
 
 
                                                                                      
   a. McLean 
 
 
 
 
                  
             b. Geddes 
 
 
 
   
d. Kendall 
 
 
 
                  
  
        c. Geddes 
Ashbee 
Figure  13 4.11: (a) Schematic plan of McLean Plan 1918; (b) schematic plan of Geddes Plan 1919; (c) schematic plan of 
Geddes –Ashbee Plan 1920-1922; schematic plan of Kendall Plan 1940, (researcher) 
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attempted to divide the city of Jerusalem into separates boroughs (Pappe, 1994). 
However, the plan fails and so does the mandate, thus Great Britain in February 1947 
declared its Mandate in Palestine "unworkable". By the end of the British Mandate in 
Palestine, Jerusalem as a "Palestinian Capital" turned into a question of hope!  
Again between the years of 1947 – 1948 the United Nations (UN) called for 
partition of Palestine and the "internationalization of Jerusalem"(Rakauskas, 1957). 
However Arabs rejected the plan, then the “Arab-Israeli” war broke out and ended by 
proclamation of independence for Israel in 1948, the event which represents practical 
translation of the British commitment to the establishment of a “Jewish homeland” in 
Palestine (Balfour Declaration of 1917). During the fighting in 1948, most of the new city 
of Jerusalem fell under the control of the Israelis. The Arabs took over the Old City and 
the eastern edges of the new city. Approximately thirty thousand Palestinians were driven 
out of their new city homes. Jerusalem was divided into what became known as West 
Jerusalem, under the Israelis, and East Jerusalem under the Jordanian administration. 
With the resignation of the British Mandate, the “passionate and romantic planning” 
fruitful days came to an end, while an establishment of a new colonial administration in 
Jerusalem took place. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the demographic composition of Palestine has 
drastically changed during the mandate. Massive Jewish immigrations were arranged to 
Palestine in that time (Sachar, 1979), the influx of Jewish settlers was forcing the 
Palestinian fellahin (native peasants) from their land, consequently the mandatory 
government tried to control the absorptive capacity of the country (Cohen, 1970). 
Nonetheless, the mandatory government allotted thousands of hectares of the Palestinian 
cultivable land to the Jews (Auman, 1975). In 1937 British Government discussed this 
issue in the report of Peel Commission which stated: 
“The heavy immigration in the years 1933-36 would seem to show that the Jews have 
been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”26 
The previous discussion reflects how the mandatory consciousness realized this 
artificial shift in the Palestinian population composition and did not stop it.  Avneri 
(1984) shows that during WWI the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of 
                                                   
26 Cited from: Palestine Royal Commission Report (the Peel Report), 1937, p. 300, London. 
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war hard times; also Porath (1974) points out that during the early years of the British 
mandate in Palestine the overwhelming population majority was Muslim and Christian 
Arabs, therefore in the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily. 
(Fig. 4.12) shows the record number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine during the early 
start of the mandate to the first years of the WWII. 
 
Figure324.12: Jewish Immigration into Palestine during 1919 – 1941, according to (Porath, 1977; edited) 
 
It is clearly shown that by the early start of the British Mandate, Jews felt rested 
and even free to direct their travel into Palestine. However, (Simpson, 1930) argues that 
Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan and Syria was considered illegal and 
recognized to have the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants. Along 
with this immigration policy, Israel spent every effort to own lands from Palestinians 
(Teveth, 1985), by 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres
27
 
(Granott, 1952). As a result of this imperial acts which Jewish practiced during the 
mandate time, Arabs organized more and more riots to liberate their lands and protect 
their rights (Kimche, 1973). After its independence, Israel continued to support Jewish 
immigration, in 1950 Israel issued the “Law of Return”, which granted every Jew the 
automatic right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen of the state. 
For nineteen years (1948-1967), the two parts of Jerusalem developed in total 
                                                   
27 1 acre = 4046.86 meter square  
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separation from one another. While it was a period of major development and change in 
“West Jerusalem”, the rate of growth was much slower in “East Jerusalem” where the 
city was marked by economic stagnation and development was modest. Although 
Khamaisi (1997) argues that Jordanian planning regime in Palestine made some changes 
by legislating new planning laws which replaced and amended the British planning acts, 
the Jordanians did not produce any new master plan for East Jerusalem. They simply kept 
Kendall Plan of 1944, which was considered the statutory plan and the only available 
reference to guide and development of the city. In planning point of view, after the 
division of Jerusalem into west and east, it might be said that Kendall Plan was no more 
“healthy” to function as a master plan. Since in the time it was planned, Jerusalem was 
envisioned as one entity that shall grow in one overall spatial system of development, in 
contrast to the divisional status! 
In addition to the economic losses, Jerusalemites (Arab residents) also suffered the 
political and social consequences of the division of the city. Not only did they lose 
property, businesses, and jobs after the division of Jerusalem but they also lost a way of 
life.  The development pattern in East Jerusalem was "organic"
28
, it was small-scale and 
piecemeal. The largest construction is initiated by a family or perhaps a small group of 
buildings by a developer. The design of individual buildings is highly differentiated, and 
the single-family house in its diverse forms is the predominant building type.  
On the other hand, West Jerusalem which was declared as a capital for Israel 
experienced the opposite scenario. The city growth initiated and implemented by the 
central government on large scale projects, construction is public and of enormous scale, 
with whole sectors in the city designed by a single architectural view. Housing projects 
with standardized, repetitive units characterized the neighborhoods of western Jerusalem 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the law of stone buildings was overlooked, and permits were 
given to construct buildings in concrete or stucco (Najjar, 2007b). The architecture of 
West Jerusalem produced during the years of division displays the “International Modern 
Style”, indeed this modernity of the new city was introduced in the mandate period, 
however the Israeli colonial planning regime made that style primarily "international" and 
                                                   
28 The researcher means: the city growth was depending on the individuals in terms of their natural needs of investment 
and construction.  
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secondarily "Jerusalem".  
Although Khamaisi (1997) argues that with regard to the legacy of the Mandatory 
plans which Israel continued to use as an effective tool for controlling land use by 
Palestinians, Israel created two other master plans for West Jerusalem. The first was Rau 
Plan (Fig. 4.13) which was a conceptual plan, during the time this plan was in place, the 
end came of the British Mandate in Palestine.  
 
Figure334.13: Rau Plan 1948 – 1949, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
Rau Plan was a natural outcome of the new situation which demanded to amend 
and update the previous plan and to establish new strategy for the planning of the city. 
The plan was formulated by architect Heinz Rau who considered the space of the entire 
city without strict considerations for the armistice lines which were widened extensively 
westwards. The plan proposed to apply the principle of designating the valleys as parks to 
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the older areas of the city as well and the park of the old city was thus incorporated in its 
dimensions as proposed in the mandatory plans. It also introduces more detailed zones 
that serve both public and private needs integrally. Moreover, special emphasis was 
expressed to create efficient inner road network. (Fig. 4.14) shows Rau schematic plan 
with its effective internal loops that incorporate the different land use titles. 
 
 
 
 
As previously mentioned, Rau plan purely was a 
conceptual plan; hence, Israel decided to prepare a 
legally binding plan of the city. In 1955, this desire of 
the government was accomplished by the architect 
Michael Shaviv who introduced his master plan 
distinctively, at first the plan was generally discussed 
and schematically analyzed (Fig. 4.15). There was much 
emphasis on the road network to cope with the existing 
infrastructure and also links into the railway same to 
some extent with the previous Rau conceptual plan. 
Figure  02 4.14: Rau schematic plan, (Dumper, 2002; 
edited)  
 
Figure  03 4.15: Shaviv schematic plan, (Dumper, 2002; edited)  
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During the approval process of Shaviv Plan, arguments went hand in hand between 
various planning authorities including ministerial and municipal levels after which the 
plan was finally approved in 1959 (Fig. 4.16). This plan shaped the major physical 
benchmarks of the new western city up to today. The plan does not subject to the 
question of “preservation” as did those of the mandatory, that is why the plan allows 
destruction of many 
traditional neighborhoods 
along commercial roads, and 
expansion of building rights 
in old neighborhoods. The 
main aim of the plan was to 
expand the Jewish 
population westwards and to 
strengthen structure of 
existing neighborhoods. 
Also, to allow for 
population growth based on 
existing infrastructure of 
roads and public buildings, 
without any large 
investments in new areas. In 
order to encourage 
development of old 
neighborhoods building 
rights were expanded in them 
which brought about changes 
in their appearance, especially concerning building heights and form. However, Shapiro 
(1973) points out that the older neighborhoods in the eastern part of the city were zoned 
in a rather general and monotonous way, almost totally lacking land for public amenities, 
while the new quarters in the western part of the new city were planned down to the last 
detail. 
Figure  03 4.16: Shaviv Plan (1955-1959), (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
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4.5   Planning after Reunification of Jerusalem (1967 thenceforward) 
In his speech at the opening ceremony for the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 
1925, Professor Weizmann
29
 stated: 
"It seems at first sight paradoxical that in a land with so sparse a population, in a land 
where everything still remains to be done, in a land crying out for such simple things as 
ploughs, roads and harbors, we should be creating a center of spiritual and intellectual 
development. But it is no paradox for those who know the soul of the Jew. It is true that 
great social and political problems still face us and will demand their solution. We Jews 
know that when the mind is given fullest play, when we have a center for the development 
of Jewish consciousness, then coincidentally, we shall attain the fulfillment of our 
material needs" (Eylon, 1999) 
The above quotation reflects the fundamentality inside the Jewish desire of 
controlling and directing the Palestinian Arabs land throughout the geographical 
existence of that native population even since the early start of mandate administration in 
Palestine. Standing on that Jewish desire, in the mid of 1960s there were numerous 
border clashes between Israel and its Arab neighbors who developed strategic defense 
agreement as a consequence (Gawrych, 2003), and whom the Palestinians fighting groups 
called their aid (Schiff, 1974). However, Oren (2002) refers that Jordanians were 
complaining from the weakness of Arab strategic support. Therefore, Jordan asked for 
support by Iraqi army (Churchill & Churchill, 1967), as well as, Egypt increased degree 
of attention into maximum on Egypt-Israel’s border (Shlaim, 2007; and Mutawi, 2002). 
Accordingly, Israel kept emphasizing that any closure of the straits would be considered 
an act of war, or eventually a justification for warfare (Cohen, 1988). Ultimately, on the 
first of June 1967, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet, 
and on the forth of June the decision was made to originate war. The day after, Israel 
initiated rigorous large-scale air strikes that were the official beginning of the Six-Day 
War
30
. 
By the end of the Six-Day War which was addressed as an "in advertent and 
preemptive war" (Stein, 1991) Israel won, then imposed dramatic consequences on the 
conquered states in general, and on the Palestinians in particular. Resultant impact on 
Palestine was the Israeli occupation for East Jerusalem and West Bank which was under 
                                                   
29Prof. Chaim Weizmann was the first president of the State of Israel 1949-1952. 
30 Also known as “June War”, “War of 1967”, and the”1967 Arab-Israeli War”; it was fought between 5th – 10th of June 
1967, by Israel on the one side; Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. 
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the Jordanian Rule, and Gaza Strip which was under Egyptian control
31
 (Pollack, 2002). 
This new occupational status directed Israel to adopt more Jewish oriented policies, 
Hinnebusch (2003) argues that those policies with regard to the Palestinian occupied 
territories resulted pressing issues in the international law and have far-reaching 
consequences in global affairs. 
Among the first steps that the Israeli government conducted was the announcement 
of “reunification for West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem” (Fig. 4.17). This event 
addresses with less than fifty years, a new start of colonial administration for the city, this 
time with more complex geopolitical status. Reunification of Jerusalem introduced the 
city of Jerusalem to jump over the scale of city into the scale of district. Highlighting its 
significance from political, religious, historical, and cultural points of view, Jerusalem 
stands top among other districts in Israel. In his criticism for the Israeli planning policies, 
Khamaisi (1997) argues that the Israeli district plans achieved the goal of restraining the 
development of the native population, the Palestinian 
Arabs, while giving the central colonial government 
an effective tool and mechanism for applying 
occupational policies and achieving targets likely to 
oppose the interests of the native people. Such 
planning strategy forces Israel to keep proceeding in 
work through all planning levels to corporate the 
challenging status which Jerusalem witnessed after 
unification.  
It is worth noting that directing the Central 
Business District in West Jerusalem westward was 
inevitable result of the Armistice Lines before the 
Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. Traders and 
shoppers would prefer to be some distance from a 
volatile border, a point further west would make the 
                                                   
31 Israel also occupied Sinai Peninsula, which it evacuated under the 1977 Camp David accords, & Syrian Golan 
Heights, which it continues to occupy. Israel removed its settlers from Gaza Strip in 2005 but continues to control all 
access points into the Strip. 
 
Figure  034.17: Reunification of East and West Jerusalem, 
(Jabareen, 2010, edited) 
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commercial areas more central relative to the western suburbs, and it would be more 
convenient for those coming to the city from the coastal plains.  Moreover, Dumper 
(2002) argues that in the mid of 1960s the available reserves land for the municipality of 
West Jerusalem was almost consumed, so the municipality had debates to re-orient 
development pattern towards vertical expansion model. Thus, it might be argued that the 
lebensraum for West Jerusalem was pressing catalyst for the Israeli annexation of East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. This factor also adds an important spatial planning 
dimension to the political factors that led to the annexation. In addition, it helps explain 
the speed and determination with which construction took place after the 1967. The 
greater availability of space suitable for construction in the annexed areas of Jerusalem 
was a major impulse behind the Israeli settlement policies there.  
One year after the Israeli 
occupation of East Jerusalem, Israel 
developed Hashimshony Master Plan for 
reunified Jerusalem (Fig. 4.18). The 
basic objective of Hashimshony plan was 
to solve the problem of urban growth for 
West Jerusalem by providing wider 
range of space for construction purposes 
(i.e. lebensraum) in the eastern part of 
the city. The plan matched the desired 
goal unequivocally, hence served as 
regulatory plan about to mid-1980s. With 
more than seven effectively distributed 
land use categories, Hashimshony plan 
introduced Jerusalem as well planned 
reunified capital.  
If we look, search, analyze, and 
eventually come out with conclusions, it 
shall be undeniably clear that lot of the 
planning tribulations coupled with the 
Figure  034.18: Hashimshony Plan 1968, (Alsaud et al., 2008; edited) 
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development of Jerusalem in the “post-1967 epoch” emerged from the political situation 
concerning the annexation of East Jerusalem and the adjacent parts of the West Bank. 
The fortitude to assert “political sovereignty” and “demographic dominance” over the 
eastern parts of the city have key impact upon the "rational development" of Jerusalem 
over and above the problems associated with rapid growth and modernization. In fact, it 
could be debated that the perception of "enlarged Jerusalem" in terms of local, regional, 
and national levels as the capital of a Jewish state inflicts planning priorities unfavorable 
or even inimical to its native inhabitants, the Palestinian Arabs. As they see it, the major 
determining factor in the Israeli planning process, overriding any topographical, 
ecological, legal, and historical factors, is once again the issue of "political sovereignty" 
which represents the ethnical, prejudiced, and demographic sovereignty.  
Quick review for Jerusalem in terms of various planning perspectives reveals the 
presence of a scarce, rigid, complex, challenging, dynamic, changing, and very influential 
“urban or physical, or even spatial” planning pattern coincident with very unique inputs 
and amazing unexpected outcomes. Indeed, the change of Jerusalem political and 
municipal boundaries required urgent steps to “re-balance” the physical and social 
existence of the city. In other words, a start of practical shift from the stage of “theory 
and concept” to the stage of “schematic town planning”, that is why the proposed plans 
for Jerusalem before 1967 could be described in general as “advisory and overall 
guidance plans” rather than “regulatory detailed plans” as those prepared after the 1967 
when neighborhood schemes witnessed profound interest and precise details based on 
spatial and quantitative studies. 
The dimensions of the Israeli planning policies with regard to Jerusalem status after 
the reunification announcement grow fast and to some extent oscillate dynamically, in 
such way confusing both: outside observers, and those affected native population, the 
Palestinian Arabs. Therefore, in order to comprehensively cover the Israeli planning 
policies in Jerusalem for the post-1967 period, the researcher was convinced to decide to 
shift analysis and discussion of those policies to the next chapter of this doctorate 
research, where the major characteristics, aims, methodologies, and consequences of 
those variant and challenging polices are deeply outlined.   
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4.6   Analytical Conclusion  
The researcher used history as a major tool during analysis to: provide a clear-eyed 
view of planning in Jerusalem since Ottomans times up to today, and to assess the 
prospects of Jerusalem space-changing-behavior in spatial planning perspective. 
Although it might be argued that Jerusalem does not have extended history in urban 
planning, its relatively recent history in any case has been extremely intensive. In the past 
century, planning in Jerusalem has been strongly connected to the politics of the area, 
Jerusalem experienced five administrative systems with less than fifty years, this by itself 
was a major factor to enrich “regardless negatively or positively” the planning history of 
Jerusalem (Fig. 4.19).  
 
 
 
Figure394.19: Administrative changes in Jerusalem, (researcher) 
 
Because of its strategic settings and religious backgrounds, Jerusalem presents 
endless challenges to planners. Ottomans, British, Jordanians, and the Israelis each have 
Mandatory Regime 
Colonial Regime 
"Divided Jerusalem" 
Occupational Regime 
"Unified Jerusalem" 
After Ottoman Rule: Sophisticated Geopolitical Spatial Status in Jerusalem 
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had different even sometimes contradictory perspectives on the city, but none has been 
“entirely successful” in guiding its development. However, each left non-erasable 
benchmarks on both sides of the city:  hard infrastructure “built up areas” and soft 
infrastructure “population” (Fig. 4.20). 
  
Figure40 .20: Socio-spatial administrative changes in Jerusalem, (researcher) 
It could be argued that the “first generation of urban planning” in Jerusalem 
developed during British mandate in Palestine where the first record for a “conventional 
town plan” for Jerusalem appeared in the early 20th century. Ottomans who governed the 
city of Jerusalem for more than four centuries (1516-1917) had not produced such town 
plans the British did; however, they inherited the British planners the “reference planning 
point” of Jerusalem, i.e. the Old City with its standing encircling wall. Thus the 
researcher may address that Ottomans adopted “conservative approach”, while the British 
who governed Jerusalem for three decades (1917-1948) adopted the “romantic approach” 
during their planning acts in Jerusalem. During their governance in Jerusalem, the British 
prepared five master plans for Jerusalem, three plans were advisory while the other two 
were statutory outline plans. After the termination of the mandatory government 
Jerusalem was divided for nineteen years (1948 – 1967), it has been generally introduced 
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in a threefold division: the Old City, East Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem. The Old city is 
conventionally defined by the area included within Jerusalem impressive encircling wall. 
East Jerusalem usually refers to the eastern parts of the city outside the walls of the Old 
City, both East Jerusalem and the Old City of Jerusalem remained under Jordanian rule 
until 1967.  West Jerusalem refers to the western parts of the city outside the walls of the 
Old City and was controlled by Israel after 1948-War. During this divisional status of 
Jerusalem, Jordanians did not produce any master plan, while the Israeli developed two 
master plans, one advisory and the other regulatory. Thus during this time scale the 
researcher may address that Jordanians adopted “primitive regulatory approach”, while 
the Israeli adopted “colonial approach”. After 1967, Jerusalem fell in total under Israeli 
occupation post the 1967-War; accordingly, East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem were 
reunified and subject to Israeli planning up to today. Fig 4.21 shows mass production of 
planning during different planning eras in Jerusalem. 
 
Figure224.21: Planning mass production in Jerusalem, (researcher)
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Chapter Five 
Political Architecture In Jerusalem 
"Poets, priests, and politicians, have words to thank for their positions, words that scream for your submission, 
and no one's jamming their transmission" 
 Gordon Sumner 
HIS chapter investigates through critical review and analysis the extent to which 
power, politics, planning and architecture are intertwined in the current spatial 
context of Jerusalem. It highlights within a framework of case studies the 
paradoxical city architecture in Jerusalem, as such illustrating the strong relation 
between architecture as a means for politics, and the respective effects upon the city 
socio-spatial structure, i.e. place and space morphologies. Moreover, this chapter traces 
evidences of the influence of the political decision-making process upon the creation of 
ethnic related regions and settlements in Jerusalem; as well as, investigates the 
power/politics in difference to social or economic dimensions and the extent to which 
superimposing the former has shaped and influenced the latter. Thus, this chapter 
explores the Israeli planning policies adopted in Jerusalem, and provides critical review 
for the key discrepancies in the urban spaces in Jerusalem and the standing Israeli 
planning policies behind them, shaping what the researcher conceptualizes “political 
architecture” in the city. 
 
 
5.1   Introduction  
According to various viewpoints in literature, “political architecture” in many 
places in the world, is yet, a subject to be thoroughly investigated. Despite the fact that 
the role of politics in shaping cities, and architecture across history, has been central in 
understanding the evolution of certain typologies, urban features and spatial elements of 
architecture of cities, this subject has been scarcely touched as an exclusive research in 
the architecture of the Arab World in particular. Little can be noticed in literary sources 
that address the subject as an independent comprehensive research to shed light on the 
role of politics as a narrative chronology of time, or place within the architectural context. 
Moreover, tracing back the roots of such an influence was less obvious in available 
T 
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writing, particularly studies which examine the extent to which politics was evident in the 
outcome in architecture of the city in the conflict areas (Al Sayed, 2011). 
Political decisions pertaining to governmental national and international policies, 
normally, result unquiet debates.  These debates utterly, float to the surface, when 
political policies impose: visions, outlooks, discussions, recommendations, decisions, 
treaties, agreements, and charters especially in the conflict areas. In many cases, such 
decisions create - on the ground - physical layouts (spaces) that rely totally upon political 
backgrounds. These spaces produced by 'political decisions', create, what the researcher 
conceptualizes as "spaces of political architecture".   In other words, spaces which appear 
as a reflection and a translation of political decisions. For instance, an interesting debate 
followed the proposal for establishing a continuous wall or fence along the borders 
between Mexico and the United States, submitted by the latter during the mid-last 
decade. Hamilton (2006) criticized that political proposal, and argued by a surprising 
critic to highlight the political nature of the event occurring at territorial border: 
“As a classic design challenge, The New York Times asked 13 architects and urban 
planners to devise the "fence." Several declined because they felt it was purely a 
political issue.” (Hamilton, 2006:1) 
The political nature of that event is, outstandingly, acknowledged by architects. As 
stated, architects did not favor participating, but rather dismissed the consequences and 
challenges expected to follow. Thus, it might be argued that political architecture is, at 
frontier and conflict areas, repulsive and architects avoided. However, architecture will 
never devoid itself of politics. This is crucially critical; the outcome of such political 
proposal shall un-doubtfully not only affect environment, biodiversity, geography, 
history, and identity, but also humans’ feelings. During the last decades of the twentieth 
century, human societies have, inevitably, had to overcome new challenges, having to 
deal with sustainability, and with outdated politics incapable to resolve new problems. 
The growing discourses of power and sovereignty accompanied by unilateral actions 
pushed tragedy to millions of people seem to lead politics and politicians into dead-ends. 
Thus, the new world ‘political architecture’ has been addressed as, a major objective, that 
needs international collaboration (Petrella, 2006). 
The international political structure built in the previous era is losing effectiveness 
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and authority. Consequently, contemporary politics is often confined to spontaneous 
reactions to the manifold and unparalleled challenges. Among the collaborative responses 
to these challenges, in 2006, an international seminar under the title “A New World 
Political Architecture” took place. The seminar focused on the revision of international 
politics in terms of 'sovereignty' and 'security', no more coinciding with nations, but with 
the various non-state stakeholders and multidimensional organizations influencing today 
politics at all levels. Moreover, the seminar emphasized the importance in the reform of 
international institutions system, that should enhance more collaborative global 
governance, respectful of social justice to all world citizens through sustainable 
development, education, the improvement of health and environment conditions and the 
promotion of women’s rights (WPF, 2006). 
Urban planning in the conflict areas, in addition to the unquiet debates discussed 
earlier in this chapter, may shape fast-changing and dynamic spatial policies 
accompanied with irreversible physical spaces (political architecture spaces) that create 
in many cases multi-dimensional challenges for the inhabitants there. Especially, for the 
indigenous residents when considered for one reason or another a group of minority. In 
Jerusalem, this case applies; since Jerusalem, as will be shown in this chapter, is directed 
to grow ‘divergently’ in two comparative images. One image is in East Jerusalem, where 
the Palestinians live in Arabic neighborhoods surrounded by Israeli Settlements. The 
other is in West Jerusalem, which is almost considered purely inhabited by the Israelis 
(Najjar et al., 2011). The direction of growth wheel in Jerusalem is tightly correlated into 
political backgrounds, rather than rational planning principles. This is clearly shown in 
the political discourses of prominent Israeli politicians/officials. For example, since the 
early Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, during the municipal council meeting held on 
thirteenth of August 1967, Rabbi Cohen declared: 
“And dare I say frankly that we have to do everything within our power to make Greater 
Jerusalem the largest Jewish city in the world, a real Jewish city, both in terms of the 
population numbers and in giving a permanent Jewish character to the whole city” 
(Halawani, 2006:41)  
 The last few words in of the above quotation established, the corner stone, of the 
political architecture in Jerusalem. A political architecture of the city that should reflect 
in its: hard infrastructure (built up areas and physical spaces) a Jewish identity, and in its 
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soft infrastructure (population) a majority of Jews. Regarding the latter component – city 
population, Amir Cheshin who served as government adviser on Arab affairs in 
Jerusalem, wrote: 
“Since 1967, Jerusalem was considered to be the largest city in Israel, …, The decision 
to strengthen the Jewish population was accompanied by another government decision: 
to also preserve a demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in the city. This 
required several measures, namely, considerably increasing the number of housing units 
available for Jewish residents in the city and taking any steps possible to prevent a 
significant increase in building aimed Arab population” (Halawani, 2006:42) 
The influential political dimension demonstrates over all other factors included for 
the future development in Jerusalem. Political architecture is, therefore, a natural output 
of the governmental and official decisions taken by the Israelis who seek every 
opportunity to achieve more and more political goals. Mordechai Ish-Shalom, former 
Mayor of Jerusalem, declared: 
 “What is required - and quickly - is Jews, many Jews in Jerusalem. No, more trickles of 
immigration” (Halawani, 2006:41) 
The Israeli determination to introduce, and emphasize totally, Jerusalem as a Jewish 
city, has seriously, affected the Israeli planning principles and policies. Politics, therefore, 
becomes the basic and the solid foundation upon which Jerusalem’s architectural space 
must stand. This combination between politics and development has, persistently, 
established unique “political architecture” in Jerusalem. Cheshin et al. (1999) 
interestingly argue with fascinating detail that proper “political” governance of Jerusalem 
would not have risked Israel's claim, but instead, would have eased tensions over the 
city's future; and sadly, that error in judgment is the tragedy of Israel's rule in East 
Jerusalem since 1967. Furthermore, Al Sayed (2011) outstandingly highlights and argues 
the political dimension and its effects upon Jerusalem’s architecture, stating: 
“In modern times, architecture as 'political' tool has been apparent as a result of 
ideological conflicts. This has been most evident in Jerusalem and was detected by the 
policies of ruling powerful authorities that left strong marks upon planning as a means to 
express apartheid policies”. (Al Sayed, 2011:169) 
Hence, the need arises to assess and re-read the space in Jerusalem in the context of 
changing socio-political power. Accordingly, it was the aim of this chapter to bring under 
scrutiny such influence upon East Jerusalem’s architectural space after the Israeli 
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occupation in 1967, and to explore this interaction between architecture and politics, 
where the later has strongly and directly influenced the former.  
5.2   Political Jerusalem – A Legal/Illegal Entity  
 
The end of the 1967 Six-Day War has resulted dramatic consequences. Israel had, 
unilaterally, annexed 70.5 square kilometers of the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) 
including East Jerusalem which presents 6.5 square kilometers of the total. Israel’s 
domestic jurisdiction (sovereignty) was extended to East Jerusalem through the Law and 
Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) in 1967. The city’s unification and its 
status as the eternal capital of Israel were declared through the Basic Law on 30 July 
1980. However, the status of a United Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital has not been 
officially recognized by most of the international community, and nearly all countries 
maintain their embassies in Tel Aviv (Kellerman, 1993). These acts are contrary to 
international law. Israel, therefore, continues to violate international law, along with 
United Nations resolutions and agreements with Palestinians. Palestinians also refer to 
United Nation Security Council Resolution 252, which considers invalid expropriation of 
land and other actions that tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem. The status of 
Jerusalem and of its holy places remains contended up to date. 
According to international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention, East 
Jerusalem represents ‘territory occupied by Israel’ in 1967 as a result of war. As such, 
Israel is obliged to uphold the rights of the residents of the territory, refrain from 
attempting to change the status or demography of the territory and provide appropriate 
services to the occupied people. In really, opposite Israeli actions happen on the ground. 
The adopted Israeli planning policies have succeeded in imposing dramatic changes in 
Jerusalem’s demographic compositions, urban fabric, physical identity, ethnic culture, 
borders and legal status, aiming therefore, to Judaizing the city making it as its united 
capital. Instead of preserving the rights of the Jerusalemites, Israel continues to violate 
Article (47) of the Fourth Geneva Convention which stipulates that residents of an 
occupied territory are to be afforded the rights of the Convention regardless of changes 
imposed by the Occupying Power, such as annexation of all or part of the territory. Israel 
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is in violation of Article (49) (1) of the Geneva Convention and Article (49) (6), which 
forbids “individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations”, and the “deport 
[action] or transfer... [of] parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies.” Article (53) of the Convention provides that states “Any destruction by the 
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to 
private persons ... is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations.” In addition to, Article (147) of the Convention which 
also prohibits “extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”32. 
 Moreover, Israel is in clear violation of the following: UN Security Council 
Resolutions [242, 252, 338 and 478], among others; the Hague Convention; the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Convention for the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention for the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention 
for the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
specifically: Article (7), denial of equal protection under the law; Article  
(9) arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile; Article (13) denial of the right to return to one's 
country; Article (17), arbitrary expropriation of personal property; Article (18) 
interference with religious worship and observance. Furthermore, Jerusalemites living in 
East Jerusalem did not obtain Israeli citizenship, but maintained Jordanian citizenship. 
According to the Israeli legal system and laws they are considered rather ‘beholders of 
conditional permanent residence’. Palestinian political resistance has been active since 
1967 against the illegitimate Israeli control over East Jerusalem. Thus, although 
Jerusalemites are not prohibited to vote in the municipal elections of Jerusalem, only a 
minority exercised this right (less than five percent in the recent elections), assuring 
support an effective boycott of the Israeli political system. Likewise, Palestinians from 
East Jerusalem did not stand for election in the Municipality. On the other hand, Israel 
seeks every opportunity to prevent Jerusalemites to practice democratic and 
developmental rights in Jerusalem. Israeli preventions regarding the establishment of 
                                                   
32 See Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
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Palestinian national institutions in East Jerusalem, the closure of many NGOs and as well 
as prohibitions and restrictions on the work of Palestinian national bodies, have 
weakened, almost to the extent of political paralysis, the representation of Palestinians in 
East Jerusalem. Thus, Palestinians are forced to become dependent on the Israeli planning 
system, which imposes manifold negative impacts on their daily lives (Jerusalem Unit, 
2010). 
Palestinians since the early Israeli occupation of east Jerusalem in 1967, have 
pursued various strategies including resistance, confrontation, and ultimately, 
negotiations. Most remarkably, in 1993, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
made the decision to pursue Palestinian independence through negotiations. Accordingly 
the PLO and Israel signed a number of agreements between 1993 and 1999, known 
collectively as the Oslo Agreements. According to Nasrallah (2008) until the signing of 
Oslo Accords (1993-1994), Jerusalem represented the metropolitan commercial and 
economic centre of the West Bank, as well as, the undeclared Palestinian Capital. 
However, the status of East Jerusalem was deferred to the permanent status negotiations. 
As stated in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, all 
of Jerusalem (not solely East Jerusalem) is subject to final status of negotiations. Yousef 
(2008) argues that the donors’ funds became reluctant to support and finance Palestinian 
activities in East Jerusalem in order to avoid any disruption of the fragile situation of the 
negotiations, funds have been directed for projects and infrastructure in Ramallah 
promoted by the PA. Thus, the international community focused on strengthening the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the WB and GS which has impacted support to 
East Jerusalem negatively (Jerusalem Unit, 2010). 
5.3   Political Engineering in Jerusalem  
The role of politics in shaping the physical layouts and in forming the future 
outlines of the Palestinian areas (oPt) is underestimated relative to the significant effects 
it has over the interdisciplinary aspects of the Palestinian’s life. The architectural and 
spatial context, which examines the extent to which politics was evident in the outcome 
in architecture of the city (space) in the conflict areas, is an outstanding tool of 
argumentation of this case-effect interrelationship. Indeed, “politics” has played 
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magnificent role in defining the style of life of the Palestinians forcing it to meet more 
and more challenges and constrains.  In this manner, Abuleil (2008) argues that after the 
Israeli annexation of the WB, GS, and EJ in 1967, Israel used the land use planning as a 
control tool to direct the Palestinian development opportunities toward ‘unsustainable’ 
manner. As these land use plans are designed to make the land – as much as possible –
'unavailable' for the Palestinian utilization, through prohibiting Palestinians from building 
and construction by designating wide areas as natural reserves, closed military areas or 
for security reasons through several military orders (Fig. 5.1, 5.2). 
 
Figure425.1: Closures and requisitioned land in oPt, (Abuleil, 2008) 
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Figure435.2: Restriction on the land use in the WB, (Abuleil, 2008) 
Before exploring in detail the political reflections upon architecture and space in 
Jerusalem, the researcher finds it fruitful to overview the Israeli political dimension upon 
the Palestinians’ lands in the West Bank, to highlight how this dimension is targeting all 
the Palestinian development in general and the Jerusalemite’s development in particular. 
For example, ICAD (2008) points out that 37% of the Israeli settlements in the West 
Bank are established on Palestinian land temporary confiscated by Israeli military orders 
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and for security reasons. These Jewish-only settlements house more than 300,000 Jewish 
settlers interspersed throughout the West Bank Levinson (2009). As such, the Israeli 
settlement policies threaten the Palestinian existence and local communities' growth; 
since these Israeli settlements are surrounding the Palestinian localities and established 
on wide confiscated Palestinian lands, which are either agricultural lands or lands 
designated for future urban expansion of these localities, and in both cases the natural 
growth of the Palestinians is prevented. Moreover, Hosh and Issac (1996) assure that 
these settlements are direct violation for the international laws, and are a focal point for 
land destruction and pollution of the Palestinian environment; they impose threats to the 
quality of the Palestinian environment and have been one of the leading causes of its 
degradation by: consuming the biggest amount of the scarce Palestinian water resources, 
disposing waste water to the open valleys reaching the Palestinian villages destroying 
wide agricultural areas and polluting surface and ground water, as well as, by dumping 
solid waste without restriction on Palestinian lands. 
According to ARIJ (2004), Israel has limited the Palestinian built up areas in the 
WB and GS under the pretext of its security and by means of more than 1500 military 
orders. Thus, the Palestinian built up area in the WB is estimated to consist only 6.3 %, 
and over 70% of the WB lands are inaccessible to Palestinians. The Israeli land use 
policies in the WB aimed restraining the Palestinian development and exploiting their 
natural resources. Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 show the land use items and their areas in the 
West Bank. 
Table85.1: West Bank land use categories in 1998, (Abuleil, 2008) 
Land Use Category Area (km
2
)  Percent of Total Area 
Palestinian built up  367.6 6.3 
Natural reserve  292.2 5.0 
Military bases  38.7 0.7 
Israeli settlement  108.4 1.9 
Forest  38.5 0.7 
Closed military areas  1214.7 20.8 
Dead Sea  195.2 3.3 
Others: represent cultivated areas, 
grazing areas, and unused land 
3583.0 61.3 
Total 5838.3 100.0 
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Figure445.3: Israeli land use classification in WB and GS, (Abuleil, 2008) 
 
The ‘political’ dimension of the Israeli planning policies at the Palestinians’ lands 
is clearly translated in the aforementioned figure. According to Abuleil (2008) the 
designated land use as closed military areas encompass about 20% of the total West Bank 
land area, mainly located in its eastern region, these lands are currently empty of any 
Palestinian communities, and most have been made unreachable to Palestinians. These 
lands are considered major resource to allow future expansion for the Palestinian 
residents who suffer from high rate of population densities which reach approximately 
870 capita per square kilometer in the West Bank and 3400 capita per square kilometer in 
the Gaza Strip. 
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The Israeli planning policies did not stop at adopting that unsustainable land use 
plans in the oPt, but it has added geopolitical dimension into the planning system which 
is a controversial criterion upon which the Palestinians’ future development can be 
achieved. This geopolitical dimension was introduced within Oslo Accords, specifically 
following the Oslo II Interim Agreement. It imposes a fragmented geographical division 
for Palestine into three major areas each has different control authorities and regulations, 
namely, ‘Area A’, ‘Area B’, and ‘Area C’ in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza 
Strip (Fig. 5.4, 5.5 and Table 5.2). 
 
Figure45 .4: Land geopolitical classification in the West Bank, (OCHA, 2011) 
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Table95.2: Geopolitical Land Classification according to (Abuleil, 2008) 
 
 
Figure465.5: Percentage of the geopolitical areas in West Bank, (researcher33) 
As noted in the previous geopolitical map, the Palestinians’ spatial contiguity is not 
any more achievable, since ‘Area A’ and ‘Area B’ are physically separated from each 
other by ‘Area C’ which forms the overwhelming majority of the total area, i.e. 74% of 
the total area are fully under Israeli control. Statistical evidence shows that 70% of ‘Area 
C’ is off-limits to Palestinian construction; while 29% is heavily restricted. This severely 
constrains the living space of and development opportunities for Palestinian 
communities, as the Israeli Civil Administration has planned only less than 1% of ‘Area 
                                                   
33 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table. 5.2). 
Area A 
3% 
Area B 
23% 
Area C 
74% 
Geopolitical Area Description  
Area ‘A’ 
This area is under the full control of Palestinian authority except 
on matters to be discussed in the final status negotiation such as 
water and territory, it is limited to the main part of the eight 
major cities of the WB, according to Oslo II area A covers a 
total area of 160.2 square kilometers compromising  
Area ‘B’ 
This area is under partial control of Palestinian authority limited 
to land and providing civil services such as education and 
health. It is comprise 400 Palestinian villages and hamlets, 
covering a total area of 1334.2 square kilometers 
Area ‘C’ 
This area is under Israel full control over land, security and 
natural resources. It covers a total area of 4327.9 square 
kilometers, all the existing Israeli settlements in the west bank 
lie within this area 
Less than 1% 
of ‘Area C’ has 
been planned 
for Palestinian 
development 
by the Israeli 
Civil 
Administration, 
(UN, 2011). 
70% of ‘Area C’ is 
off-limits to 
Palestinian 
construction; 29% 
is heavily restricted, 
(UN, 2011). 
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C’ for Palestinian development (UN, 2011). PENGON (2002) argues that this 
geopolitical division forms countless Palestinian disconnected enclaves encircled by 
settlements and bypass roads. Moreover, Palestinians living within each area according to 
this geopolitical definition must has respective identification cards, Palestinians living in 
‘Area A’ and ‘Area B’ hold green identification cards while those living in ‘Area C’ hold 
orange identification cards, nonetheless, all Palestinians whose identification card is 
either green or orange are not allowed to access into areas inside Israel (Yousef, 2008). 
This geopolitical division affects severely the socioeconomic basis and the spatial 
sustainable aspects of the Palestinians, and therefore, enhances spatial fragmentation and 
hinders any integration and articulation of the Palestinian urban and urban-rural relations. 
According to Hosh and Issac (1996) this geopolitical division prohibits the Palestinians 
from constructing an effective national infrastructure, or formulating an integrated 
national policy for the agricultural and water sector. Hence the planning process proposed 
by the Palestinian Authority and the progressive economy required for independent 
Palestinian entity is facing more and more challenges imposed by the Israeli political 
planning dimensions. 
5.3.1   Architecture of Separation and Fragmentation  
An interesting quotation that resembles the political segregation which Jerusalem 
has passed through since the first Israeli occupation in 1948 up to today is appealingly 
introduced by Omar Yousef:  
“Palestinian East Jerusalem: Born out of division, raised under occupation and chopped 
to pieces during the 'peace process'”. (Yousef, 2008:21)  
The previous few lines express frankly how Jerusalem was directly affected and 
progressively influenced by the various political eras the city moved under. It is also 
shown how dramatic is ‘the conclusion’ of the final status of East Jerusalem’s spatial 
context, “pieces” – wrote Yousef, during the political negotiations, or in other words, 
during the peace process. It is still crucially, underestimated, to describe what happens in 
Jerusalem by words, political consequences have put burden upon the daily life of the 
Jerusalemites making it unbearable. Yousef (2008) argues that after Oslo Agreement and 
the respective political implications in the region, many Palestinians who used to live and 
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work in Jerusalem for many years, but began to hold green or orange identification card 
as they do not live inside the territory marked by Israeli municipal boundary of Jerusalem 
became unable to access the city and lost their emotional, spiritual, economical, and in 
many cases family relations in Jerusalem. In the spatial consciousness of East Jerusalem, 
Palestinian neighborhoods are part of the urban continuum of their fabric of life. 
However, the political implications were driven against these considerations and realm. 
In this manner, Yousef (2008:21) wrote about one Palestinian who lived in Eizaria: “Our 
families are spread throughout this area and now, all of the sudden, they do not belong to 
the city”, then he continued describing the transformation of identity for one Palestinian 
who has long been considered a Jerusalemite but after the political changes he lost this 
title: 
  “… he is and has always been a Jerusalemite. He studied at Jerusalem’s schools, …, 
and knows all of the cities pubs in east and west! But since the imposition of checkpoints 
and the Separation Wall, he has become an “illegal alien” inside the annexed zone. In 
the census carried out by the Israeli authority after 1967 war, he was registered as a 
resident of a house that lies one hundred meters away from the arbitrary borderline, 
which illegally annexed Palestinian land to the Israeli municipality”. (Yousef, 2008:21) 
Thus, the social life of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is no more coherent or 
sustainable, unity and spatial integration if not built upon social integration will not 
achieve stability or future consistency. Intensifying the status of social cuts, Yousef 
(2008:22) described how Palestinian became unable to move freely to their works and to 
meet their families in Jerusalem, he wrote: 
 “it’s a pity, but they [Jerusalemite] can’t do it [to give a ride for Palestinian who had 
green or orange identification card] for their mothers and sisters, which must be even 
more painful for them. Now I understand the situation and don’t expect rides anymore. 
The sad thing is that all of this injustice is seen as legal and my normal life is considered 
illegal”. (Yousef, 2008:22) 
Accordingly, the Palestinians neighborhoods in East Jerusalem have collectively 
faced sudden rupture of their social and economic life, not only those Palestinians who 
live outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, but also Jerusalemites living inside 
the municipal territories. Figure 5.6 shows part of the harsh life style Palestinians found 
themselves forced to deal with in order or in a trial to amend their spiritual, social, 
economic and cultural cracks, the picture show Palestinians on the one side and Israeli 
soldiers with the separation wall in between. 
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Figure475.6: A crack in the wall though which Palestinians from Eizaria can sneak into Jerusalem in order to 
overcome the sudden rupture of their socioeconomic support network, (Yousef, 2008) 
It could be argued that Palestinians in general did not pay much attention to where 
they lived until the Oslo Agreement was signed and political implications followed. This 
fact applies in particular for people who lived within the Palestinian urban fabric in 
Jerusalem, which indeed, had developed gradually as a natural extension of the city’s 
neighborhoods especially after the division of Jerusalem in 1948 when East Jerusalem 
was developed under the Jordanian control and Palestinians neighborhood developed 
inside the city without Israeli restrictions until 1967 when the eastern part fell under 
Israeli occupation. Since then, the annexed part has been subjected to a continuous policy 
of spatial and demographic engineering which aimed at achieving Jewish majority in both 
sides of the city (Jabareen, 2010). In this manner, Yousef (2008) argues that Israel used 
spatial planning as a tool to impose restrictions on the Palestinian development and the 
Palestinian housing within the municipal area, in order to limit the numbers of 
Palestinians within the Israeli municipal area in Jerusalem and to utilize vacant 
Palestinian lands for the construction of Jewish-only settlements.  
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The separation policy in Jerusalem is generated by the urban territoriality which 
aims at controlling geography through influencing and controlling the actions and 
interactions of people, things and relationships. It involves categorizations, border 
settings and urban policies in its generic term (Sack, 1986). The outcome of the Israeli 
territoriality in Jerusalem has fostered the urban instability and created two groups living 
together under one municipal border but separately. These are one overwhelming Israeli 
group and the other subordinate Palestinian group, in other words, a Jewish group of 
majority, and an Arab group of minority. Yousef (2008) argues that the regime ideology 
in Israel has an outstanding influence upon the spatial policies in Jerusalem; which has 
been employed for the benefit of the Jewish community. As a result, the urban 
morphology of Jerusalem has been changing and shifting towards more Jewish identity 
and physical layouts. The Jewish settlements spread in East Jerusalem are constructed 
around and between the urban Palestinian neighborhoods devastating their future 
continuum and fragmenting the Palestinian urban space, thus, increasing discrepancies in 
terms of urban ethnic conditions between the Israelis and Palestinians (Fig. 5.7).  
Figure485.7: Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, (Yousef et al, 2008) 
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The previous figure portrays how is the distribution of the Israeli Jewish 
settlements in East Jerusalem planned in a manner that creates two ethnically separated 
communities classified by national affiliation: an Israeli/Jewish communities and 
Palestinian/Arabic clusters respectively. Figure 5.8 illustrates the ‘pure Arabic’ fabric in 
East Jerusalem during the period 1948-1967, and how these Palestinian communities 
expanded after 1967 in the eastern, northern, and southern directions of the city; 
meanwhile the western side remained ‘pure Jewish’ yet. 
 
 
Figure495.8: Expansion of Arabic Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (Najjar et al, 2006) 
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5.3.2   Architecture of Security and Surveillance  
Between the years 1967 and 1993, Israel utilized the political engineering which 
employed urban planning for fragmenting the Palestinian neighborhoods in East 
Jerusalem. However, Israel continued fostering this political engineering which 
intensified the ethnic separation between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews by adopting 
sophisticated physical segregation policies on the ground: flying checkpoint, permanent 
checkpoints and, eventually, the Separation Wall, also known as “Isolation Wall”, 
“Colonial Wall” or, “Apartheid Wall” (Juma, 2003). These divisional tactics were 
formulated after the beginning of political negotiations between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, more specifically, after the adaption of Oslo Agreement in 1993, starting by 
installing checkpoints on the major roads that link East Jerusalem to the West Bank, and 
then where intensified at the early years of the second millennium, particularly after the 
year 2003, when Israel began constructing the Separation Wall on the ground. These 
policies have created unique political architecture in Jerusalem that delineates the 
military and security morphologies over the city spatial context and socioeconomic 
fabric.  
Since the early adaption of the “security architecture34” in Jerusalem by Israel, the 
style of life for the Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem has been changing 
dynamically, to meet more social damage and urban struggle in their isolated 
neighborhoods and controlled transport and road systems. In this manner, Najjar (2007c) 
exemplifies part of the suffering that many of the Jerusalemites face, stating: 
“Until (recently - 2003), when any of the hundred thousand people in Al Eizarya, Abu 
Dis or Sawahre [Arabic Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem] wanted to reach Jerusalem, 
all they had to do was take Al Eizarya's main road, which connects to the Jerusalem-
Jericho road, and within minutes they could reach the Old City, those days are gone. 
Today Al Eizaria road comes to a sudden halt at a wall eight meters high, topped by rolls 
of barbed wire, ..., If you want to get to Jerusalem, you must turn around, drive east to a 
checkpoint at the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, turn around again and head northwest to 
the A Zaim checkpoint, then to French Hill, …, and finally to East Jerusalem. Even if you 
take this approach, however, your arrival in Jerusalem – supposing you're a Palestinian 
– depends on additional factors. First, the checkpoints, …, Second, …, must have a blue 
identity card, …, This measure rules out half the people of East Sawahre and the vast 
majority of those from Abu Dis. These may enter only by a special [Israeli] permit, rarely 
granted.” (Najjar, 2007c:55-56) 
                                                   
34 Security architecture - is a norm used by the researcher - which refers to the physical layouts created in the city of 
Jerusalem under the Israeli claim of security, such as the Separation Wall and the permanent checkpoints on the main 
roads leading into Jerusalem.  
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Since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli policies have targeted the 
Palestinian presence in the city. Firstly, Israel changed the total area of Jerusalem and 
extended its domestic legislation over the city. Subsequently, Israel constructed the 
Separation Wall (Fig. 5.9) to isolate Jerusalem from the rest of oPt which severed the city 
from its demographic, geographic, and economic support base (Jerusalem Unit, 2010).  
 
Figure50 .9: Israeli Wall in East Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010) 
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Israel constructed illegally and in direct violation of the International Law the 
Separation Wall, which ethnically divides, two communities living in one city and above 
one land, to form segregated clusters and discrete spaces. In nonurban areas, the 
separation wall is more than forty meters wide, consisting of barbed wire, an anti-vehicle 
ditch, a dirt path to pick up footprints, an electric fence, another dirt path, an asphalt road, 
yet another dirt path, and more barbed wire (Fig. 5.10). In urban areas, it becomes an 
eight-meters-high wall of reinforced concrete (Fig. 5.11).   
 
Figure51 .10: Section in the Separation Wall in the nonurban areas (Najjar, 2007c, edited) 
 
Figure52 .11: Section in the Separation Wall in the urban areas in Jerusalem (Najjar, 2007c, edited) 
Provident features for the architecture of 
security in EJ: Monitoring concrete tower 
and the aggressive concrete walls 
40 m width of the fence 
confiscating Palestinians' 
lands along its pathway 
Huge area (volume) of security 
and military landscape 
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Recalling the 'illegality' of the Separation Wall, Palestinians stand firmly upon the 
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as the principal judicial organ of the 
UN, which found that: “the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying 
Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, 
and its associated regime, are contrary to international law; Israel is under an obligation 
to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith 
the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein 
situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts 
relating thereto”. In accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion, “Israel is under an 
obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction… including in 
and around East Jerusalem; all States are under an obligation not to recognize the 
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or 
assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States party to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention…have…the obligation, while respecting the UN Charter 
and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian 
law as embodied in that Convention”, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010:21).  
Further social disintegration, displacement and fragmentation of families has taken 
place due to the construction of the Separation Wall and the extension of Israel’s 
jurisdiction such as the 2003 Nationality and Entry into Israel (Temporary Order) Law, 
forbidding residents of the oPt to live in Israel with their spouses. The Separation Wall 
disconnects entire communities from what used to be their economic hub, and in turn, 
disrupts the entire Palestinian economy by constricting the flow of income. Security 
architecture, therefore, has had severe impacts on Jerusalemites’ social life. The 
expansion of Israeli settlements and the continuous spreading of inspection checkpoints 
have shrunk the space available for Palestinians to live and work, confiscation of land 
and property has deepened a general feeling of insecurity and uncertainty. These factors, 
coupled with the fragmentation of Palestinian families and due to the Separation Wall 
and a multitude of discriminatory practices, have resulted in a profound identity crisis for 
the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, especially for the new generations within in a 
scattered spatial context.  
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Constructing the Separation Wall in East Jerusalem and other areas in the oPt 
attracted wide world debates and controversial conclusions. Juma (2003) argues that the 
purpose of constructing the Israeli Separation Wall is coming out of the Israeli ethnic and 
discrimination policies, stating: 
“You can call it a “Separation Wall,” “Isolation Wall,” “Colonial Wall” or, as we call 
it, “Apartheid Wall”; but certainly not a “Security Wall.” Yet, none of these names 
reflect the shocking reality of what the Wall really is.” (Juma, 2003:138) 
Furthermore, Najjar (2007c) questions the status of ‘security’ of the separation 
elements in Jerusalem, arguing that if these barriers in Jerusalem are intended for 
security, still, their course is very odd, emphasizing that function of the wall is not to 
achieve security purposes, but rather to devastate the Palestinian social unity in 
Jerusalem, Isolating East Jerusalem and cutting the Palestinian geographical continuity in 
the West Bank, stating:  
“It [the wall] does not separate Jews from Arabs, or Arab villages from settlements. It 
separates Arabs from Arabs. …, It [the wall] divided the West Bank into separate 
cantons, north and south. …, It [Jerusalem] supplied the villages not only with goods and 
services, but also with great job opportunities. The wall cuts through all that. …, Now 
comes the barrier, dividing blues [blue ID holders] and greens [green ID holders], …, 
separating the store from its customers, the farmer from his lands, the pupils from their 
school, the sick from the hospital, the dead from the cemetery. …, Security, as said, is a 
pretext.” (Najjar 2007c, Pp.58-59) 
The above quotation shows well how ‘territoriality – explained earlier’ is 
outstandingly translated and physically clarified by the separation architecture adopted by 
Israel, especially in Jerusalem. Figure 5.12 shows the Israeli separation (fence map) on 
large scale territories of the West Bank. The map shows how that only short sections are 
needed to isolate Jerusalem from the oPt in the West Bank, i.e. keep it clear of Ramallah 
in the north and Bethlehem to the south. According to this objective, no fence is needed 
either west or east of the city except opposite Abu Dis. On the other hand, Israel aims to 
maintain effective connection between the city and the Jewish settlement quite the 
opposite of what happens in the Palestinian neighborhoods there. In this way, much more 
than just the city becomes incorporated. This cannot be achieved by fencing Jerusalem in, 
but by fencing in the near-by cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem to the tightest possible 
parameters. Moreover, territoriality serves effectively the Israeli definition of Greater 
Jerusalem (Fig. 5.13), by swallowing over 90% of the whole Palestinian district named 
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after the city, Palestinian urban areas will be transformed into the shape of a huge 
territorial wedge, which will tear the West Bank apart into two separate pieces, one in the 
north and one in the south, while emptying it of its Arab metropolitan core (Juma, 2003). 
 
 
Figure53 .12: Separation Fence in the West Bank, (Juma, 2003) 
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Figure54 .13:  Greater Jerusalem map, (PASSIA maps archive, edited) 
The map of Greater Jerusalem clearly renders the fragmented spatial context in East 
Jerusalem. It shows the scattered Palestinian urban localities – shaping what is described 
as isolated ghettos or cantons, these are classified as: ‘north ghetto’ which includes: Beit 
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Hanina, Qalandiya, Beir Nabala, Al- Jeeb, Jodaira and Kufr Aqab; ‘northwest ghetto’ 
which includes: Beit Duqqu, Beit Ijza, Qbeba, Beit Sourik, Beit Anan, and Qatana; ‘east 
ghetto’ which includes: Ar-Ram, Jaba', Hizma, Shu’fat and Issawiya; ‘southeast ghetto’ 
which includes: Abu Dis, Anata and Eizarya; and ‘southwest ghetto’ which includes: 
Silwan, Sur Baher and Beit Safafa. On contrast to the disconnected Palestinian urban 
spaces in East Jerusalem, the map portrays the continuity and connectivity of the Israeli 
neighborhoods and settlements, which was the main objective to shift excessively the 
proposed boundaries of Greater Jerusalem towards the north and east, deliberately, such 
that to include more Jewish settlements, and thus, enhancing the dominance of Jewish 
demography inside Jerusalem. 
The Israeli separation policies significantly reshape the Palestinian physical spaces 
by approaching the 'de facto’ status over the Palestinian lands, which in total, are 
aggravating urban dilemmas and more social struggles. Juma (2003) argues that the 
Separation Wall is the last phase of the Zionist colonial project aimed at the complete 
control on the West Bank, and whose implementation has continued in a well-planned 
manner, and through the fortification of the Separation Walls, Israel will achieve the 
following: 
o Israel lays hold over Palestinian lands while surrounding the residential 
areas in order to make them unlivable, controlling the number of 
Palestinians able to survive, with the goal of ensuring a Jewish majority in 
all of historic Palestine. 
o Israel makes certain that no Palestinian state will be viable through the 
control of Palestinian water resources and fertile agricultural lands that 
could otherwise be the base for any future socio-economical development. 
o Israel effectively erases the 1967 boarders and redesigns them accordingly 
to meet their political ambitions of maintaining full control over the West 
Bank. 
o Israel completely isolates Jerusalem from the West Bank through the 
building of settlement blocs on all sides, strangling the city whereby no 
room for Palestinian expansion, demographically as well as socially and 
economically, remains.  
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According to many Palestinian viewpoints, the Separation Wall is the most critical 
step of Israel’s annexation in East Jerusalem. It makes certain for Israel of achieving 
socio-economical and institutional subordination in the Jerusalemites’ life aspects. It aims 
in East Jerusalem, as in the rest of the West Bank, to expropriate as much Palestinian 
lands as possible and sever the territorial connection between Jerusalem and the rest of 
the West Bank. The route of the Wall reinforces the settlement blocks and expropriates 
additional lands for the settlement expansions and other development projects. 
Furthermore, Israel adopts sophisticated closure policies in East Jerusalem, consisted of 
creating a series of military checkpoints around Jerusalem (Fig. 5.14), as such Jerusalem 
is permanently closed away from the neighboring Palestinian cities and villages.   
 
Figure55 .15:  The Wall and checkpoints map in Jerusalem, (PENGON maps archive) 
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The Israeli checkpoints monitor and prohibit Palestinian movement from the West 
Bank to Jerusalem; they were placed in positions to delineate the borders of Greater 
Jerusalem. These checkpoints are not only designed for Palestinians living in West Bank, 
but also for Jerusalemites, which means, every Jerusalemite who wishes to leave the city 
must pass through Israeli check points for inspection that may take several hours during 
the rush hours. East Jerusalem was the center of services and the core of the cultural, 
administrative, and political Palestinian life. Today however, the Israeli closure policies 
damaged that connectivity of the daily life of the Palestinians, and thus, foster the Israeli 
goal of strangling East Jerusalem politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The 
closure also accomplishes the complete separation of the transport system linking 
northern and southern parts in WB.  Consequently, dramatic changes were imposed upon 
the road networks that Palestinians must use instead of those passing through Jerusalem. 
The only way where more than million Palestinians can travel from the north to the south 
is Wadi Annar Road, which means the Valley of Hell; a road with steep and deadly 
curves which do not sustain the heavy traffic (Figure 5.16).  
Figure56 .16: Israeli checkpoints and the north-south artery road in WB passing through Jerusalem, (Yousef 
et al, 2008) 
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The architecture of security created in East Jerusalem, as shown, fragmented 
neighborhoods physically imprisoned by walls and fences, and surrounded by Israeli 
checkpoints which upraise the feeling of ethnic segregation and social siege, and 
therefore, producing more feelings of unsecured space for the Palestinians. That 
architecture forced Palestinians to redistribute their geographical existence to maintain 
their residency rights in Jerusalem. Najjar (2007c) argues that the Separation Wall 
depopulates many Palestinian villages, as well as, tearing social tissues, families and 
communities apart. For instance, more than 80% of the population of West Esawiya 
village deserted their homes in order to remain within Jerusalem municipal boundaries. 
Out of a population of 5000 people, only around 1000 Palestinians now remain in this 
village, and because of the Israeli wall, they are prevented from entering Jerusalem. The 
visual impact of the security architecture in East Jerusalem deepens the ‘unsecured 
feeling’ Palestinians practice in their ghettoized neighborhoods (Figs. 5.17 - 5.23). 
 
Figure57 .17: Palestinians moving towards an Israeli inspection point, (Yousef et al, 2008) 
 
Figure58 .18: Palestinian building located nearby uncompleted segment of the Separation Wall, (Yousef et al, 2008) 
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Figure59 .19: Security architecture – landscape of the Separation Fence, (Juma, 2003, edited) 
 
 
Figure605.20: Israeli bulldozers during constricting the Separation Fence, (Juma, 2003, edited) 
Part of the Fence complex 
shown in Fig. 5.10 
presenting features of 
architecture of security 
Part of the Fence complex shown in 
Fig. 5.10 presenting the “Huge 
Volume” of the features of 
architecture of security 
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Figure615.21: Notice sign at Qalandia checkpoint – the main northern gate into Jerusalem. It states that by 27.3.2006, 
passing through this checkpoint will be only allowed for those holding Israeli permission, no Palestinians will be 
moving through this checkpoint without holding a valid permission, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure625.22: Welcome sign at 'Atarot checkpoint – main industrial area in northern Jerusalem. It states, welcome at 
'Atarot checkpoint –Happy Stay, which means, it shall take time before passing that point, (researcher) 
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Figure635.23: Caution sign at the Separation Fence near military zone, (Juma, 2003) 
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The architecture of separation and security has manifold negative impacts on 
various aspects of the Palestinians’ lives. ARIJ (2006) summarizes these negative impacts 
as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table105.3: Consequent impacts of the Israeli separation policies according to (ARIJ, 2006) 
Impact Description  
Political  
 For the second time, Israel delineates, unilaterally, the 
political boundary of occupied Jerusalem. 
 The segregation wall manipulates the geographical balance 
of Jerusalem governorate with more than 44% of its area 
taken in towards Israel, thus forces Jewish majority to the 
city’s demography. 
 The wall cuts the organic tie between Jerusalem and other 
Palestinian governorates. 
Economical 
 The segregation plan stands to cause severe damage to the 
Palestinian agriculture sector and to the Palestinian farmers 
as a result of land confiscation and the constraints imposed 
on mobility and marketing. 
 Israel maintains control over the Palestinian trade and 
tourism. 
 Increase the unemployment and poverty levels. 
 Inflammation in land prices and more diminishing 
investment opportunities. 
Social  
 
 Thousands of Palestinian citizens are cut-off from the main 
urban centres where health, educational and social services 
located. 
 Harsh measures are imposed on Palestinian mobility and 
movement, transportation from or to the segregated areas 
will be extremely difficult. 
 Increased urbanization pressure and population densities. 
 Palestinian Christian and Muslims will not have access to 
the holy sites in Jerusalem unless they have special permits 
to enter Jerusalem issued by the Israeli civil 
administration. 
Environmental  
 Decline the space area designated for landfills and 
wastewater treatment sites. 
 Diminish in area designated as natural reservations, 
forests, pastures, open spaces, and recreation. 
 Loss of grazing area and increase in desertification. 
 Distort wildlife cycle and cuts-off different kinds of 
animals from their natural habitat particularly during 
migration seasons. 
 The segregation plan is altering the Palestinian natural 
landscape. 
 Many archaeological and historical related to Palestinian 
cultural heritage will be segregated behind the wall. 
 Loss of open space which poses a threat to the 
sustainability of the urban and rural areas as well as a 
threat to more loss of the natural resources and 
biodiversity. 
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5.3.3   Architecture of Paradox
35
    
As a holy city for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, Jerusalem has always been of 
prodigious symbolic importance (Kanaan, 2005). Given its spiritual, cultural and 
historical values, Jerusalem outlines the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. These 
values also make Jerusalem important to people around the world. However, East 
Jerusalem is a city whose people suffer from poverty, social fragmentation, and the daily 
targeting of their presence. The process of spatial planning is usually constructive, just 
and legitimate (Stein and Harper, 2003), aiming at improving the living conditions by 
producing better urban, social and economic human environments. Thus, urban citizens 
expect high standards of services and well-constructed infrastructures raising into higher 
quality of life (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Satisfying these needs is part of sustainable 
urban environment (UN, 1992); however, Kates et al. (2000) argue that the world’s 
present development path is not sustainable. Urban planning has been optimally 
characterized as reformative norm (Hall, 1988). However, as will be shown in this 
research, urban planning in Jerusalem has paradoxical outputs which demarcate it to be 
inequitable, implicitly biased and not what it promises to be (Huxley and Yiftachel, 
2000). 
Urban spaces in Jerusalem are produced utterly in two divergent modes of 
production. The first is through "progressive" planning policies, in West Jerusalem; while 
the second is through "regressive" planning role in East Jerusalem. These unequal 
planning modes reflect two-sided planning paradigms in the current Israeli planning 
policies in Jerusalem. Although the city of Jerusalem is ′unified′ in its political 
(municipal) boundaries, it is totally ′separated′ in its spatial development and physical 
fabric. In other words, an “active and dynamic space” in West Jerusalem, whereas an 
“inactive and fragmented space” in East Jerusalem as shown in Fig. 5.24. The 
Palestinians’ presence, cultural heritage, and future development in East Jerusalem are, 
therefore, vulnerable and extensively threatened. Accordingly, examining the current 
adopted Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem is not a choice, but rather an urgent need.   
                                                   
35 This section of the PhD research has recently been published by the researcher and co-authored by the supervisors, 
the publication is referenced as: Najjar, R., Reicher, C., and Amro, J. 2011, Critical Two Sided Urbanism: The Case of 
Jerusalem -East and West. Politics and Power: The Impact upon Architecture and City, London Art and Architecture 
Magazine, 1(5):158-168. London: Lonaard. 
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                  Figure645.24: Development pattern in Jerusalem according to the Israeli planning policies, (Najjar et al, 2011) 
During the last decades, many cities witnessed hyper-segregation, ethnic 
separation, and persistent racial discrimination, as what happened in America, where 
debates increased for ending racial discrimination and social segregation in housing 
policies (Kushner, 2008). However, the case in Jerusalem is more passionate, it presents 
the case of “deeply divided city” due to the intensity of the ethnic conflict it has faced for 
more than sixty years (Hasson, 2007), and eventually, perceived as a frontier city (Klein, 
2005). Israel occupied West Jerusalem after the termination of the British Mandate in 
1948, then annexed East Jerusalem after the end of 1967 War. Since then, Jerusalem has 
been subjected for extensive Israeli planning policies aiming at expropriating more of the 
Palestinian lands and expelling native Palestinians from East Jerusalem. 
East Jerusalem is the area that extending from Kafr Aqab in the north to Sur Bahir 
in the south, this area totals approximately 70,500 dunums (Figure 5.25). The Six Day 
War created planning vacuum in East Jerusalem which has only gradually been filled by 
the Israeli planners. As mentioned previously in the research problem statement, one-
third the municipal area of East Jerusalem (i.e. 24,500 dunums) have been expropriated 
for the benefit of Jewish-only settlements (Figure 2.26).Thus approximately one-third of 
East Jerusalem has been removed from the reserves of land available to the Palestinian 
Arab population. Of the remaining area, only 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem 
prior to the expropriations (i.e. 9,100 dunums) is zoned for residential purposes of 
Palestinians. Additional planning is needed in many of these areas before building 
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permits may be received. Thus the planning of the east of the city has almost been 
completed and valid town plans exist. Yet these do not meet the needs of the Palestinians 
who live in East Jerusalem nor allow for sustainable development there (Khamaisi and 
Nasrallah, 2003). 
 
Figure65 .25: Jerusalem border after 1967, (Arabic Studies Association, edited.) 
Occupied lands 
in 1967 
Occupied lands 
in 1948 
The Old City 
East 
Jerusalem 
West 
Jerusalem 
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Figure665.26: Expropriated lands in East Jerusalem during 1968-1998, (Najjar et al., 2011) 
Noting that of the 45,500 dunums remaining after land expropriations, planning has 
been completed and approved for approximately 38.7% of the area. Planning procedures 
for the remaining area (61.3%) have yet to be completed. Of the planned areas 
approximately 40% are defined as open space where no construction for the Palestinians 
is permitted while large areas of these spaces are used for Jewish settlements
36
; 
approximately 37% are zoned for residential construction. The approved plans earmark 
approximately 6,100 dunums for residential construction. Of this total, approximately 
1,000 dunums require the preparation of unification and re-parcellation plans that will 
take many years to be prepared and approved before building permits can be issued. 
Therefore, approximately 11.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem is only available to 
the Palestinian population for residential construction. Arnon, (1998) points out that this 
construction is possible mainly in existing built-up areas. The percentages of the land 
categories according to the current planning policies in East Jerusalem are shown in 
Figure 5.27. 
                                                   
36 This topic is deeply analyzed in the next section of this chapter. 
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Figure675.27: Jerusalem planning status in percentage according to (Halawani, 2006, edited) 
 
Najjar (2007c) argues that the adopted Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem have 
aimed at constraining the future development of the Palestinian residents there. However, 
the Palestinian growth rate was higher than the Jewish up to the year 2009 (as shown in 
Table 3.2/chapter three), accordingly, Israel intensified more efforts to control and restrain 
that natural growth rate of the Jerusalemites. The Israeli unequal planning policies have 
been forcing the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem to suffer in satisfying their basic 
daily needs, and eventually, forced them to depend on the Israeli system of services 
which is based on ethno-national affiliation with approximately 10 percent of the 
municipal budget services allocated to Palestinian Jerusalemites who comprise, according 
to Israeli statistics, 35 percent of the total population (Jerusalem Unit, 2010, Yousef, 
2008). Israeli planning policies with all the inevitable consequences against the 
Palestinian population continue and include:  
o Palestinian land expropriation; 
o Palestinian clusters ghettoizing; 
o Socioeconomic fragmentation; 
o Palestinian building restrictions; 
Approved Area 
37% 
Unapproved Area 
33% 
Unplanned Area 
26% 
Expropriated Area 
4% 
Thus approximately 
59% of EJ is area 
where development 
is not permitted for 
the Palestinians 
As will be shown later in 
this chapter, large amount 
of the planned areas are 
zones where Palestinians 
are not allowed to make 
use of 
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o Destruction and confiscation of homes; 
o Lack of adequate public infrastructure; 
o Prejudicial land and zoning laws; 
o Changing residency rights and permits; 
o Construction of the Separation Wall around the Palestinian localities; 
o Installation of military checkpoints; 
o Considerable construction of Jewish-only settlements around the Palestinian 
localities; 
Yousef (2008) argues that Israel has closed essential and active Palestinian 
Jerusalem-based organisations in order to eliminate the Palestinian identity, and thus, 
obliges the Jerusalemites to become completely dependent on Israeli institutions. Some of 
the discrepancies in the level of service between East and West Jerusalem are shown in 
Table 5.4. These differences clearly manifest discriminatory treatment of Palestinians. 
Moreover, some of the unequal Israeli planning policies adopted in Jerusalem are shown 
in Table. 5.5, as well as (Figs. 5.28 - 5.33) present urban paradox in Jerusalem. 
Table115.4: Comparison between level of services in Jerusalem - East and West (Jerusalem Unit, 2010) 
Type of Service 
East 
Jerusalem 
(primarily 
Palestinian 
population) 
West 
Jerusalem 
(primarily 
Jewish Israeli 
population) 
Status of sewage network 
(km) 
67 650 
Number of buildings not 
linked to sewage network 
2,620 70 
Status of roads (km) 87 680 
Status of pavements (km) 73 700 
Number of social care 
centres 
3 20 
Number of public parks 45 1,087 
Average number of 
persons per public park 
7,362 477 
Number of family health 
centres  (motherhood and 
childhood) 
5 32 
Average number of 
children per centre 
68,882 1,821 
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Table125.5: Unequal Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem - East and West (Najjar et al, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unequal  Israeli Planning Policies In Jerusalem 
East and West 
Construction Densities 
After Expropriation 
In 1968 
(Units per dunum) 
Average Housing 
Density 
(Person per room) 
 
Jewish Palestinian Jewish Palestinian 
6.1 2.2 1.1 2.2 
Population Living in 
Densities  3 
(Person per room) 
Population Density 
(Person per dunum) 
 
Jewish Palestinian Jewish Palestinian 
2.4% 27.8% 21.7 14.6 
Palestinians  in Jerusalem 1967-1996- Housing Facts: 
[12,600  housing units  existed in  East Jerusalem  in 
June 1967] 
10,473  housing 
units were added 
between  
1967 - 1996 
 
Number of 
housing units in 
the Arab sector 
grew by 83% 
during 
 1967-1997 
 
One housing 
unit was added 
for each 
additional 9.7 
Palestinian 
residents 
during  
1967-1997 
Jews  in Jerusalem 1967-1996- Housing Facts: 
[57,500  housing units  existed in  West  Jerusalem  in 
June 1967] 
70692 housing 
units were added 
between  
1967-1996 
 
 
Number of 
housing units in 
the Jews sector 
grew by 123% 
during  
1967-1997 
 
One housing 
unit was added 
for each 
additional 3 
Jewish residents 
during  
1967-1997 
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Figure685.28: High-rise Jewish residential complex in West Jerusalem planned by Jerusalem Municipality and 
implemented by the Israeli government, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure695.29: Scattered Palestinian residential area in East Jerusalem developed by the local residents, (researcher) 
Large scale Israeli residential 
complex of bridged typical units 
in West Jerusalem 
Israeli 
residential 
tower 
 
Polluted visual fabric in the 
Palestinian neighborhoods in 
East Jerusalem  
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Figure705.30: High-tech infrastructure in Pizgat Ze'ev Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure715.31: Deteriorated infrastructure in Shu'fat Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
Wide 
sidewalk 
Bus lane 
Tram 
Repetitive 
residential unit 
Damaged asphalt surface and 
no sidewalks or curb stone  
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Figure725.32: Wide roads with adequate parking in Reches Shu'fat Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure735.33: Insufficient right of way and inadequate parking spaces in Beit Hanina in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
Sidewalk 
Repetitive 
residential unit 
Parking lane 
Palestinian cars park over the 
sidewalks in Beit Hanina because 
there is no adequate street room 
or parking spaces 
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The urban fabric, growth and expansion in Jerusalem are, therefore, manifested in 
two distinct ways: the first is a growth initiated and implemented by the central 
government, located in West Jerusalem and Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem; while 
the second is a restrained pattern against the organic needs of the native Palestinian 
residents, located in East Jerusalem. Yousef (2008) highlights interestingly these two 
parallel societies in Jerusalem, stating: 
“A look at Israel’s demographic and territorial policies in Jerusalem and the West Bank 
reveals how these policies laid the foundation for the development of two different and 
separate system of living, which nourished the conditions of ethnic segregation. Both 
systems run along different but overlapping urban fabrics and each has its own 
geographic flow. Both connect and interact at certain points but are relatively 
autonomous, governed by different laws, and with a life of their own”. (Yousef, 2008: 29) 
The first system serves the Israeli tissue and 
governs the Jewish fabric. This progressive system 
adopts an integrative approach among the Jewish 
localities spread in West Jerusalem and the Jewish 
settlements in East Jerusalem, by providing well 
established services and modern infrastructure, and by 
providing physical and spatial connectivity between 
these two east and west geographies achieved by 
comprehensive by pass roads (Fig. 5.34-5.36). This 
system is developed and promoted by the regime. 
Planning is prepared by the state where housing is 
financially designed in affordable pattern for the Israeli. 
In this system, projects are characterized by rabid, mass 
production, and undertaken with special facilitation 
from Jerusalem Municipality (Yousef, 2008). 
Construction is public and of enormous scale, with 
whole sectors of neighborhoods designed by a single 
architect. Housing projects are standardized with 
repetitive units characterized the Jewish neighborhoods 
in East and West Jerusalem (Fig. 5.37).   
Figure745.34: Highways for Jewish settlements and meandering 
streets for Palestinian communities in EJ, (Yousef, 2008, edited) 
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Figure75 .35: Large scale infrastructure in main streets and transport systems in West Jerusalem using bridges, tunnels 
and elevated street sections, (researcher) 
 
Figure765.36: Poor structure of the major road used by Palestinians to enter East Jerusalem from West Bank, (researcher) 
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Figure775.37: High housing density with repetitive units in Ramot Allon settlements in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
The second system exists in the Palestinian fabric in East Jerusalem. However, this 
system is controlled by two different authorities which, still aim at the same objective, 
restraining the Palestinian development. Jerusalem Municipality controls the system of 
living of the Palestinians who live within its borders, while the Israeli military authorities 
control the system of life of the Palestinians living in Jerusalem district but outside the 
municipal boundaries. On contrary to the first Jewish system, the Israeli authorities in this 
system do not undertake any significant development or infrastructure projects. 
Accordingly, Palestinians in East Jerusalem are subjected to two different sets of laws, 
the annexed 70 square kilometers around the Old City were governed by Israeli civil law, 
and the rest of the governorate is controlled by Israeli military laws. Although the 
municipality is a non-military organization, the Jerusalemites in East Jerusalem feel that 
it is the major source of fear and threat, Yousef (2008) described that ‘unsecured feeling’ 
of one Jerusalemite, stating: 
  “… in Jerusalem, the municipality is more dangerous than the army”. (Yousef, 
2008:27) 
Jerusalem municipality’s planning law is restrictive towards the Palestinian 
construction and development. Because of the difficulties Palestinians face to obtain 
building permits within the municipal area in East Jerusalem, they are forced to move 
outside the municipal boundaries where construction is more available but with much 
Colonial landscape of the Jewish 
settlements in East Jerusalem 
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more lower level of services. The Israeli Planning and Building Laws organize and 
control all aspects of planning and development in East Jerusalem, they set forth the 
principles according to which statutory planning and development are to be undertaken. 
For example, there should be an approved ‘Detailed Urban Plan’ in order to obtain a 
permit to build a house, extend an apartment, add a balcony, pave a street, or develop 
land for economic or public purposes. The complexity of building regulations and 
unprecedented bureaucratic steps required before obtaining a building permit (which 
normally take many years) make the Palestinians incapable to develop small scale 
standardized neighborhoods, and force them to build scattered individual houses, and in 
many cases, they are even unable to add any extension to the existing buildings. 
Palestinian development is, therefore, restrained, small-scale and piecemeal. The largest 
construction is initiated by a family or perhaps a small group of buildings by a developer. 
The design of individual buildings is highly differentiated, and the single-family house in 
its diverse forms is the predominant building type as shown in Figure 5.38.  
 
 
Figure785.38: A ghettoized Palestinian neighborhood with low housing density & poor infrastructure in East Jerusalem 
surrounded by the Israeli Separation Wall in the front and back layers of the picture, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010, edited) 
The Israeli Separation Wall encircles the 
Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem 
forming "ghettoized spaces of risk"  “Space of Risk” 
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Palestinian 
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Eventually, it could be concluded that since the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, the 
Israeli planning policies and actions have targeted the Palestinian presence in the city. 
The determination to assert political sovereignty and demographic dominance over the 
eastern parts of the city have key impacts upon the rational development of Jerusalem 
over and above the problems associated with rapid growth and modernization. In this 
concern, Israel continued imposing radical spatial facts over Jerusalem and changed the 
total area of Jerusalem extending its sovereignty over the city (Fig. 5.39). According to 
the Israeli planning policies, Palestinians living in Jerusalem must remain a minority, 
Israel assumed the right to evict and deport them out of the city in order to restrict 
Palestinian presence. At the same time, Israel confiscated and seized Palestinians’ lands 
and properties and built more Jewish settlements.  
 
Figure795.39: Arab east Jerusalem within Greater Jerusalem, (PASSIA maps archive) 
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Standing on an urban planning point of view, the case in which the interrelations 
between "space, power, and politics" are outstandingly presented - lies in Jerusalem. In 
East Jerusalem, the image is even noticeably more evident. Upon examining the social 
and power spatiality, two predominant realities, diametrically tied, strike one’s mind: the 
physical displacement, and the social struggle. This social struggle is shifted into 
turbulence through the Israeli application of the architecture of separation and security in 
Jerusalem. People living within urban ghettoized neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, 
before the completion of the Israeli Wall, could have ‘risky accessibility’ into the city. 
That was possible through partial openings in the Wall, so that Palestinians approached 
dirt roads to breakthrough fences and climb concrete blocks in order to go to work, reach 
schools, conduct social family visits, and eventually do Friday prayer in Al Aqsa Mosque 
(Figs. 40, 41). 
 
Figure805.40: Palestinian students climb concrete wall to reach school in Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Unit, 2010) 
 
Figure815.41: Palestinian women standing at Qalandia checkpoint – the main northern gate into East Jerusalem, while 
Israeli soldiers prevent them to enter Jerusalem to do Friday Prayer at Al Aqsa Mosque, (Najjar, 2007c) 
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It is shown that urban planning in Jerusalem consists of two contradictory 
approaches: ‘progressive planning’ in West Jerusalem which serves the current and future 
needs of the Jewish Israeli residents there. On the other hand, ‘regressive planning’ in 
East Jerusalem, which hinders the current and the future development of the Palestinian 
residents. As such, deliberate and discriminatory actions against the Palestinian 
population continue. Planning in Jerusalem, therefore, is inequitable, implicitly biased 
and reflects not what it promises to be. It is used as a tool of control over the native 
Palestinian residents, rather than a tool of positive change. However, Yousef (2008) 
argues that both divided communities, the Israelis and Palestinians, are matching at one 
line, the commercial activities between the Israelis and the Jerusalemites, stating: 
“Although East and West Jerusalem remained ethnically segregated in terms of separate 
Palestinian and Jewish neighborhoods, commerce was a major magnet that brought both 
people to common place of encounter and interaction. …, the moments of tolerance and 
acceptance take place through business”. (Yousef, 2008:21) 
The existing paradox in the Israeli planning context in Jerusalem shaped two 
contradictory physical spaces. A Palestinian unsecured society; and an Israeli advanced 
and secured one. Control in this research means increasing the Jewish demography in 
Jerusalem over Palestinians and making them a majority in order to Israelize Jerusalem, 
neglecting its original Arabic roots, as well as, restraining the Palestinians future 
development. Israel succeeded to impose new geographical, demographical and physical 
facts on the ground. The Israeli planning laws and regulations have been designed to 
facilitate the process of expropriating Palestinian lands to be used for Israeli settlements, 
obstruct the growth and development of Palestinian neighborhoods. The significant 
influence of the political decision-making upon the creation of ethnic related regions and 
settlements in Jerusalem has been also shown. The effects of power and politics upon 
social and economic dimensions were evident; the extent to which superimposing the 
former has shaped and influenced the latter is outstanding. This reveals the dark side of 
planning in Israel and proves the regressive impact of Israel's planning policies, which in 
total have profoundly shifted land along with economic resources from indigenous 
Palestinians to Israeli settlers and Jewish immigrants. Palestinians suffer in consequence. 
The Palestinian feeling of living in ‘unsecured spaces’ in East Jerusalem is, therefore, 
overwhelmingly growing in the Palestinians’ daily life and existence. 
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5.4   Green Architecture – Gray Planning37  
The urbanization process in East Jerusalem has been described as a still process, in 
other words, a frozen or even rarely-developed process. This section of this chapter 
explores the green and open landscape concept as one of the dominant factors described 
in the Jerusalem Master Plan. This factor is one that restrains urbanization and hinders 
expansion of the Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. Both descriptive and 
comparative approaches were adopted to analyze and evaluate the historical development 
of green spaces and open landscape concepts in East Jerusalem. This section examines 
the current status of these spaces and policies with objectives for misusing these spaces to 
implement and achieve Israeli policies. The overall objective of the Israeli policies 
appears to be to hinder the Palestinian development and expansion process in East 
Jerusalem while speeding-up the expansion and building process of more Israeli 
settlements. 
5.4.1   Urban Morphology  
Open landscapes besides greenbelts have long been considered an effective tool for 
containing and shaping urban growth. Greenbelt concepts were developed in London and 
diffused to many cities, including Jerusalem. Israel has created planning policies using 
open landscapes to restrict the future development of the Palestinian neighborhoods in 
East Jerusalem by making them disintegrate socially (ethnically), and thus  reducing their 
traditional Palestinian character.  In theory, a landscape comprises the visible features of 
an area of land, including physical elements such as landforms, living elements of flora 
and fauna, abstract elements such as lighting and weather conditions, and human 
elements (Najjar, 2008); in other words, landscape "is of all kinds of painting the most 
innocent, and which the Devil himself could not accuse of Idolatry" (Gombrich, 
1966:107). The Palestinian Landscape has always been distinguished for its diversity and 
uniqueness within a limited area of land. Each of the Palestinian cities has its own 
remarkable landscape, which is considered a part of the Palestinian cultural heritage.  
                                                   
37 This section of the PhD research has recently been published by the researcher and co-authored and acknowledged 
by the supervisors, the publication is referenced as: Najjar, R. and Amro, J. 2011, Future development of the 
Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem: Misuse of environmental concepts in land management. International 
Journal of Environmental Studies, 68(4):531-542. London: Routledge. 
 150 
 
Palestine’s landscape is the best historian, narrating the story of Palestine and its people 
throughout their history.  The Palestinian landscape is a major element that must be 
observed and analyzed, especially. The Palestinian lands have suffered from successive 
invasions and occupation.  The history of ancient Palestine and its cultural landscape 
have been gradually replaced by an image of ancient Israel and Jewish landscape. 
A living image of the Palestinian historical and cultural landscape lies in Jerusalem. 
Jerusalem's heart and soul undeniably lies in its Old City, an area reflecting 5000 years of 
human history condensed in barely one square kilometer. Covering more or less the 
original area of the age-old settlement in the Judean mountains, the Old City's maze of 
narrow, and sometimes confusing, alleys and stairways hide a treasure of historical, 
cultural and spiritual heritage.  The Old City's four quarters are home to an amazingly 
diverse mix of people, and the extent of ethnic and spiritual coexistence displayed here 
every day greatly adds to this unique area's allure. The quarters are grouped around the 
Temple Mount, a spiritual focal point for multiculturalism,  especially for Muslims since 
the Seventh century CE, when the Dome of the of the Rock and Al Aqsa Mosque were 
built atop the Mount. All this wealth is protected by a thick, imposing stone wall, 3 
meters thick and between 5 and 15 meters high. Erected by Sultan Suleiman the 
Magnificent in the 16th century CE to protect the city's residents and its Islamic holy 
places - not the least against a possible resurgence of the Crusades - it is one of the 
world's best preserved walls in that period. Extending over approximately 4.5 kilometers, 
the wall roughly follows the line of earlier foundations built by Roman Emperor Hadrian 
and fortified in Byzantine times, and it is surrounded by a beautifully landscaped green 
belt, which sets off its splendor. 
Urban morphology is the study of the physical form of a city, which consists of 
street patterns, building sizes and shapes, architecture, population density and patterns of 
residential, commercial, industrial and other uses, amongst other things. Special attention 
is given to how the physical form of a city changes over time and to how different cities 
compare to each other. Another significant part of urban morphology deals with the study 
of the social forms which are expressed in the physical layout of a city and conversely, 
how physical form produces or reproduces various social forms (Whitehand, 1987a). 
Urban morphology is also considered as the study of urban fabric, as a means of 
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discerning the underlying structure of the built landscape. This approach challenges the 
common perception of unplanned environments as chaotic or vaguely organic through 
understanding the structures and processes embedded in urbanization (Whitehand, 1981; 
Whitehand, 1987b; Slater, 1990a). Within industrial countries, urban landscape is a major 
research topic. Much of the recent work attaches considerable importance to the historical 
forms created by previous generations (Slater, 1990b). Jerusalem by its texture combines 
the historical and the modern landscape perspectives; this makes planners give it special 
value. 
Researches dealing with the physical form of urban areas became more evident 
during the 1980s. Nevertheless, related publications formed only 12% of geographical 
papers on the internal structure of cities in the middle of the decade (Whitehand, 1986). 
By 1990, there was sufficient international interest in the urban landscape amongst 
academics and professionals in a range of disciplines for the international Conference of 
Urban Landscape to be convened (Whitehand and Larkham, 1992; Moudon, 1997). 
Jerusalem has acquired special attention in the related planning literature, since it 
includes monuments of the main monolithic religions on the globe.  Within Europe, the 
influence of studies of urban form has created a pool of knowledge and experience upon 
which town planning has drawn, at least indirectly. Within the Third World, the 
contribution of urban morphology has hitherto been relatively small. Here urban 
morphologists are particularly needed to contribute to master plans with a historical view, 
before the cities of the twenty-first century are severed irreparably from their roots. When 
Ebenezer Howard put forth the idea of the garden city in 1898, he was looking for an 
antidote to the ills of the urban life. His solution was a town set against a background of 
the country. Various sources contributed to the thinking of Howard and his 
contemporaries. Part of the inspiration appears to have been the Bible (Osborn, 1969).  
Another element was the nineteenth century experience of the Industrial Revolution and 
the reaction against it (Howard, 1966).  
5.4.2   Historical Development of the Green and Open Spaces in EJ 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, Palestine, like many other Ottoman provinces, 
had undergone a slow process of modernization. It was increasingly exposed to Western 
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technology and culture. The European consulates and missionary-philanthropic 
organizations that had begun operating in Jerusalem around mid-century served as 
vehicles for the introduction of Western influence. The Germans, Russian, French, and 
English presence was reflected in their architectural compositions; e.g., the Anglican 
cathedral of St. George, the churches under the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission. Political 
life in Palestine under the British Mandate (1917-1948) was turbulent. The Arab 
population of Palestine, Muslim as well as Christian, more than doubled during the first 
half of the twentieth century, and Jerusalem's Arab population grew from 28,000 in 1922 
to 65,000 in 1946. Rapid demographic development went hand in hand with accelerated 
economic progress. The British brought with them new standards of physical 
infrastructure and public services. Electricity was first introduced in private homes in the 
large cities in the mid-1920s. Development in the country slowed down with the outbreak 
of the First World War. The years following the First World War brought rapid growth. 
In 1917, when General Sir Edmund Allenby entered the Old City of Jerusalem, British 
rule over Palestine began. The British set up their administrative centre for the country in 
Jerusalem, transforming it from a relatively neglected Ottoman provincial town to a 
modern administrative, political, religious and cultural centre. Jerusalem expanded to the 
north, south and west. Many eminent architects and planners were brought to Jerusalem 
to draw master plans, develop guidelines, and design buildings. Since the civil 
administration of the British Mandate Authority was headquartered in Jerusalem, the city 
acquired a new position of political importance adding to its position of religious 
significance, and became the capital of the country. This in itself was a major source of 
urban growth. 
The origins of the concept of greenbelts long predate the initial use of the term 
(Thomas, 1970). Definition of the greenbelts causes much confusion in Jerusalem and, 
indeed, there is no hard-and-fast definition. In Jerusalem no statutory status distinguishes 
the land included in the belt or its use. Instead, the term greenbelt is applied by the quasi-
governmental agency responsible for afforesting and maintaining a portion of the public 
land in and around the city. The Jerusalem greenbelt ranges from several kilometers at its 
broadest to as few as twenty meters at its narrowest and covers an area of approximately 
thirteen square kilometers (Cohen, 1994). The benefits of greenbelts are to improve the 
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city’s aesthetics and health; but in East Jerusalem those green spaces are not noticeable 
and rare. On the other hand, open landscapes are widely allocated, since these spaces 
damage the Palestinian neighborhoods and devastate their landscape integrity as well as 
restrict their future development.  
Greenbelts were imported to Jerusalem by the British.  British plans for Jerusalem 
predated official commencement of the mandate; they had been initiated in 1917 before 
the end of the Ottoman regime in Palestine. With Turkish troops still in the town of 
Nablus, slightly more than eighty kilometers from the gates of Jerusalem, the British 
commander General Allenby summoned the city engineer of Alexandria, William 
McLean, to Jerusalem to advise the army on urban development (Kendall, 1948). A 
proclamation in 1918 limited construction within two and-a-half kilometers of Damascus 
Gate, and special effort was made to direct construction away from these areas to the east 
and south of the Old City. The reason for imposing these restrictions was the British 
desire to preserve the special character of Jerusalem, which was best expressed in 
concern of the Old City and its immediate surroundings, the areas of scenic vistas to the 
east and, to lesser extent, the south, and the approaches to the city from the four points of 
the compass (Cohen, 1994). This was in line with British respect for Jerusalem’s role in 
the Bible and the widespread Evangelical understanding of religion (e.g., Lloyd George 
was a Welsh Protestant) which operated in decision-making circles; although Sir Mark 
Sykes was a Roman Catholic.  
In 1919, the Pro-Jerusalem Society commissioned Patrick Geddes to prepare a plan 
for the city. It, like the 1918 scheme, proposed severe restrictions on building 
immediately adjacent to the external side of the Old City wall. That land was occupied in 
many places by ramshackle structures, and the British authorities sought to convert it into 
strip of green parkland that would beautify and set the Old City apart from the 
surrounding built-up area (Fig. 5.42). In 1921 the Town Planning Commission was 
established, and initial ordinances on development were issued. A 1922 scheme proposed 
by the commission had four zones, one of which was a “park system composed of public 
and private open spaces”. A 1929 scheme contained a map labelled “Showing Green Belt 
Around the City Walls” (Kendall, 1948). The concept of a greenbelt was also evident in 
the work of the Jewish Agency, which was engaged in planning new Jewish 
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neighborhoods and communities in Palestine, an activity that was officially sanctioned by 
the Mandate authorities (Kauffman, 1926). 
 
 
Figure315.42: The Old City of Jerusalem with the protection wall, (aerial map from Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
 
The impetus for the British planning of Jerusalem in the interwar years was 
aesthetic and historical – including the matter of open spaces. The efforts were primarily 
for preservation or, perhaps more accurately, restoration rather than as guides for the 
evolution of the city. This position was indicated in Kendall’s comment about the lack of 
trees in Jerusalem:  
“There can be little doubt that by 1919 the Central Commission and all the persons 
interested in the appearance of Jerusalem were impressed by the inadequacy of tree 
planting generally”(Najjar and Amro, 2011:537) 
Old City Of 
Jerusalem 
Northern Wall 
Eastern Wall 
Western Wall 
Southern Wall 
 155 
 
The 1944 plan for Jerusalem was intended to meet the needs of the city as a whole, 
and discussion of open space indicated a shortage for the entire area. The plan gave 
details only for the areas of traditional concern to the British planners and for a small 
number of prominent locations. In addition to the continued focus on the Old City and the 
Mount of Olives, the section on open space described provision to save the greenery 
areas where future roads will be opened through, so that when a proposed road crossed 
open spaces, provision would be made to transplant existing trees from the road way to 
adjacent plots, achieving amenity in the development of future neighborhoods (Kendall, 
1948).  Kendall continued to serve as a planning adviser to the government of Jordan 
after 1948 (Efrat, 1984). 
 After the Arab-Israel war (1948), Israel located some of the forests and the newly 
established agricultural communities on the sites of the depopulated Arab Villages. In 
1950 planting began near Givat Shaul, a new neighborhood occupying the site of a 
former Arab village. Major purposes of the greenbelts are to prevent urban sprawl, 
provide escape from noise, congestion and strain of the city life, and to seek recreation in 
the countryside. In East Jerusalem, there has been a seemingly contradictory function; 
Israel has used the forest block as a key tool in separating Jerusalem from the 
surrounding landscape (Cohen, 1994) i.e. the West Bank, to devastate the contiguity 
between them, and to impede access by the Palestinians to Jerusalem. Although some 
deforestation soon took place after the reunification of Jerusalem after the 1967 war, it 
was piecemeal and not guided by greenbelt planning. Instead, it was noticeably intended 
to beautify specific areas, especially along the approaches to the city and in the pre-1967 
No Man’s Land. An additional function of tree planting was to prevent alternative land 
use, mainly by the Palestinians (Cohen, 1993). 
5.4.3   Discussing the Urban Green Spaces' Status Quo in Jerusalem 
The urbanization process according to Yokohari et al (2000) is a global 
phenomenon that requires an increasing amount of land and other resources. Unpolluted 
environments, as well as, possibilities for recreation in open green spaces, are among the 
top expectations of urban citizens (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Urban sustainability 
requires adopting development choices which consider the integration between actions 
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and consequences in the environment, economy and society. The overlapped connectivity 
of that interrelationship is illustrated using a three dimensional diagram shown in Figure 
5.43, in which sustainable development is represented schematically using three circles 
for the target dimensions of environment, economy and society, to which are added the 
time, north, and east-south dimensions (Abuleil, 2008).  
 
 
Figure835.43: Environment, economy and society interrelationship in sustainable perspective, (Abuleil, 2008, edited)  
Despite the large debate over sustainability, that sustainable development goes 
beyond environmental conservation, to economic and social objectives,  Haughton, and 
Hunter, (1996) argue that the development of cities, generally, generate more pollution. 
Areas classified as green spaces in the master plan of Jerusalem (B3000-1991) are about 
13 percent of total land area of East Jerusalem (Fig. 5.44). The master plan of East 
Jerusalem shows that all the Arab neighborhoods are surrounded by lands that are 
regarded as green zone except for Beit Safafa and Kafr Aqab, which means that these 
lands are to remain open zones or ‘vacant’ lands (Fig. 5.45). On the contrary, lands 
surrounding Israeli settlements are classified as development zones, where future possible 
expansion is permitted. In practice, lands that were classified as green area in the 
planning schemes would eventually be confiscated for Israeli use in building new Israeli 
settlements (Figs. 5.46, 5.47). This policy is used to block the Palestinian development in 
one hand and expand the Israeli settlements growth on the other. 
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Figure845.44: Lands declared green within East Jerusalem, (Najjar, 2007c, edited) 
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Figure85 .45: The Master Plan of East Jerusalem, shows how Green Spaces surround the Palestinian neighborhoods, and 
thus, restrict their future possibilities for expansion and development, (Arnon, 1998, edited) 
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Figure865.46: Aerial image shows how the ‘green spaces’ around the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem (above 
picture/top for Abu-Ghneim green mountain) are expropriated by Israel and used eventually to construct Jewish-only 
settlements (above picture/below-for Har Homa settlement during construction works), (Halawani, 2006, edited)  
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Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem 
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Figure875.47: Above, side picture that shows how the “natural green spaces” in the Palestinian Abu-Ghneim Mountain 
are replaced by Israeli high-density buildings for Har Homa Jewish-only settlement, (ARIJ photos, edited)  
 
According to the Israeli planning policies, green spaces and open landscape zoning 
in the master plan of Jerusalem can be classified into two main categories: the first 
category lies in East Jerusalem, the researcher conceptualizes as “green spaces of risks” 
which formulate a “static sphere” surrounding the Palestinian neighborhoods in East 
Jerusalem, where Palestinians are prevented to do any kind of development, creating 
therefore, an "unsecured feeling" of future threat in terms of the “transformation” of that  
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natural landscape which presents in the Palestinians’ minds a rigid tie to the space’s 
history and identity; as well as, “psychological threat” of the danger for changing the 
Arabic names of that green spaces into Jewish names imposed by the Israeli central 
government, namely, "Israelization" of the Palestinian natural landscapes. This 
‘transformation process’ of East Jerusalem’s original green spaces is subjected into 
further Israeli detailed plans, for each expropriated green area, the Israeli Jerusalem 
Municipality along with other governmental planning bodies prepare town schemes that 
only consider the Israeli needs, even the proposed green area  in these town schemes are 
not preserving the original natural landscapes, but rather, depend upon new proposed 
zones to be designed within the colonial layout of the Jewish settlements, and thus, 
changing the original identify of the space, see Figure 5.48 for the approved master plan 
of Har Homa settlement which is established on Palestinian expropriated lands.  
 
Figure885.48: Master plan of Har Homa settlement, the plan proposed new green areas without considering the original 
forest exited prior construction works, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)  
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The municipality of Jerusalem began preparing the master plan (#5053) of Har 
Homa directly after the order of expropriating Abu Ghnaim Palestinian lands in 1992 and 
approved it in 1995. Har Homa was planned as a high-density urban settlement of 2056 
dunums (Figs. 5.49, 5.50). The residential area constitutes approximately 38% of the plan 
area with high construction density of 175%, allowing building height with eight floors 
for each building; the plan allocates land for public use including hotels, institutions, and 
public services, as well as, lands for commercial and industrial purposes as detailed in 
Table 5.6 and reflected in percentages in Figure 5.51. 
 
Figure895.49: Architectural sections of 8-10 floors buildings in Har Homa, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
 
Figure905.50: High rise tower under construction in Har Homa settlement, (Halawani, 2006, edited) 
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Table135.6: Land use categories in Har Homa master plan according to (Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure915.51: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Har Homa settlement, (researcher38) 
                                                   
38 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.6). 
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Public Buildings 232 11.3  
Public Institutions 70.6 3.4 
Public Services 13.4 0.7 
Hotels 28.3 1.4 
Roads 377.4 18.4  
Private Commercial Zone 48.2 2.3 
Industrial Zone  71.5 3.5 
Forest Zone  332.5 16 
Gardens  104.7 5 
Total 2056 100 
The plan introduces 7 land use categories 
unlike the plans given for the Palestinian 
neighborhoods in EJ which introduce 4-5 
categories as will be shown in this chapter 
The plan 
allocates high 
percent for 
residential use 
(high density) 
unlike the 
percent given 
for the 
Palestinian 
neighborhoods 
in EJ as will be 
shown later in 
this chapter 
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The second category lies in West Jerusalem, the researcher conceptualizes as 
“green spaces of life” where natural forestry and open landscapes are integrated with 
town planning and connected to serve the local Israeli population without preventing 
future development of the Israeli neighborhoods or Jewish settlements (Fig. 5.52, 5.53). 
 
Figure925.52: Natural green profile of Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
 
Figure935.53: National parks and natural reserves in Jerusalem, the figure shows how are the natural green recreational 
facilities concentrated in West Jerusalem, (Jerusalem Municipality, edited)  
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The process of misusing green concepts to achieve specific ethnic goals of the 
regime is conceptualized by the researcher as gray planning through artificial green 
architecture. Green spaces in Jerusalem were planned within an Israeli perspective to 
serve and support the Jewish population in Jerusalem. These green spaces can only be 
used by Israelis in the future to prevent the amalgamation of Israeli and Arab 
neighbourhoods in the city and to merge with surrounding settlements. The Israel Lands 
Authority aims at control over unused Arab tracts that, instead of being considered for 
deforestation (a process which would challenge governmental tenure or lead to premature 
sale and less revenue for the state), are being earmarked by the Israeli government for an 
Israeli future use, preventing Arabic residents from making use of the free spaces for 
their constructional needs. In addition, the Israeli Ministry of Housing prepared plans to 
restrict the Palestinian community (owners of the land) to use undeveloped tracts so that 
they are available instead for future Israeli settlements. This is also to ensure that 
Palestinian communities are geographically separated (Cohen, 1994). Tree planting in 
Jerusalem has an explicit function of ethnic separation between the Arab Palestinians and 
Israeli populations, an example of which can be found between the Israeli neighbourhood 
of East Talpiot and the Palestinian village of Sur Baher. 
5.5   Study Cases  
   As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Israeli urban planning policies in 
Jerusalem are creating two separate societies within the same district of Jerusalem, 
Palestinian or Arabic Society, and Israeli or Jewish Community. However, the earlier 
society still suffers from fragmentation of its social and geographical contexts in contrast 
to the later community, which is well connected and integrated by spatial continuity and 
physical infrastructure. The Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem has intensified the 
complexity between the Palestinian urbanized neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, via 
complex set of measures and tools. The Israeli government created mechanisms to 
expropriate Palestinian lands. One of the main methods is the “green land” method by 
which the needs of the Palestinian Arab residents in East Jerusalem could not be satisfied 
due to the fact that, the available free lands have been earmarked as green and open 
landscape, see Figure 5.54 which presents the land cut-off in the Israeli planning system.   
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Figure945.54:  Clarification chart of the Israeli gray planning process of minimizing lands for Palestinian development in 
East Jerusalem according to (Najjar and Amro, 2011, edited) 
 
It is noteworthy mentioning that the approved planning areas consist only 40 
percent of the total area of East Jerusalem, however, Palestinians in East Jerusalem are 
neither able to utilize all the planned areas for their organic development needs nor the 
other unplanned areas. Approximately 34 percent of East Jerusalem is expropriated for 
Jewish settlements, while 26 percent is still unplanned areas, therefore, Palestinians living 
in East Jerusalem are facing serious challenge to find enough room for their future 
development and expansion, see Figure 5.55. The researcher argues that more than 75 
percent of the total area of East Jerusalem is part of what he conceptualizes as the “static 
sphere” where  vacant Palestinians’ lands are frozen by the Israeli planning policies of 
Total area of Jerusalem 
(East & West) 
(126,000 dunums) 
44% of Jerusalem 
West Jerusalem 
(52945 dunums) 
56% of Jerusalem 
East Jerusalem 
(71055 dunums) 
34% of East Jerusalem 
Confiscated Land for Israeli 
Settlements (24193 dunums) 
66% of East Jerusalem 
Remained land after 
expropriations 
(46862 dunams) 
 
26% of East Jerusalem 
Unplanned Areas 
(17969.6 dunams) 
 
40% of East Jerusalem 
Planned Areas 
(28895.4 dunums) 
14% of East Jerusalem 
Green Area 
(9995 dunums) 
12% of East Jerusalem 
Housing Area 
(9178 dunums) 
14% of East Jerusalem 
Roads & Public Buildings 
(9722.4 dunums) 
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any kind of development, and transferred in the future for the purpose of establishing 
Jewish settlements, see Table 5.7.  
 
Figure95 .55: Urban management percentages in East Jerusalem municipal area (researcher39) 
Table145.7: Urban Management in East Jerusalem and the respective land management categories, (researcher39) 
Space Planning and Urban Management  
Percentage of 
EJ Total Area 
(%) 
Percentage 
of Planned 
Area 
E
as
t 
J
er
u
sa
le
m
 
Expropriated Lands
*
 34 
(%) 
R
em
ai
n
ed
 
af
te
r 
ex
p
ro
p
ri
at
io
n
 Unplanned Areas
**
 26 
P
la
n
n
ed
 
A
re
as
 
Housing 12 30 
Roads and public 
buildings 
14 35 
Green Areas
***
 14 35 
Total (%) 100 100 
Notes 
* This area of land is deducted from Palestinian East Jerusalem Lands and 
annexed, illegally, into the Israeli lands for the advantage of the Jewish 
population. 
** 
This area of land is undeveloped zones where Palestinians in East Jerusalem 
are unable to utilize; it is also subjected into future Israeli planning policies for 
the advantage of the Jewish population. 
*** 
This area of land is undeveloped zones where Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem are prevented to utilize; many of these zones are subjected into 
Israeli expropriation for the purpose of construction Jewish settlements 
illegally. 
Thus, according to the Israeli 
Planning Policies, approximately 
74% of the total area of East 
Jerusalem are zones where 
Palestinians are not allowed to 
utilize for their future development 
 
                                                   
39  The researcher produced this figure/table based on analyzing the data presented in (Fig. 5.54). 
Epropriated 
lands for Jewish 
Settlements 
34% 
Unplanned Areas 
26% 
Housing Areas 
12% 
Roads and Public 
Buildings Areas 
14% 
Green Areas 
14% 
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Eventually, the planned areas which amount up to 40 percent of the total area of 
East Jerusalem are categorized mainly under three major folds: housing areas, roads and 
public building areas, and green and open landscapes areas, the respective percentage of 
each category is presented in Figure 5.56. However, more than 70% of the total area of 
East Jerusalem is zones where Palestinians are not allowed to utilize for their future 
development (34% expropriated areas, 26% unplanned areas, and 14% green areas). 
 
 
Figure965.56: Approved planning categories in East Jerusalem each in percent to total approved areas, (researcher40) 
 
In fact, most of the East Jerusalem plans prepared by the Israeli Municipality of 
Jerusalem have allocated extensive areas for open landscape spaces. As shown in the 
previous figure, approximately 35% of the total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned 
for this purpose. As such, construction is completely forbidden in open landscape areas, 
where the permitted usage only includes forestry, groves, agriculture, and the use of pre-
existing roads. Unlike open public land, open green spaces are not expropriated from 
their owners and remain private property unless the Israeli government decides to 
confiscate such green lands for the purpose of constructing new Jewish settlements, or 
even for expanding the boundaries of existing settlements. 
                                                   
40  The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Fig. 5.54). 
Housing Areas 
30% 
Roads and Public 
Buildings Areas 
35% 
Green Areas 
35% 
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5.5.1   The Case of the Northern Areas  
5.5.1.1   Beit Hanina and Shu'fat 
An outstanding example of the gray planning policies is the Israeli urban planning 
in Beit Hanina and Shu'fat (Fig. 5.49). When the planning process began, extensive areas 
in these neighbourhoods were earmarked for residential construction on the scale of some 
12,500 housing units. On the basis of governmental policy, the Israeli District Committee 
decided to restrict construction to 7,500 housing units and earmarked large areas for open 
landscapes (Figs 5.50, 5.51). Numerous objections to these decisions were submitted by 
private landowners whose lands were allocated for open landscape. The Committee 
decided to remove these areas from the scope of the plan, as it could not really counter 
the objectors' arguments in terms of planning considerations. The removal of the open 
landscape area from the planning process in no way alters their legal status, since these 
areas are earmarked for open landscape in the general outline plan for Northern 
Jerusalem Plan 3000B (Najjar, 2007c). 
 
Figure975.49: Location of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat relative to the Old City (researcher41) 
                                                   
41 The researcher extracted this figure from (Fig. 5.13). 
Location of 
Beit Hanina 
and Shu'fat  
 170 
 
 
Figure985.50:Beit Hanina Plan #3457A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows 
how the Israeli planning policies  restricts the borders of Beit Hanina to include majorly the already built up areas and 
limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the east, north,  west and south as Green Open Landscapes, 
while the other vacant lands are expropriated for the purpose of constructing of two Jewish-only settlements, one on 
east of Beit Hanina while the other is on south-east part of Beit Hanina. 
Jewish 
Settlement on the 
eastern edge of 
Beit Hanina 
Jewish 
Settlement on the 
south east edge 
of Beit Hanina 
Palestinian built-up 
area of Beit Hanina  
Green 
Spaces 
of Risk 
Open landscapes 
surround all the 
borders of Beit 
Hanina  
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Figure995.51: Shu’fat Plan #3456A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B  (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how 
the Israeli planning policy restricts the borders of shuf'at to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its 
future expansion by designating vacant lands in the east and west as Green Open Landscapes, while the other vacant 
lands are expropriated for the purpose of constructing two Jewish-only settlements, one on west of Shu'fat while the 
others are on northeast and south of Shu'fat. 
Green 
Spaces 
of Risk 
Palestinian built-
up area of Shu'fat 
town  
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Jewish Settlement 
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surround west, 
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According to Jerusalem Municipality planning perspectives, both of Beit Hanina and 
Shu'fat neighborhoods were planned as urban clusters with Ramallah-Jerusalem Road serving 
as a commercial urban axis with high-density construction. The construction density declines 
as moving away from the center toward the margins of the neighborhoods. Table 5.8 shows 
the detailed planning categories of these neighborhoods. Of the total area of the plans, less 
than 30 percent is allocated for residential construction purposes with relatively low density 
and obviously low rise buildings. Residential land use is categorized into two classes, ‘Class 
1’ where all the built-up areas close to Ramallah Jerusalem Road are earmarked as a 
residential area with a construction density of 75% on three floors. And ‘Class 5’ covers the 
remaining areas located on the margins of the neighborhoods in vacant areas intended for low-
density residential construction of 50% on two floors. Figure 5.52 shows the percentages of 
each planning category in Beit Hanina and Shu'fat (Najjar, 2007c; Arnon, 1998). 
Table15 .8: Bayt Hanina and Shu'fat land use plan categories according to (Najjar, 2007c, edited) 
Planning 
Category 
Beit Hanina and Shu'fat 
Area 
(dunums) 
Percentage of 
Planned Areas 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 Village Core  44 0.6 
Dwelling ‘Area 5’ – (50% density) 1043 14.5 
Dwelling ‘Area 1’ – (75% density) 1022 14.3 
Total Dwelling Area 2109 29.4 
R
o
ad
s Roads 905 12.6 
Paths for Pedestrians 80 1.1 
Total Roads 985 13.7 
P
u
b
li
c 
A
re
as
 
Public Buildings 390 5.4 
Institutions 91 1.3 
Open Public Areas (Parks) 145 2.0 
Cemetery 4 0.05 
Engineering Facilities 12 0.15 
Total Public Areas 642 8.9 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 
A
re
as
 
Commercial Plus Residential Areas  398 5.5 
Total Commercial Areas 398 5.5 
U
n
u
se
d
 
A
re
as
 
Open Landscape Area 2965 42.5 
Total Unutilized Areas 3037 42.5 
 173 
 
 
Figure1005.52: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Beit Hanina and Shu'fat, (researcher42) 
 
As detected from the previous figure, the plan allocates very marginal area dedicated 
for the purpose of ‘public spaces’, especially those designated for recreational purposes 
which people need for social interaction with healthy and natural entertainment facilities, 
namely, the ‘public parks’ which consists only 2 percent of the total planned area. On the 
other hand, the plan allocates excessively large area accounts for 43 percent of the total 
planned area earmarked as open landscapes, particularly on spaces over vacant tracts. From 
a landscape and planning viewpoint, large sections of these areas are suitable for construction 
(Fig. 5.53). However, they were earmarked as open green spaces for political reasons. As 
explained earlier, the areas under open landscape land use title prevent Palestinians to make use 
of the land of any kind of development to serve their future expansion needs, on the contrary, 
these spaces surround the Palestinian built-up areas to construct hidden border of their 
development, then confiscated for Jewish settlements (Fig. 5.54). Figure 5.55 shows 
comparatively the percentage of what the researcher conceptualizes as green spaces of life 
versus green spaces of risk within the planned area of both Beit Hanina and Shu'fat. 
                                                   
42 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.8). 
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Figure1015.53: Open landscapes prevent future development of the residential areas in Beit Hanina, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure1025.54: Jewish-only settlement established upon confiscated Palestinian lands in Beit Hanina and other areas in 
East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
 
Areas zoned as open landscapes in Beit 
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Figure1035.55: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Beit Hanina and Shuf'at; the figure shows the 
percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas of the plan, (researcher43) 
 
The percentage of green spaces of risks in this case is shocking. These spaces 
continue producing the “unsecured” feeling to the local Palestinian residents who are also 
the landlords of these spaces. For example, Hodgkins (1996) argues that 2000 dunums 
from Shu'fat village were designated as a green area in 1968 and was planted with 
cypress trees and remained untouched until 1994 when a new Jewish-only settlement 
(Reches Shu'fat) was approved to be built consisting of 2,500 units (Figs. 5.56, 5.58).  
 
 
Figure1045.56: Reches Shu'fat settlement built on confiscated Palestinian lands in Shu'fat, (Halawani, 2006, edited) 
                                                   
43 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.8). 
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Figure105 .57: Reches Shu'fat Jewish-only settlement which was established over expropriated Palestinian lands that was 
planted by cypress trees, (Halawani, 2006, edited) 
 
 
Figure1065.58: The main street leading to Reches Shu'fat Jewish-only settlement, (researcher) 
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5.5.2   The Case of the Middle Areas  
 
This sections deals with four Palestinian localities in the middle of East Jerusalem, 
namely Wadi Al-Jawz, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud and Jabal Al-Mukabir. These 
neighborhoods are vital Palestinian economical and residential nodes in central East 
Jerusalem and lie within the visual basin of the Old City. Although these neighborhoods 
are among the most important Arabic clusters in central East Jerusalem, their urban fabric 
and the residential areas are fragmented and not integrated. Figure 5.59 identifies the 
geographical location of Wadi Al-Jawz, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud and Jabal Al-Mukabir 
relative to the Old City.  
 
 
Figure1075.59: Location of study cases in middle areas relative to the Old City, (researcher, extracted from Fig. 5.31) 
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5.5.2.1   Wadi Al-Jawz  
The neighborhood of Wadi Al-Jawz, because of its logistic location and proximity 
to the Old City (Fig. 5.60), has attracted many Jerusalemites since long time ago to live 
and reside inside it (Fig. 5.61). However, the municipality of Jerusalem imposed 
restrictive planning policies to marginalize the potential of the neighborhood and to limit 
its capacity to absorb more Palestinian residents. The ‘politics of demography’ to make 
certain that the Jewish population in Jerusalem will remain a majority, and thus, 
Palestinian Arabs in East Jerusalem should not exceed a certain limit to remain a group of 
minority have driven the political objectives in the Israeli governmental bodies to impose 
one-sided planning policies in Jerusalem for the advantage of the Israeli people and on 
the expense of the Palestinian residents there. As such, the Israeli spatial planning regime 
imposed upon the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem was not serving the Arab 
population with the basic social and infrastructure needs. 
 
 
Figure1085.60: One of Jerusalem Old City’s northern gates that leads directly into Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher) 
A commercial plaza in 
Wadi Al-Jawz active 
after Friday Prayer 
Northern gate in the Old City 
leads directly to Wadi Al-Jawz 
 179 
 
 
Figure1095.61: General view of Wadi Al-Jawz neighborhood in Eat Jerusalem, (researcher) 
  
Wadi Al-Jawz is a Palestinian long-standing residential neighborhood in East 
Jerusalem, situated to the north of the Old City and close to the East Central Business 
District. However, the neighborhood suffers from severe deterioration of the physical 
infrastructure along with scattered pattern of development enforced by the Israeli 
municipality of Jerusalem. The neighborhood urban fabric is no more coherent, the 
buildings are in general of bad structures and reflect in total a slum oriented pattern of 
development. The growth could be described as piecemeal; it reflects its expansion in 
incremental additions into the existing structures in the city. All of this is, strictly, 
imposed by Jerusalem Municipality which in most cases prevents the residents from 
adding new extensions into their homes either vertically or horizontally or building new 
houses in the vacant lands. Therefore, to match their basic needs, Palestinians are 
obligated to react to this Israeli policy by adding “illegally” some fast-erected 
attachments to their homes as will be shown in the following figures, (Figs. 5.62 – 5.70). 
 
Wadi Al-Jawz  
The Hebrew University 
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Figure1105.62: Attachments added into one Palestinian residential building in Wadi Al-Jawz, the figure shows the 
incremental fast-erected attachments added to the building mainly by hollow blocks or light steel structures, additions 
are made almost in all the building façades, which in total damages the building style and urban fabric, and thus 
producing low-quality social and physical landscape – an output of the political architecture, (researcher)    
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Figure1115.63: Additions made to serve households’ basic needs in residential building in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure1125.64: Incremental growth, sanitary rest rooms attached into residential building in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher) 
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        Figure5.65: Heterogeneous building façades in Wadi Al-Jawz – an output of the political architecture, (researcher) 
 
Figure1135.66: Scattered urban fabric in Wadi Al-Jawz – an output of the political architecture, (researcher) 
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Figure1145.67: Urban sprawl and scattered skyline in Wadi Al-Jawz , (researcher) 
 
Figure115 .68: Spatial urban Paradox between Wadi Al-Jawz and the adjacent Jewish settlement, (researcher) 
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Figure1165.69: Poor infrastructure at the commercial area in Wadi Al-Jawz, no room for proper parking, (researcher) 
 
Figure1175.70: Poor infrastructure at the industrial area in Wadi Al-Jawz, (researcher) 
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The visual outlook of Wadi Al-Jawz is deemed by the Israeli planning policies to 
continue fragmentally. The plan for this neighborhood was the first prepared by the 
Municipality of Jerusalem which addressed more restrictions upon the Palestinian future 
development and vacant lands are kept under open landscape zones (Figs. 5. 71-5.73) 
 
Figure1185.71: To the right, Wadi al-Jawz and American Colony Plan #2639 in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B  
(Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how the Israeli planning policy restricts the borders of Wadi al-Jawz to 
include majorly the already built up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands as Green Open 
Landscapes. 
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Figure1195.72: Large zones earmarked as open landscapes in Wadi Al-Jawz  are confiscated for constructing the Hebrew 
University, while others remained undeveloped despite the urgent need for urban expansion, (researcher) 
 
Figure1205.73: Open landscapes in Wadi Al-Jawz remained undeveloped despite the vital need for expansion, (researcher) 
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5.5.2.2   Silwan 
The village of Silwan is considered one of the most important Palestinian 
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Silwan commands interesting views to the old city. It 
has narrow and relatively contour oriented structure which is characterized by dense 
construction benefiting the varied slopes of the mountain edges, and therefore, it interacts 
uniquely with the topography and presents beautiful architectural landscape. However, 
the difficult topographical conditions have created serious problems of overcrowding and 
in adequate infrastructure in the village (Fig. 5.74). It is located adjacent to the southern 
wall of the Old City of Jerusalem, and thus, gets more interest in the Palestinians history 
and local Jerusalemite’s concern (Fig. 5.75). 
 
 
Figure1215.74: General view of Silwan village in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
Silwan 
 
Kidron Valley 
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Figure1225.75: Location of Silwan relative to the Old City of Jerusalem, (researcher) 
 
The proximity of Silwan to the Old City has attracted the Jerusalemites to live in 
the village since long time. Arnon (1998) argues that according to the planning scheme of 
Jerusalem Municipality, the maximum residential capacity of Silwan is approximately 
1,200 housing units, however, and according to the Municipality of Jerusalem more than 
1,300 housing units already exist in the village. Thus there is no potential for additional 
housing neither for the exiting Palestinian population there nor for new comers. The 
village includes a very large proportion of small apartments, so that building additions are 
intended mainly for the extension of existing housing units rather than for the 
construction of new units. Table 5.9 shows the detail plan land use categories in Silwan, 
and Figure 5.76 shows the percentages of each planning category and the respective land 
area according to the approved land use plan prepared by Jerusalem Municipality which also 
restricts the future development of Silwan by not expanding the village boundaries or 
increasing the construction densities or zones. 
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Table165.9: Silwan land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited) 
Planning 
Category Silwan 
Area 
(dunums) 
Percentage of 
Planned Areas 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 Dwelling ‘Area 6’ 27 6.9 
Dwelling Area ‘detailed planning’ 172 44.1 
Total Dwelling Area 199 51.0 
R
o
ad
s 
Roads 54 13.8 
Paths for Pedestrians 28 7.2 
Total Roads 82 21.0 
 P
u
b
li
c 
 
A
re
as
 
Public Buildings 25 6.4 
Institutions 1 0.3 
Open Public Areas (Parks) 24 6.1 
Cemetery 19 4.9 
Total Public Areas 69 17.7 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 
A
re
as
 Hotel and Recreation 3 0.8 
Total Commercial Areas 3 0.8 
U
n
u
se
d
 
A
re
as
 Open Landscape Area [nature 
reserve] 
37 9.5 
Total Unutilized Areas 37 9.5 
 
 
 
Figure1235.76: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Silwan, (researcher44) 
                                                   
44 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.9). 
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The approved master plan of Silwan is shown in Figure 5.77, while Fig. 5.78 and 
Fig. 5.79 reflect the Israeli determination for preventing any opportunity of future 
development of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem.  
 
Figure1245.77: Silwan Plan #2783A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it shows how 
the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Silwan to include majorly the already built up areas and limits its 
future expansion by designating vacant lands as Green Open Landscapes. 
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Figure125 .78: Over saturated space in Silwan where no room for new or additional buildings for the local Palestinian 
residents, (researcher) 
 
Figure1265.79: Vacant lands in Silwan earmarked as open landscapes restrain the Palestinian development, (researcher) 
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Jerusalem Municipality earmarks vacant 
lands in the north edge of Silwan as large 
scale Jewish cemetery, and thus limits the 
village extension in this direction 
Silwan panoramic view 
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5.5.2.3   Ras Al-Amud  
The preparation of Ras Al-Amud plan took many years of delay before approving 
the plan. The plan received final authorization from the Minister of the Interior in the late 
years of 1990s. Residential areas constitute 39% of the total area of the plan. The plan 
proposes low construction density of 50% and 25%. Approximately 65% of the 
residential areas are earmarked for 50% construction density while 35% of the areas are 
planned at a construction density of 25% (Arnon, 1998). On the other hand, Halawani 
(2006) argues that this designation of low-rise buildings and low construction density is 
part of the Israeli planning policies adopted only for the Palestinian neighborhoods in 
East Jerusalem, unlike the Jewish settlements there, for instance a Jewish neighborhood 
in Ras Al-Amud neighborhood allows for construction density of 112 percent and four 
stories. Table 5.10 shows the detail plan categories of Ras Al-Amud. 
Table175.10: Ras Al-Amud land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited) 
Planning 
Category 
Ras Al-Amud 
Area 
(dunums) 
Percentage of 
Planned Areas 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 Dwelling ‘Area Special’ 14 1 
Dwelling ‘Area 4’ – (70% density) 360 26 
Dwelling ‘Area 6’  174 12.6 
Total Dwelling Area 548 39.6 
R
o
ad
s Roads 171 12.4 
Paths for Pedestrians 20 1.4 
Total Roads 119 13.8 
 P
u
b
li
c 
 
A
re
as
 
Public Buildings 65 4.7 
Institutions 52 3.7 
Open Public Areas (Parks) 28 2.1 
Cemetery 3 0.3 
Total Public Areas 148 10.7 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
al
 
A
re
as
 
Hotel and Recreation 23 1.7 
Gas Station 2 0.2 
Total Commercial Areas 25 1.9 
U
n
u
se
d
 
A
re
as
 Open Landscape Area [including 16 
dunums not included in the plan] 
470 34 
Total Unutilized Areas 470 34 
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Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.80 – 5.81 show the 
percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher 
conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in 
Ras Al-Amud respectively. 
 
Figure1275.80: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Ras Al-Amud, (researcher45) 
 
Figure1285.81: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Ras Al-Amud; the figure shows the percentage of 
distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher45) 
                                                   
45 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.10). 
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The maximum residential capacity of Ras Al-Amud plan is approximately 2,000 
housing units (Arnon, 1998). According to the Municipality of Jerusalem the area already 
includes approximately 1,750 units. Thus the potential for additional housing is 250 units. 
However, the plan has extensive areas earmarked as Open landscape space amounting to 
approximately 34% of the total planned area (Fig. 5.82).  
 
Figure1295.82: Ras Al-Amud Plan #2668A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it 
shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Ras Al-Amud to include majorly the already built up 
areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre and south as Green Open 
Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities (if any). 
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5.5.2.4   Jabal Al-Mukabir  
The approved plan of Jabal Al-Mukabir shows four main land use categories, 
namely residential, roads, public areas and open landscapes. No commercial lands are 
entitled in the plan as shown in Table 5.11. The table shows strong restrictions imposed 
on the residential areas. Construction percentages are 25% on two floors only, therefore, 
the construction density in the village is extremely low. The areas earmarked for 
construction are very limited, amounting to approximately 20% of the total planned area 
including the already built up spaces. The maximum capacity is 230 housing units. 
According to the Municipality of Jerusalem some 120 housing units exist in the village. 
Thus the potential for additional housing is 110 units. The borders of the areas for 
construction were established by the plan according to the borders of the existing built-up 
area, without any possibility for expansion. In terms of the public areas, the plan includes 
only a single site of one dunum designated for a kindergarten. On the other hand, the plan 
provides for a minimal network of roads that will not allow access to each home. Despite 
all these solid restrictions imposed upon the Palestinians in Jabal Al-Mukabir, the plan 
allocates very huge areas as open landscapes which constitute more than 70% of the total 
planned area, and thus, imposing more challenges over the future needs of the 
Jerusalemites (Arnon, 1998). 
Table185.11: Jabal Al-Mukabir land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited) 
Planning 
Category 
Jabl Al-Mukabir 
Area 
(dunums) 
Percentage of 
Planned Areas 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 
Dwelling ‘Area 6’  - (25% density) 117 20.5 
Total Dwelling Area 117 20.5 
R
o
ad
s Roads 22 3.8 
Total Roads 22 3.8 
 P
u
b
li
c 
 
A
re
as
 Public Buildings 1 0.2 
Cemetery 11 1.9 
Total Public Areas 12 2.1 
U
n
u
se
d
 
A
re
as
 Open Landscape Area [including 22 
dunums not included in the planned] 
361 73.6 
Total Unutilized Areas 361 73.6 
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Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.83 – 5.84 show the 
percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher 
conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in 
Jabal Al-Mukabir respectively. 
 
Figure1305.83: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Jabal Al-Mukabir, (researcher46) 
 
 
Figure1315.84: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Jabal Al-Mukabir; the figure shows the percentage 
of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher46) 
                                                   
46 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.11). 
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The distribution of the open landscapes is designed to damage any possibility of 
geographical continuum in Jabal Al-Mukabir and to prevent the future Palestinian 
expansion opportunities in the vacant lands (Fig. 5.85).  
 
 
Figure1325.85: Jabal Al-Mukabir Plan #2691 in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it 
shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Jabal Al-Mukabir to include majorly the already built up 
areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre, east, west and south as Green 
Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities (if 
any). 
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5.5.3   The Case of the Southern Areas  
This section sheds light upon the southern parts in East Jerusalem; the southern 
Palestinian localities discussed in this section are Arab A-Sawahra, Sur Baher and Um-
Tuba, shown in Figure 5.86. These localities were located in Jerusalem District, and then 
were included within the municipal boundaries after the Israeli annexation of East 
Jerusalem in 1967 and the respective expansion of the municipality political borders. 
 
Figure1335.86: Location of Arab A-Sawahra and Sur Baher relative to the Old City, (researcher47) 
                                                   
47 The researcher extracted this figure from (Fig. 5.31). 
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5.5.3.1   Arab A-Sawahra  
Arab A-Sawahara is located in the south-east of the city; it is the largest 
neighborhood of East Jerusalem and is inhabited mainly by indigenous Arabs. The master 
plan of Arab A-Sawahra classifies zones into main four categories; namely, residential, 
roads, public areas and open landscapes. The total planned area is approximately 4,682 
dunams; Table 5.12 shows the respective area of each land use category. The plan is very 
conservative regarding the residential land use, it is of very low density, i.e. it allocates 
construction density of 25%, or in other words, only two floor buildings. On the other 
hand, it allocates no less than 60% of the total area of the plan for open landscape. The 
areas earmarked for open landscape include several clusters of existing buildings as well 
as isolated buildings. Zoning as open green spaces means that households cannot extend 
their homes or connect to infrastructure services. The instructions attached to the plans 
include a clause stating that in ‘lawful’ existing buildings within open green spaces, no 
additional building will be permitted, with the exception of extensions required for the 
purpose of sanitary improvements to an existing building. In practice, the use of the word 
lawful prevents any building extension, since it is difficult to prove that long-standing 
buildings were constructed legally, while the new buildings were built unlawfully 
(Najjar, 2007c). 
Table195.12: Arab A-Sawahra land use plan categories according to (Najjar, 2007c, edited) 
Planning 
Category 
Arab A-Sawahra Area (dunums) 
Percentage of 
Planned Areas 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 
Dwelling ‘Area 6’  - (25% density) 1109 23.9 
Total Dwelling Area 1109 23.9 
R
o
ad
s Roads 662 13.4 
Total Roads 662 13.4 
 P
u
b
li
c 
 
A
re
as
 Public Buildings 59 1.3 
Total Public Areas 59 1.3 
U
n
u
se
d
 
A
re
as
 Open Landscape Area [including 82 
dunums not included in the planned] 
2852 61.4 
Total Unutilized Areas 2852 61.4 
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Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.87 – 5.88 show the 
percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher 
conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in 
Arab A-Sawahra respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure1345.87: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Arab A-Sawahra, (researcher48) 
 
Figure135 .88: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Arab A-Sawahra; the figure shows the percentage 
of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, (researcher48) 
                                                   
48 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.12). 
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The excessive distribution of the open landscapes is, deliberately, designed to 
damage any possibility of geographical continuum in Arab A-Sawahra and to prevent the 
future Palestinian expansion opportunities in the vacant lands (Fig. 5.89).  
 
 
Figure1365.89: Arab A-Sawahra Plan #2683A in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), it 
shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Arab A-Sawahra to include majorly the already built up 
areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre, east, west and south as Green 
Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities (if 
any). 
Palestinian built-up 
area in Arab A-
Sawahra 
Excessive 
distribution 
of the open 
landscapes 
throughout 
Arab A-
Sawahra 
Green 
Spaces 
of Risk 
 202 
 
5.5.3.2   Sur Baher 
The other Palestinian neighborhoods if this section are Sur Baher and Um Tuba 
which are located in the south of Jerusalem, to the south of East Talpiot. Sur Baher and 
Um Tuba have had no master plan until 1999, when the municipality of Jerusalem 
prepared the master plan of these neighborhoods as shown in Figure 5.90. The plan 
portrays the zoning policy adopted for Sur Baher and Um tuba to earmark the zones 
around the built up areas for residential purposes, but with low construction densities. 
These spaces are connected by relatively limited road network that does not extend 
towards new vacant areas, meanwhile open spaces surround residential areas. Table 5.13 
shows the respective area of each land use category for the planned areas of these 
neighborhoods. 
 
Figure1375.90: Sur Baher and Um Tuba master plan according to (Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
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Table205.13: Sur Baher and Um Tuba land use plan categories according to (Arnon, 1998, edited) 
Planning 
Category 
Sur Bahir and Um Tuba 
 
Area 
(dunums) 
Percentage of 
Planned Areas 
R
es
id
en
ti
al
 Village core 19 0.5 
Dwelling ‘Area 5’  - (50% density) 290 8.3 
Dwelling ‘Area 6’  - (25% density)   1024 29.2 
Total Dwelling Area 1333 38.0 
R
o
ad
s 
Roads 420 12 
Landscape area 45 1.3 
Path for pedestrian  37 1.1 
Total Roads 502 14.4 
P
u
b
li
c 
A
re
as
 Public Buildings 104 3.0 
Institutions 15 0.4 
Open public areas (Parks, etc.) 39 1.1 
Cemetery 23 0.6 
Other areas of public use 17 0.5 
Total Public Areas 198 5.7 
U
n
u
se
d
 
A
re
as
 
Open Landscape Area  1465 41.9 
Total Unutilized Areas 1465 41.9 
 
Although the planned area for residential areas amounts for 38 percent, the 
construction densities are very low, allowing in most cases for two floors buildings for 77 
percent of the residential areas as shown in Figure 5.91. 
 
Figure1385.91: Percentage of construction density in the residential areas in Sur Baher and Um Tuba, (researcher49) 
                                                   
49 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.13). 
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Standing upon the presented data in the previous table, Figs. 5.92 – 5.93 show the 
percentages of each planning category, and the percentage of what the researcher 
conceptualizes as green spaces of life versus green spaces of risk within the planned area in Sur 
Baher and Um Taba respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure1395.92: Planning categories in percent of total planned area for Sur Baher and Um Taba, (researcher50) 
 
 
Figure1405.93: “Green Spaces of Life” Vs. “Green Spaces of Risks” in Sur Baher and Um Taba; the figure shows the 
percentage of distribution between both categories with reference to the total green areas allocated in the plan, 
(researcher50) 
                                                   
50 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.13). 
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The excessive distribution of the open landscapes is, thoroughly, designed to 
damage any possibility of geographical continuum in Sur Baher and Um Taba and to 
prevent the future Palestinian expansion opportunities in the vacant lands (Fig. 5.94).  
 
 
Figure1415.94: Sur Baher and Um Taba Plan #2320 in Jerusalem General Outline 3000B (Jerusalem Municipality, edited), 
it shows how the Israeli planning policies restricts the borders of Arab A-Sawahra to include majorly the already built 
up areas and limits its future expansion by designating vacant lands in the north, centre, east, west and south as Green 
Open Landscapes, also these open spaces prevent any continuity between the proposed expansion opportunities, as well 
as, in the south western edge there is a Jewish settlement which hinders the Palestinian development and movement. 
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In spite of all the aforementioned shortcomings in terms of the future development 
of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem, as most of the vacant lands are allocated 
for open landscapes where development is not allowed, it is quite sophisticated and costly 
to obtain a building permit from Jerusalem Municipality in the vacant lands in residential 
areas. Figure 5.95 demonstrates the bureaucratic steps the local residents should pass 
through before obtaining a building permit. These steps are identical for any Palestinian 
neighborhood in East Jerusalem; however, the example is taken for the case study in Sur 
Baher and Um Taba. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1425.95: Steps needed to obtain a building permit in East Jerusalem, the procedure is very complex and takes many 
years before issuing a building permit by the municipality, (researcher: according to data by Halawani, 2006) 
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The previous schematic outline of the complicated routine and procedural steps 
needed to obtain a building permit from the Israeli Municipality in Jerusalem is 
aggravated by considering the huge amount of money which should be deposited as a 
permit fee. Applying a request to the municipality to ask for approval to initiate 
engineering design process costs about 1155 NIS
51
 (312 $). The fees of water and 
sanitation depend mainly on the land and the building floor areas respectively. In terms of 
water fees, the municipality ears 10 NIS (2.7 $) for each one square meter of the land 
area, and 70 NIS (18.9 $) per one meter square of the building area, in addition,  15% of 
the total water fee is to be paid for the price of connecting water pipes to the building. In 
terms of sewage fees, the municipality ears 30 NIS (8.1 $) for each one square meter of 
the land area, and 40 NIS (10.8 $) per one meter square of the building area. The 
municipality earns 36 NIS (9.72) per one meter square of the building area as building 
license fees. Table 5.14 illustrates the exact permit cost of one building that obtained 
municipal building permit in Sur Baher and Um Tuba. The building area in this case 
study is 966 square meters distributed into three floors.  
 
Table215.14: Municipal fees' categories with the respective cost for obtaining a building permit of one building in Sur 
Baher and um Tuba according to (Halawani, 2006) 
Permit Item  Cost  
 NIS (₪)  
Equivalent 
Cost US ($)  
Percent of 
total cost (%) 
Opening file in the municipality 1155 312 0.15 
Fire department fee 1025 277 0.13 
Archeology fee 1630 440 0.21 
Dump site fee 5120 1382 0.66 
Final payment to the municipality 62000 16740 7.94 
Sewage and water fee 344419 92993 44.11 
Betterment levy fee
*
 365395 98657 46.80 
 Total  780744
**
 210801
**
 100 
Notes:  
*     
Betterment levy is a tax taken upon preparing master plan and improving the environment of the city. 
** 
The cost does not include the payments for the lawyer, land surveyor, design and supervision of 
consultant engineering office, as well as construction. 
                                                   
51 NIS (Israeli New Shekel), sign (₪): is the local currency used in Israel and the oPt. 1 NIS ₪ = 0.27 US$.  
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Thus, the total cost to get municipal building permit of 966 square meters in Sur 
Baher and Um Tuba is 780,744 NIS (210,801 $). In other words, the permit cost per 
square meter is 808 NIS (218 $). This number does not include the engineering design 
and supervision or lawyer and surveyor costs, still it is extremely high and unaffordable 
for most of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem; it is almost equivalent to 
construction costs of building skeleton works. Figures 5.96 and 5.97 show the municipal 
receipts of the most costly building permit items, i.e. sewage and water and betterment 
levy fees respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure1435.96: Municipal receipt for the sewage and water fees of the discussed example (Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
 
 
Figure1445.97: Municipal receipt for the betterment levy fees of the discussed example (Jerusalem Municipality, edited) 
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5.6   Discussion 
Examining of the overall planning map of East Jerusalem and analyzing the tables 
of land usages reveal a number of planning problems, the absence of overall integrated 
urban planning for East Jerusalem floats to the surface in this sense. This is the 
fundamental planning problem in East Jerusalem. The overall planning map shows that 
each neighborhood has been planned separately with the objective of dealing with local 
scale level. These plans were prepared at different periods and do not relate to the 
regional scale or the area as a whole, as well as, do not present a perspective which 
integrates the Palestinian neighborhoods into a single urban fabric. The result of this 
approach is that there is no integration of infrastructure, facilities and other services on 
the urban level, beyond individual neighborhoods. Figure 5.98 shows schematic outline 
of the spatial context in East Jerusalem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure145 .98: Schematic outline of the spatial context in East Jerusalem highlighting the fragmentation of the Palestinian 
neighborhoods because of the Jewish settlements and the wall, (researcher) 
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The past, present, and future of - a testy but necessary relationship - float to the 
surface when discussing planning status in East Jerusalem, more specifically, when 
dealing with the Palestinian neighborhoods and challenges Jerusalemites should face 
from the unilateral Israeli planning policies adopted by Jerusalem Municipality. The 
research presented in this study relates to the planning situation in East Jerusalem after 
forty five years of Israeli rule. The Municipality of Jerusalem has prepared town planning 
schemes for almost all the existing Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, as such 
planning has been completed for the entire built-up areas and valid town plans exist.  It is 
noteworthy reminding that only 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem zoned for 
residential purposes. Nonetheless, in many areas of these zones additional planning is 
needed before building permits may be received. For example, the land net area is a 
matter of concern in East Jerusalem, since the municipal building regulations vary 
according the land total area as shown in Figure 5.99. Thus, statutory planning has far-
reaching ramifications for the possibilities open to individual residents regarding building 
opportunities, whether or not they may build, and according to what conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1465.99: Special conditions imposed upon the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem in terms of obtaining 
building permits on plots of more than one dunum, (Najjar, 2007c, edited) 
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The geography and demography in East Jerusalem have been severely impacted by 
the Israeli planning regime.  In order to outline these impacts and as part of the research 
work, selected urban town plans for specific Palestinian neighborhoods distributed 
geographically in the north, centre and south were analyzed to reflect the overall 
Palestinian situation in East Jerusalem from spatial planning point of view. It has been 
shown that, yet, these town plans do neither meet the needs of the local Palestinian 
population nor allow for sustainable development. However, statutory planning evidently 
determines the character of the public domain. According to Najjar (2007c) the detailed 
plans for Beit Hanina and Shu'fat all include extensive areas earmarked for unification 
and re-parcelation. Indeed, most of the available areas that offer potential for new 
construction are either defined as compounds for unification and re-parcelation, a process 
that usually takes several years, or earmarked as open landscapes. Consequently, building 
in these areas has been completely frozen and pending approval of the plans. For 
example, the town plans of Bayt Hanina and Shu'fat allocates more than forty compounds 
for re-parcelation, Arnon (1998) argues that this is equivalent to more than sixty percent 
of the total planned area of the two neighborhoods. These conditions delay development 
since the bureaucratic procedures are extremely time-consuming. The following text 
discusses the two-sided planning perspective of Jerusalem Municipality in East 
Jerusalem. Table 5.15 shows selected three Palestinian neighbourhoods and one Israeli 
settlement in East Jerusalem for comparative analysis.  
  
Table225.15: Land use categories for approved plans in Palestinian neighborhoods and Israeli settlement in East 
Jerusalem, (researcher, based on Tables: 5.6, 5.8, 5.11 and 5.12) 
Affiliation Palestinian Neighborhoods 
Israeli 
Settlement 
Land use category  
(% of total planned area) 
North EJ: (Shu'fat 
& Beit Hanina) 
Middle EJ: (Jabl 
Al-Mukabir)  
 South EJ: (Arab 
A-Sawahra) 
Har Homa  
Residential Area 29.4 20.5 23.9 38 
Roads 13.7 3.8 13.4 18.4 
Public Areas 8.9 2.1 1.3 16.8 
Commercial Areas 5.5 0 0 2.3 
Industrial Areas 0 0 0 3.5 
Open Landscape Areas 42.5 73.6 61.4 16 
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The previous table shows the urban discrepancies in East Jerusalem between the 
Arab and the Jewish neighborhoods. The average of residential areas in that comparison 
of the Palestinian neighborhoods is less than 25% of the total planned area, while it 
reaches to 38% of the Jewish settlement. On the other hand, the construction building 
density in the Palestinian neighborhoods is very low; it reaches 25% in Jabal Al-Mukabir 
and Arab A-Sawahra, and ranges between 50%-70% in Beit Hanina and Shu'fat. While 
for Har Homa settlement it reaches 175% which is seven times higher than that 
designated in Jabal Al-Mukabir and Arab A-Sawahra, see (Figs. 5.100 - 5.102). 
 
 
Figure1475.100: Palestinian scattered housing units with low construction densities in EJ, (researcher) 
 
 
Figure1485.101: High-rise buildings & high construction densities in Har Homa settlement (Jerusalem Unit, 2010, edited) 
Repetitive Jewish 
housing units of (8 
floors) building heights 
in Har Homa settlement  
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construction density  
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each other  
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of (2–3 floors) building 
heights  
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Figure1495.102: Percentage of the residential areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher52) 
 
Indeed, after 1967 when Jerusalem Municipality began preparing town planning 
schemes for the Palestinian localities in East Jerusalem, areas were defined where 
building permits could be received subject to various complicated conditions. These 
conditions established a number of permitted low construction densities in most cases 
which allow for one or two floors only. Building permits were issued subject to these 
conditions and in accordance with the provisions of ‘Section 78’ of the Planning and 
Building Law, which is designed to enable the authorities to issue building permits during 
the period of announcing the preparation of a town planning scheme and its approval. 
The use of ‘Section 78’ was intended to solve urgent problems pending the preparation of 
general outline plans for the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. However, 
since the preparation of the general outline plan which began only in the 1980s, the 
provisions of ‘Section 78’ became a dominant tool in the Israeli planning policies in East 
Jerusalem. Moreover, in many cases the licensing process in East Jerusalem is infinitely 
more complex than in the west of the city, due to problems relating to existing 
infrastructures and bureaucracy. In order to solve problems, Jerusalemites are in many 
cases obliged to submit detailed planning scheme for their plot, a process that creates 
additional delay of several years before a building permit may be obtained. Thus the path 
for obtaining a building permit is paved with endless obstacles. 
                                                   
52 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15). 
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Most of the urban plans of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem allocate 
extensive areas for open landscape area. Approximately 40% of the total planned area of 
East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. Construction is completely forbidden in open 
landscape zones, where the permitted usages include forestry, groves, agriculture, and 
existing roads. It has been shown that all the Palestinian neighborhoods discussed in this 
chapter suffer from severe restrictions upon the residential capacity which is restrained by 
the planning regulations imposed by the municipality of Jerusalem. It could be argued 
that the Israeli planning paradigm in East Jerusalem enforces Palestinian development 
towards ‘rural pattern’ through limiting the construction densities into low values and the 
building heights into low levels. In spite of the urgent need for residential areas in the 
Palestinian neighborhoods and the fact that the exiting residential zones are in many 
neighborhoods already got saturated, the Israeli planning policies allocates very vast 
areas for ‘open landscape zones’ where development is not allowed. For example, the 
plan of Jabal Al-Kukabir allocates only 20.5% of the planned area for residential 
purposes, however it allocates 73.6% for open landscape zones, see Figure 5.103 which 
presents comparison between some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in terms of the 
amount of areas earmarked as open landscapes. 
 
Figure150 .103: Percentage of the open landscape areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in 
East Jerusalem, it shows the excessive allocation for this land use while it could redistributed in lower 
percentages for the benefit of residential land use category, (researcher53) 
                                                   
53 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15). 
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By limiting the Palestinian future expansion opportunities in East Jerusalem, the 
Israeli planning system attempts to enhance ‘slum-style’ character of many Palestinian 
urban areas from urban design perspective, and therefore, reflecting that the Jerusalemites 
are not accommodating urbanization. However, Palestinians perceive this as no more 
than a pretext for the application of political considerations limiting the development of 
Palestinian East Jerusalem. The planning of Jerusalem is influenced by government 
policy dictating that a proportion of 78% Jews and 22% Arabs should be maintained in 
the demography of Jerusalem. To this end, it has been necessary to restrict the 
development of the neighborhoods in the east of the city. One consequence of this policy 
has been the zoning of areas for open landscape on a basis that relates not to professional 
planning or design considerations, but rather to arbitrary decisions establishing the limits 
of construction. These open landscape zones are conceptualized by the researcher as 
green spaces of risks, since they generate feelings of insecurity to the local Palestinian 
residents who do observe these remain undeveloped spaces until eventually being 
expropriated for the establishment of Jewish settlements, Figures 5.104 - 5.105. On the 
other hand, the allocation of open landscapes in the Israeli settlements is providing the 
settlement with healthy environment and do not affect the development opportunities of 
the Israeli population, on the contrary, these spaces are integrated in the town planning 
schemes to provide well-integrated and environmental living conditions, as such the 
research conceptualizes these open landscapes located in the Jewish settlements as green 
spaces of live, Figures 5.106 – 5.108. 
 
 
Figure151 .104: The borders of the built-up areas of the Palestinian neighborhoods are earmarked as open landscape zones, and thus freezing 
the future expansion opportunities of the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
Open landscapes 
“Green Spaces of Risk” 
Open landscape zones establish hidden border to 
the Palestinian built-up areas in East Jerusalem 
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Figure152 .105: Green spaces of risks construct hidden borders to the Palestinian development in EJ, (researcher) 
 
Figure153 .106: Green spaces of life in Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, (researcher) 
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Figure154 .107: Green spaces of life produce social interaction in the Jewish settlements in EJ, (researcher) 
 
Figure155 .108: Open landscapes do not hinder residential development inside the Jewish settlements in EJ, (researcher) 
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Although zoning for open landscapes is presented heavily in the urban plans of the 
Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, areas allocated for public use are 
inadequate and do not respond to the needs of the local residents, and therefore, 
Palestinians suffer from severe shortage of the public institutions (educational, cultural, 
health, youth clubs, parks, gardens etc.), recreational and welfare spaces, as well as 
infrastructure. Hence, all the plans for East Jerusalem show a profound shortage of open 
public land. The limited allocation of land for gardens and parks is based on the fact that 
considerable areas are allocated for open landscape in East Jerusalem. But, the open 
spaces are actually undeveloped spaces that cannot serve as a substitute for public 
gardens, including playgrounds for children and space for leisure activities. On the other 
hand, in the Jewish settlements huge areas are designated for these purposes, Fig 5.109. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure156 .109: Comparison of open public spaces between the Palestinian neighborhoods and Israeli settlements in 
Jerusalem, (Najjar and Amro, 2011, edited) 
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The previous figure shows the level of urban discrepancies between the Arabic and 
the Israeli communities in Jerusalem.  Where the first suffer from profound shortage of 
institutional and community services as well as proper and adequate infrastructure, while 
the latter experiences well established level of these services and advanced infrastructure. 
Figures 5.110 – 5.111 show these discrepancies for the discussed localities. 
 
 
Figure157 .110: Percentage of the public areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher54) 
 
 
Figure158 .111: Percentage of the roads’ areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher54) 
                                                   
54 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15). 
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Eventually, the analysis of the land use categories for the Palestinian 
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem has shown that these plans reflect unsustainable pattern 
of development, the plans do include severe shortage of vital land use categories that are 
needed to guarantee sustainable social and economic life, see Figures 5.112 – 5.113. 
However, the Israeli planning policies showed special concern for the Jewish settlements 
in east Jerusalem and prepared well integrated urban plans for them. 
 
 
Figure159 .112: Percentage of the commercial areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher55) 
 
Figure1605.113: Percentage of the industrial areas in some Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods in EJ, (researcher55) 
                                                   
55 The researcher produced this figure based on analyzing the data presented in (Table 5.15). 
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5.7   Conclusion  
Since the first Israeli occupation of West Jerusalem in 1948, and the annexation of 
East Jerusalem in 1967, the Israeli planning policies and actions have targeted the 
Palestinian presence in the city. The determination to assert political sovereignty and 
demographic dominance over the eastern parts of the city have key impact upon the 
rational development of Jerusalem over and above the problems associated with rapid 
growth and modernization. In this concern, Israel continued imposing radical spatial facts 
over Jerusalem and changed the total area of Jerusalem extending its sovereignty over the 
city. According to the Israeli planning policies, Palestinians living in Jerusalem must be a 
minority, Israel assumed the right to evict and deport them out of the city in order to 
restrict Palestinian presence. At the same time, Israel confiscated and seized land and 
properties and built Jewish settlements that surround the Palestinian neighborhoods and 
prevent their future expansion. Moreover, Israel constructed the Separation Wall around 
East Jerusalem which severed the city from its demographic, geographic, and economic 
support base. Therefore, profound evidences of the influence of the Israeli political 
decision-making upon the creation of ethnic related regions and settlements in Jerusalem 
were demonstrated, and the rule of power and politics in shaping the city space and 
producing what the researcher conceptualizes as “political architecture” was 
outstandingly proven.  
 It has been shown that urban planning in Jerusalem consists of two contradictory 
approaches: progressive planning in West Jerusalem which serves the current and future 
needs of the Jewish Israeli residents; and regressive planning in East Jerusalem which 
hinders the current and the future development of the Palestinian residents. As such, 
deliberate and discriminatory actions against the Palestinian population continue. 
Planning in Jerusalem, therefore, is inequitable, implicitly biased and reflects not what it 
promises to be. It is used as a tool of control over the native Palestinian residents, rather 
than a tool of positive change. Control in this research paper means increasing the Jewish 
demography in Jerusalem over Palestinians making them a majority in order to Israelize 
Jerusalem, neglecting its original Arabic roots, as well as, restraining the Palestinians 
future development. Israel succeeded to impose new geographical, demographical and 
physical facts on the ground. The planning laws and regulations, imposed by the Israelis, 
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have been designed to facilitate the process of expropriating Palestinian lands to be used 
for Israeli settlements, obstruct the growth and development of the Palestinian 
neighborhoods. Most of the vacant spaces in the Palestinian neighborhoods are frozen 
through the current Israeli zoning laws, since most of these lands are designated as open 
landscapes where development is prevented and no construction is allowed. These zones 
are conceptualized by the researcher as ‘green spaces of risk’; a risk that generates 
unsecured feelings to the Palestinians who see their vacant lands available but they 
cannot make use of them. Instead, Israel expropriates these open landscapes for the 
benefit of establishing or expanding more Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem, and 
therefore, Palestinians suffer in consequence. On the other hand, there is no counteractive 
practical strategic program performed to create reversed results turn to the benefit of the 
Palestinians. 
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Chapter Six 
Epilogue 
“Life: It is better not to wrap philosophy around such an inconceivable evolving beautiful mystery. If based 
on perception, alone; whatever the conclusion - it is still guessing” 
T.F. Hodge  
HE epilogue is a concluding part of this doctoral research, it is formulated to 
provide a closing review of what has been discussed, conceptualized and tackled 
in this dissertation. This chapter is presented with an analytical elaboration given 
by the researcher; it is divided into two main parts: the first is a ‘general summary’ 
of the research’s findings and arguments; while the other part provides ‘an outlook and 
future spatial scenarios’ for the geopolitical spatial context of Jerusalem. Therefore, the 
epilogue is an instructive chapter which highlights and envisions the overall situation of 
the case study from spatial planning perspective. 
 
6.1   Concluding Summary  
East Jerusalem hardly is a standing city yet, but the future will examine its 
existence to the extreme limits. Political turbulences and urban instability were not the 
only provident challenges that have faced the researcher to conduct this doctoral research; 
but also words and phrases set up sophisticated battle that obliged the researcher to seek 
deeply catching the best terminologies and the most convenient expressions describing 
the complex spatial situation of the case study (Jerusalem) which this doctorate 
dissertation presents objectively. The research presents comprehensive set of relations 
namely (space, politics, power and planning) based upon theoretical framework; these are 
interestingly elaborated and conceptualized within referenced spatial contexts in 
Jerusalem (East and West). The direct and implicit role and impacts of these relations 
were examined. It has been shown that power and politics are the major planning drivers 
which set out the development pattern and objectives. Consequently, the spatial and 
T 
 225 
 
social profiles of Jerusalem were changing very fast producing new norms of urban 
fabrics and geographical extents which all together constitute manifold challenges to the 
indigenous Palestinian residents (the Jerusalemites). Figure 6.1 shows schematically the 
impacts of the major parameters (politics, power, and planning) and the respective major 
four phases in which Jerusalem (space) passed through under different ruling powers 
discussed in this dissertation.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure161 .1: The influence of ‘politics’, ‘power’, and ‘planning’ upon the spatial development in Jerusalem, (researcher) 
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The previous figure shows that the relation between power, politics and time (in the 
case of Jerusalem) is proportional; as time passes through, the spatial status of Jerusalem 
becomes more complex. Jerusalem experienced five administrative systems with less 
than five decades; this by itself was a major factor to enrich the planning history of 
Jerusalem. Consequently, Jerusalem went through various socio physical transformations, 
namely, historical old city, urbanized city, divided city, and finally it becomes polarized 
city which is implicitly divided and explicitly fragmented ethnically. A polarized 
contested city is a city in which groups from multiethnic origins live under the regime of 
one dominant ethnic group. This kind of cities usually enhances the willingness of unjust 
development and instability, as well as consist a host of urban conflict and tension. In 
Jerusalem, urban policies play an important role in achieving political goals, and thus 
altering the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, and also re-shaping the distribution of 
socio-economic benefits. Therefore, planning functions in this case (East Jerusalem) as a 
regressive tool utilized by the dominant group (Israelis) over weaker group (Palestinians). 
Hence, the Israeli ‘power’ and ‘politics’ enhance using what the researcher 
conceptualizes as ‘imperfect planning’ against the native Palestinians, in which planning 
becomes as a “control tool” instead of “reforming tool” principally upon weaker ethnic 
minorities. Furthermore, the ideology of the regime intensifies urban instability in 
Jerusalem; the sacred spatial context of the historical centre in Jerusalem for both the 
Israelis (Jews) and the Palestinians (Muslims and Christians) aggravates the problem, 
standing upon religious viewpoints. 
Eventually, Jerusalem (East and West) is politically unified by one municipal 
boundary; however, the planning system is not serving that (proposed) spatial unity of 
Jerusalem, it rather supports a divergent mode of amalgamation between the western and 
eastern parts of the city. Meanwhile, the Israeli planning paradigm is not characterizing 
both identities of these two spatial entities (EJ and WJ) allowing the experience of both 
individually, it rather enhances the characteristics (socio-physical) of the dominant group 
(Jews in WJ and in EJ settlements), but neglects and even eliminates these for the weaker 
groups (Palestinians in EJ). Consequently, spatial planning in Jerusalem does reflect two 
paradoxical approaches: the first is a ‘progressive planning paradigm’ that serves the 
dominant group in Jerusalem (Israeli Jews living in WJ and in EJ settlements), and 
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applies under the normative planning principles which aim at improve the living 
conditions and reduce the ills of urbanization. The second is a ‘regressive planning 
paradigm’ that restrains the development of the native but weaker group in Jerusalem 
(Palestinian living in EJ), as well as threatens their future existence and cultural identity.  
The paradoxical planning regime in Jerusalem has strongly affected the spatial 
layouts (built up areas) in both sectors of the city (eastern and western), in each split case, 
the layouts reflect contradiction of what a unified city space is supposed to mean. In the 
case of the dominant groups’ areas, the space is undertaking fast modernization steps 
with large scale infrastructure and housing projects introducing in the same time high 
technologies and state of the art urban design elements. On the other hand, in the case of 
the weaker groups’ areas, the space is almost frozen (i.e. growth and expansion is very 
limited), the infrastructure is extremely deteriorated and the overall urban fabric is shifted 
towards rural and even slum-style contexts. Indeed, this doctoral research has shown that 
these restrained and un-modernized spatial layouts of the Palestinian neighborhoods in 
East Jerusalem are imposed and preserved by the Israeli planning policies. Therefore, the 
researcher named the physical layouts being produced under the Israeli planning policies 
in East Jerusalem as contextual fabric of ‘political architecture’; furthermore, the 
researcher conceptualized the contradictory status between the areas of the dominant and 
weaker groups as: ‘secured spaces, or spaces of life’ and ‘spaces of risks’ for each group 
respectively which produce collectively unbalanced space in Jerusalem, see (Figure 6.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure162 .2: Unbalanced space in Jerusalem - conceptualizing of the research hypothesis, (researcher) 
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6.2   Outlook for Jerusalem 
Social reform and spatial sustainability are amongst the prominent challenging 
criteria considered during the process of spatial planning in the conflict areas where cities 
suffer from ‘deeply divided’ socio-spatial characteristics. Jerusalem is a metropolis that 
represents high intensive case in which urban conflicts are outlined through cultural, 
social, religious, ideological, ethnic, political and geopolitical ‘one-sided’ urban policies. 
The future definition of East Jerusalem has met profound interest after the recent political 
turbulences between the Palestinians and the Israelis; and new arguments about the Israeli 
colonialism against occupied Jerusalem arise. For instance, pertinent concepts of 
ethnocracy, de-palestiniazation, targeting the social fabric, all together underline and 
expose the hegemonic effects of Israeli colonialism on ethnographic, demographic, 
social, and spatial dimensions of Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem, respectively. 
Therefore, visioning Jerusalem is a crucial issue in which the Palestine people can 
propose their aspects of hope for their future capital.  
The Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem have paved the road of success for the 
governing regime to achieve deeply designed objectives which (in total) left deep-rooted 
facts on the ground. These include physical changes and socioeconomic features which 
led into new demographic engineering (battle) and cultural struggle inside the city. As 
such, deliberate and prejudiced actions against the Palestinian people continue. Planning 
in Jerusalem, is therefore, inequitable, implicitly biased and reflects not what it promises 
to be; Palestinians suffer in consequence. On the other hand, there is no counter strategic 
plan to generate reversed (balanced) results turn to the benefit of the Palestinians. Indeed, 
dealing with all the spatial contexts and planning parameters in Jerusalem highlight the 
endless assumptions that may arise during exploring the future status of Jerusalem. 
However, the more difficulties shall arise when dealing with the future scenarios of East 
Jerusalem, especially when considering it as a Palestinian capital city. With all the 
challenges driven into Jerusalem, the city still occupies very central geopolitical status 
(Fig. 6.3) which attracts more attention from planners, politicians, historians and 
geographers. Future is thus best simulated by scenarios as Mackinnon states: 
"Thinking through [scenario] stories, and talking in depth about their implications, 
brings each person’s unspoken assumptions about the future to the surface. Scenarios are 
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thus the most powerful vehicles I know for challenging our “mental models” about the 
world and lifting the “blinders” that limit our creativity and resourcefulness" (Lauchlan 
Mackinnon’s Quotation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure163 .3: Geopolitical centrality of Jerusalem on the local, district, regional, national and territorial scales, (researcher) 
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Recently, specifically in the last year of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) through the Palestinian President’s Office and 
the specialized unit for Jerusalem identified after deep study the vision statement for East 
Jerusalem as a future Palestinian capital, stating: 
“Jerusalem is an Arab and international city with a Palestinian identity. Palestinians 
take pride in Jerusalem’s central historical, cultural, religious, and spiritual significance 
for the three monotheistic religions. Jerusalem is a vibrant city that contributes to human 
development and local, Arab, and international civil and cultural diversity. Jerusalem is 
an ideal city to live in, work in, and invest in because of its possession of unique and 
sustainable economic, social, health, cultural, touristic, and recreational attributes that 
befit its status as the capital of the future State of Palestine.” (Jerusalem Unit, 2010:32) 
This “vision” identifies Jerusalem in different regional contexts within different 
social, political and economic settings. Standing upon the theoretical and scientific 
definition of the vision, makes it clear that, a 'vision' is an outlook for a 'desired future' 
status. Utterly, a vision is therefore an optimistic, coherent, emotionally appealing and 
convincing statement about a desired “future-oriented” outcome; and in this case, it is an 
articulation of the way to live peacefully and equitably in Jerusalem. Indeed, this vision 
requires combining elements of various ideas and practices together, drawing connections 
that cross boundaries, linking concepts from one regime or culture with those from 
another. Albert Einstein called this process a “combinatorial play” and conceived it as 
foundational for creative thinking (Dyer et. al, 2011). A comprehensive and ideal vision 
should therefore be composed of two vital parts: the visible part, that can be observed and 
felt (such as: places, objects, etc.); and the invisible part (such as: political, cultural and 
social aspects) which make the visible part possible and applicable. 
The researcher envisions the future of Jerusalem as a livable, equitable and a free 
standing capital for two states, the State of the Israel, and the “future” State of Palestine. 
Jerusalem will be a smoothly accessible city for both nations, i.e. the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, as well as, it will be an attractive global city for all visitors throughout the 
world. It will be a city of peace, diversity, equality, prosperity and economic 
sustainability, tourism and cultural centres, a linking city on the territorial and 
international levels.  The following text in the next section of this doctoral research 
draws interestingly some future scenarios for the question of Jerusalem as a capital city of 
the two aforementioned states. 
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6.3   Spatial Scenarios for Jerusalem 
Standing upon the very unique historical, religious, and political backgrounds in 
Jerusalem, the future of this changing city becomes more attractive in terms of scenario 
planning viewpoints. But definitely, with very complex set of assumptions and premises. 
Considering the manifold dimensions currently conceived within Jerusalem spaces, 
makes it very difficult to answer questions about the future status of the city and its 
residents. For instance, if peace agreement settles between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, what will happen to Jerusalem spatial and social contexts? What could happen if 
peace continues to fade away? Is there any possibility to have a just administration for 
Jerusalem with the coexistence of both: the Israelis and Palestinians? Indeed, such 
questions among many others could not have clear answers, but instead, could have more 
likely assumptions when answered, jointly, by shared understanding and outlook between 
the Israelis and the Palestinians. Although discussing officially the final status and the 
future of Jerusalem have been postponed ever since the beginning of the peace process in 
1993, some Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals shared common ideas regarding the future 
of this sacred city. 
Among the first Israelis who introduced scenarios for the future of Jerusalem is 
Meron Benvenisti
56
; these scenarios could be concluded as: Jerusalem undivided capital 
of a single geopolitical unit; Jerusalem a divided capital to two separate geopolitical 
units; and Jerusalem as a distinct geopolitical enclave. Other interesting scenarios were 
addressed by Naomi Chazan
57
 included: Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty with full 
autonomy to Palestinians; Jerusalem with split sovereignty; and Jerusalem under shared 
sovereignty. Moshe Ma'oz
58
 on the other hand, believed that Jerusalem should remain 
undivided and should serve as a capital of two states: the State of Israel in West 
Jerusalem and the State of Palestine in East Jerusalem. Differently, Manuel Hassassian
59
 
suggested that the only solution for the question of Jerusalem is to integrate communities 
that hold Jerusalem sacred for one reason or another by a joint sovereignty approach, 
which fosters integration, as well as separation (Najjar, 2007 c). 
                                                   
56 Former deputy mayor of Jerusalem 1971 to 1978. 
57 A former member of the Israeli Knesset from the Meretz Party between 1969 and 1974. 
58  An Israeli professor in history in the Middle East. 
59 Executive Vice President of Bethlehem University. 
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Another remarkable scenarios that were developed jointly by an Israeli and 
Palestinian research group during the last decade, were published in two different books, 
the first was published in 2005, entitled as: “Jerusalem in the Future: Scenarios and a 
Shared Vision
60”; and the other was published in 2007, entitled as: “Successful 
Jerusalem: Vision, Scenarios and Strategies
61”. The second book is an advanced version 
of the first one; it is more comprehensive and provides five different scenarios for the 
future of Jerusalem, while the first book provides only four. However, both of these 
books did not illustrate the scenarios by plans or maps, even schematically, but used 
flowcharts which were rather generic, more vision oriented and narrative. The five 
scenarios introduced by the research group are: the besieged city; the scorched earth; the 
bi-national city; the hybrid city; and the city of bridges. The first scenario presents the 
continuation of the status quo, while the second is considered the worst case scenario 
which represents more complex situation of the conflict between Palestinians and the 
Israelis. The other two scenarios are considered as translational scenarios into peace 
situation, while the last scenario is the best case scenario for full peace agreement and 
final settlement for all the struggles between the Palestinians and the Israelis. 
Given that scenarios and visions, in general, do not characterize absolute truths or 
generate determined outputs solely; it becomes essential to understand and even to 
outline some of the scenarios for "what is best" to Jerusalem in terms of both national 
affiliation to its inhabitants, i.e. the Israeli Jewish population, and the Palestinian Arab 
population. Hence, the scenarios shall simulate the basic factors which will affect the city 
and represent the respective spatial dynamics of the city. The researcher identifies four 
different possible city spatial scenarios’ dynamics for Jerusalem geopolitical context as 
shown in Figure 6.4. Basically, the city dynamics is correlated into four major spatial 
axes; namely: the urban stability (depending upon the peace process and political 
negotiations); the urban instability (conflict); the physical fragmentation; and finally the 
sustainability. Based upon the relational combination between these spatial axes, another 
four spatial scenarios are generated; specifically: social degradation (the worst case), 
                                                   
60 International Peace and Cooperation Centre (IPCC), 2005, Jerusalem in the Future: Scenarios and a Shared Vision. 
Jerusalem. 
61 International Peace and Cooperation Centre (IPCC), 2007, Successful Jerusalem: Vision, Scenarios and Strategies. 
Jerusalem. 
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conflict management and conflict transformations (intermediate stages), and eventually 
social integration (best case) under shared vision.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure164 .4: Jerusalem city’s different spatial scenarios' dynamics, (researcher) 
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Moving into urban stability and enhancing the socio-physical spatial contexts in 
Jerusalem shall depend ultimately on, conceiving, and integrating, the following spatial 
units (places) which are parts of Jerusalem (the space), namely: the Israeli neighborhoods 
in West Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, the Palestinian 
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the Old City, the vacant lands in West Jerusalem, and 
the vacant lands in East Jerusalem. Integrating these spatial units “the conceived places in 
Jerusalem” will make it more possible to generate ideal spatial unit “the Jerusalem 
space”; and therefore, Jerusalem space (the total) shall get its spatial definition via the 
sum of places (the parts). As such the dialectical spatial understanding between, 'places' 
and 'space', applies ideally. Understanding the very changing nature of relations, and the 
complexity of predicting “probable future interactions” between these relations, for the 
case of Jerusalem, does outstandingly touch the dialectical ‘philosophy’, and even its 
foundational base - the ‘contradiction’, e.g. (stability vs. instability), which addresses 
interestingly the question of change. Consequently, proposing future spatial scenarios for 
Jerusalem shall, utterly, comply with the dialectical mode of argumentation. Figure 6.5 
illustrates the dialectical property in Jerusalem space. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure165 .5: The dialectical characteristic of Jerusalem spatial definition, (researcher) 
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Recalling the major invisible parts in Jerusalem, i.e. planning, power, and politics, 
as well as the influential effects of these elements upon the visible parts in Jerusalem, 
reveals the very ‘contradictory’ and even the “conflictual” nature of the existing spatial 
contexts in Jerusalem as shown in Figure 6.6. This case does generate an ‘unbalanced 
space’, and therefore, it does again clearly emphasize the cornerstone in dialectics, which 
is, contradiction. Accordingly, taking into account the political, social, economic, urban, 
cultural, religious and psycho-social constraints and opportunities in analyzing the 
existing situation in Jerusalem, or even understanding or forecasting the final status of 
this complex space, is not as easy as, in other non-contradictory spaces. Therefore, the 
researcher in the following text shall not merely focus on the 'end situations' in 
Jerusalem; bur rather shall concentrate on developing viable scenarios for living towards 
a better future in Jerusalem, as well as, discussing the perpetuation of the status quo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure166 .6: The dialectical (contradictory) nature of Jerusalem space, (researcher) 
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Jerusalem from the West Bank via the separation wall. The illegal Israeli occupation to 
East Jerusalem continues unchanged; the features of political architecture in the city will 
be magnificently increased, and more security features will be imposed over the eastern 
part of the city.  The only Israeli municipality will continue to exist and the planning 
policies will not allow any kind of social or physical integration between the Israeli and 
Palestinian communities, but strictly will deepen the fragmentation of the Palestinians 
urban and social fabric. East Jerusalem will not be able to cope with the needs of the 
Palestinian population, and thus, many Jerusalemites will be obliged to search for other 
living spaces outside the city. On the contrary, Jewish settlements in the eastern part will 
continue to expand, while the Arabic neighborhood shall continue to shrink. Hence, the 
Israeli (Jewish) population shall present the overwhelming majority. Accordingly, the 
Palestinian community and identity will be very vulnerable and minimal respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure167 .7: Scenario one: Segregated Jerusalem (presenting both the status quo and the worst case), (researcher) 
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6.3.2   Scenario Two: Jerusalem Twin City  
The “twin city” scenario presents the best case scenario where ultimate and 
permanent peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians will be reached. 
Jerusalem will be divided into three major parts; namely: West Jerusalem, Central 
Jerusalem, and East Jerusalem. Consequently, fixed and determined political borders for 
each part of the city become internationally recognized. West Jerusalem shall be the 
Israeli self-standing capital, it shall be under complete Israeli sovereignty and control, an 
independent Israeli municipality will be responsible for the municipal boundaries of this 
capital and shall have the complete power and authority to manage the planning system 
and all other ordinary municipal services there; in addition, the residents of this capital 
shall be Israelis, while the Jewish identity will be spatially provident throughout the city 
space. Equivalently, East Jerusalem shall be the Palestinian independent capital, it shall 
be under complete Palestinian sovereignty and control, and all the Israeli settlements 
there will be evacuated and re-inhabited by Palestinians. An independent Palestinian 
municipality will be established and shall be responsible for the municipal boundaries of 
this capital and shall have the complete power and authority to manage the planning 
system and the other ordinary municipal services there. In addition, the residents of this 
capital shall be Palestinians, while the Arabic identity will be spatially provident 
throughout the city space. 
On the other hand, Central Jerusalem which contains the Old City of Jerusalem and 
extends similarly from east to west and from north to south, shall be equally shared 
between Israel and Palestine, and will be shared between the Palestinian community and 
the Israeli society. This major part of Jerusalem shall be considered as a cross-border 
development zone where major cultural, commercial, educational utilities will be jointly 
shared. This zone will be a corridor of prosperity that will be administrated evenly by a 
joint council composed of official and popular representatives of each nation. This zone 
will be integrated with the shared-sphere which surrounds both of the external boundaries 
of the two capitals, and thus forming a total area under shared vision which consists 
outline of the twin capitals and enhancing therefore a shared vision of Grand Jerusalem. 
The schematic outline plan of this scenario is shown in Figure 6.8  
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Figure168 .8: Scenario two: Jerusalem The Twin City – schematic outline plan, (researcher) 
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Under this scenario, the one-sided control and occupation are justly replaced with 
political separation and functional integration of the city in the same time. Different two 
political systems with distinct political citizenships, i.e. Israeli and Palestinian, are 
uniquely shared under the umbrella of one urban affiliation, Grand Jerusalem. To achieve 
sustainable mode of development, harmony and cooperation, both of East and West 
Jerusalem municipalities shall coordinate to select representatives to be part of the district 
“Grand Jerusalem” planning council which will work on the general guidelines and 
visions to control growth under mutual benefits. Accordingly, both municipalities shall 
continue to work on and upgrade a joint general outline plan for Grand Jerusalem and 
integrate it under comprehensive master plans of the two cities. The plans shall introduce 
integrated land uses, utilize common infrastructure facilities, and avoid duplication of 
resources, utilities or services as much as possible. As such, Jerusalem will be an 
attractive and prosperous world capital, serving as a successful model for cross-border 
cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians. 
6.3.3   Scenario Three: Jerusalem Open City  
This scenario represents the ‘conflict transformation’ stage (shown previously in 
Fig. 6.4). In this scenario, according to interim peace agreement
62
, Jerusalem will be 
divided into three major parts; namely:  West Jerusalem, Central Jerusalem, and East 
Jerusalem. However, the final political borders of West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem are 
not fixed, and still subject for negotiations, meanwhile peace process is being supported 
by both, the Palestinians and the Israelis, and each of the contested groups has positive 
understanding for the mutual need of the final peace agreement. Therefore, the 
international community will take major role in facilitating the final status agreement, 
and will also be involved in administrating the central part of Jerusalem until reaching 
fixed political borders, and the two capitals become internationally recognized. Under 
this ‘translational’ stage, the city of Jerusalem will work as an open city; smooth, safe 
and efficient accessibility from both sides of the eastern and western directions into the 
central part of Jerusalem and the Old City is always available for both nations, the Israelis 
and the Palestinians without restrictions as shown in Figure 6.9. 
                                                   
62 This ‘interim’ agreement is not limited to specific validity date, it is unlimited in timeframe but quarterly meetings 
are usually held between the two official representative negotiations committees  
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Figure169 .9: Scenario three: Jerusalem The Open City – schematic outline plan, (researcher) 
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Since the final border lines are not fixed yet, the international community will take 
the responsibility of administrating the “buffer zone, and the sacred area” between East 
Jerusalem and West Jerusalem, i.e. Central Jerusalem which will be entitled as an 
‘international enclave’. This administration will make it possible for equitable and safe 
living, as well as, just sharing of the city most holy places and vital economic centres. 
However, each community will make sure to watch and supervise the adjacent 
boundaries between the international enclave and the respective inner area, i.e. the 
“outer” eastern border of the international enclave will be supervised by the Palestinians; 
and equivalently, the “outer” western border of the international enclave will be 
supervised by the Israelis. Still, the security issues and administrative tasks will be totally 
conducted by the international community for both sides of the borders.  
Two split and independent municipalities will be established; the first is an Israeli 
municipality in West Jerusalem and the other is a Palestinian municipality in East 
Jerusalem. Meanwhile, a special service council will be established for Central Jerusalem 
which will act on behalf of ‘municipality’. West Jerusalem will be the Israeli self-
standing capital, it shall be under complete Israeli sovereignty and control, the Israeli 
municipality will be responsible for the municipal services there and shall coordinate 
with the international community (through the special service council) pertaining to the 
final boundaries of this capital, however it shall have complete power and authority to 
manage the planning system there. Likewise, East Jerusalem will be the Palestinian 
capital, it shall be under complete Palestinian sovereignty and control, the Palestinian 
municipality will be responsible for the municipal services there and shall coordinate 
with the international community (through the special service council) pertaining to the 
final boundaries of this capital, however it shall have complete power and authority to 
manage the planning system there.  
All the Israeli settlers living in Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem will be 
redistributed into West Jerusalem, and the separation wall between the Palestinian 
neighborhoods will be removed. The international enclave in Central Jerusalem with its 
heterogeneous population will make Jerusalem more competitive internationally, and 
even, more globally appealing city. On the one hand, in West Jerusalem, the Jewish 
identity will be spatially provident; however, negative migration from West Jerusalem to 
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other Israeli coastal cities is expected due to the “unusual” feeling some Israelis will have 
as a result of the coexistence of two ethnically and culturally different communities, the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, as well as, as of the easy accessibility between the two 
capitals. On the other hand, in East Jerusalem the Arabic features will be spatially 
provident and high rates of internal immigration from other Palestinian cities into East 
Jerusalem are expected due to spiritual ties with the city.  
6.3.4   Scenario Four: Jerusalem Bi-National City  
This scenario represents the ‘conflict management’ stage (shown previously in   
Fig. 6.4). In this scenario, according to provisional peace agreement
63
, Jerusalem will be 
a united city, but implicitly divided into three various peripheries; that is West Jerusalem, 
East Jerusalem, and the Old City will be dissolved within ‘heterogeneous’ and demarked 
shared space. Specifically, Jerusalem will be outlined by three outstanding zones; 
namely: the inner periphery, the internal periphery, and the external periphery as shown 
in Figure 6.10. However, each of these peripheries’ national affiliation is highly 
correlated with the radial distance from the city centre and with the east and west 
directions. The provisional peace agreement for this scenario proposes areas with “pure” 
national affiliation for each community, and other areas with “mixed” national affiliation, 
i.e. coexistence of Palestinians and Israelis. Therefore, and according to the historical and 
religious significance of the Old City for both communities, the inner periphery (which 
includes the historical centre and its suburbs) is divided into two parts, eastern and 
western. The western part extends from north to west and south, it will include ‘Israeli-
only’ neighborhoods, and the Jewish character will be provident spatially inside this part, 
and therefore this part will represent a Jewish-only community; however, Palestinians 
from the other parts of the city will be able to visit this Jewish part, but will not have the 
right to reside or run business there. Similarly, the eastern part extends from north to east 
and south, it will include ‘Palestinian-only’ neighborhoods, and the Arabic character will 
be provident spatially inside this part. Consequently this part will represent a Palestinian-
only community; however, Israelis from the other parts of the city will be able to visit 
this Palestinian part, but will not have the right to reside or run business there. 
                                                   
63 This ‘provisional’ agreement is not limited to specific validity date, it is unlimited in timeframe but scheduled two-
annual meetings are usually held between the two official representative negotiations committees.  
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Figure1706.10: Scenario four: Jerusalem The Bi-National City – schematic outline plan, (researcher) 
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The next zone is the internal periphery, this zone will include both communities 
distributed almost evenly all around this periphery, i.e. Israelis and Palestinians will share 
this space openly, Israelis living in settlements in East Jerusalem will be redistributed, 
some will remain in their settlements, while the others, will be transferred into Jewish 
neighborhoods in the western parts and Palestinians will re-inhabit their evacuated places. 
Inside this periphery of the city, spaces will be re-identified to get more normalization 
and balance between the Israeli and the Palestinian communities, so colonial and random 
development will be guided to match smoothly midway.  Both Israelis and Palestinians 
will have right to reside and invest freely. Finally, the external periphery is the ‘outer’ 
part of the city, and therefore, each community will be more provident with the organic 
direction of its existence, i.e. Israeli neighborhoods will be majority in the western side of 
this zone and Palestinians will be minority. Whereas, Palestinian neighborhoods will be 
majority in the eastern side of this zone and Israelis will be minority. Access and 
movement will be freely provided for both nations, and the rights to reside and invest are 
equally shared too. Eventually, to administer the ‘municipal’ boundaries of the city, a 
City Hall will be established instead of the municipality, and will be shared by official 
staff of both communities, as well as the city councilors will be composed from 
Palestinians and Israelis, and will be elected democratically by both communities; while 
the mayor will be periodically
64
 changed to represent both national affiliations evenly. 
Under this ‘translational’ stage, the city of Jerusalem will work as equitable shared space; 
where smooth, safe and efficient accessibility throughout the eastern and western 
directions into the central part of Jerusalem and the Old City is always available for both 
nations, the Israelis and the Palestinians without restrictions. 
6.4   Conclusion 
The case in which a city is ‘politically united’, but ‘physically divided’, and even, 
‘socially fragmented’, is outstandingly presented in Jerusalem.  It might be needless to 
merely explore literature in order to reveal what “challenges” the city of Jerusalem 
                                                   
64 The elections will normally take place each four years, therefore, the mayor will be for the first two years one of the 
Israeli councilors, and then for the other remaining two years, the mayor will be one of the Palestinian councilors, and 
vice versa for the next city hall election round, i.e. starting with Palestinian mayor and shifting into Israeli mayor. 
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imposes over its ‘eastern’ part, more particularly, over its ‘Palestinian’ residents. Instead, 
a single tour in the city shall astonishingly demonstrate that. Therefore, it could be argued 
that Jerusalem urban landscape is the “best historian” that not only portrays the 
challenges and difficulties which the city indigenous residents face, but also outlines 
changes and socio-physical transformations chronologically. The landscape will also 
highlight spatially the two contradictory spheres in Jerusalem; that is, places where 
Jewish communities live in, and places where Arabic communities live in respectively. 
This contradiction in the physical structures, urban fabrics and social textures in 
Jerusalem was shown to be, deliberately guided, by the Israeli planning policies. Planning 
in this context, is conceived as a ‘regressive’ tool of change instead of being a 
‘reformative’ tool of change; that is, planning has been used as a control tool over the 
Palestinian population in East Jerusalem. In spite of the very complex geopolitical 
situation on the ground of Jerusalem, the researcher explores and develops various spatial 
scenarios questioning therefore the ‘future’ of Jerusalem. Accordingly, four different 
scenarios have been elaborated, standing upon the status quo and moving forward into 
more stable and desired future status in Jerusalem. As such, the power of ‘reformative’ 
planning (planning as a mean of positive change) to achieve more urban justice and 
stability for the manifold and heterogeneous cultural, ethnic, social, and spatial 
backgrounds in Jerusalem has been highlighted. However, these scenarios (other than the 
worst case) are still considered “evolutionary initiatives” for prospective ‘positive 
change’ and presented schematically in the form of ideas and outlines; consequently, 
comprehensive multicriteria analysis and strategies are required before applying the 
respective scenario planning model on a real situation on the ground.  
 
 
 
The End 
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